On his website, Arminian Perspectives, Ben Henshaw has a questions page at which he answers questions about Arminianism and Calvinism that visitors to his site pose in the comment section of the page. Here is a question from a man name Paul followed by Ben’s answer:
Question:
My understanding of the Calvinist perspective is that God will override our free will when necessary for his plan, but that this is not always the case. In Rom. 9, Paul seems to use the example of Pharaoh and the plagues in this way. Going back to Exodus, after the first few plagues, the text states Pharaoh hardened his heart. On the last plagues, God hardened Pharaoh’s heart. In the Exodus text, it’s as if Pharaoh initially chose to set a course on his own that fit God’s plan. For God to accomplish what he wanted, he hardened Pharaoh’s heart to help him finish that course. That has always been my understanding of how Calvinists view free will; it exists, but within the constraints of God’s higher purposes.
Here is my question. Do mainstream Calvinists specifically deny the existence of free will entirely? Could you point me to a few Calvinist sources that clearly deal with this?
Answer:
Many Calvinists say they believe in free will, but it is not what you would normally understand to be free will. Traditional Calvinism is very clear that God controls everything. That is what sovereignty means to Calvinists. If we could form a thought or move on a desire independent of God’s control, He would not be sovereign. Even further, Calvinists base God’s foreknowledge on His decree alone. So God can only foreknow what He decreed from eternity and will infallibly bring about in time. This obviously includes everything since Calvinists see foreknowledge as exhaustive. That can only be if the decree is likewise exhaustive. That means that even our every sinful thought, desire and action was irresistibly decreed by God so that we can no more avoid those thoughts, desires, and actions than we could make God cease to exist. That is why Calvinism is often charged with making God the author of sin.
Some Calvinists deny free will altogether without trying to make it still sound as if free will is real. All Calvinists deny libertarian free will (which includes real options, real choices, and alternative power in the will). Instead, they hold to “compatibilism.” Compatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. How can that be? They simply re-define free will. They say that one is free (and morally accountable) if one can do as they desire. But here is the catch. We have no control over our desires or which desire will win out in choosing. So really we do not have freedom of the will. Our will is controlled by the greatest desire, and we have no control over what desire will be the greatest. And in the end, God still controls everything, even in compatibilism.
If you read the post on Piper I referred you to [in previous discussion], you will see how this plays out. So no Calvinist believes that alternative power exists in the will. They believe that we choose in accordance with desires that we have no control over. Desires control us and God ultimately controls our desires, just as He controls everything else. No Calvinist holds to libertarian fee will, as it has come to be known. If you look at my post on choice that I referred you to [in previous discussion], that will help you as well.
In the end, Calvinists do not make free will compatible with determinism. That’s impossible. The concepts are mutually exclusive. A good example would be the difference between being married and being a bachelor. These terms, when rightly understood, are mutually exclusive. You can’t make them compatible. But if you re-define “married” to mean “single”, then Voila!, Bachelor and Married are now compatible. Or suppose you wanted to make a square compatible with a circle. Well, you could just carve away at the edges until the square became a circle. But would we then say that squares are compatible with circles? Of course not. Compatibilism is just a catchy term to give the impression that a real solution has been reached, when that is not the case at all. When you re-define freedom in a deterministic way, you do not make freedom compatible with determinism. All you do is prove that determinism is compatible with determinism, and who denies it?
My understanding of the Calvinist perspective is that God will override our free will when necessary for his plan, but that this is not always the case.
This is actually the Arminian view. In Calvinism, God is always controlling the will, so there is never any need to “override” it.
As far as sources, you can read from any Calvinist and see how they understand free will and how they deny it as normally understood, going all the way back to Calvin.
