Great example of early Engish Arminianism (1726). Bird explains total depravity, prevenient grace, unlimited atonement, conditional decrees, predestination and perserveriance as he examines some of the problems in Calvinism. He has mild appeals to middle…
Determinism
Robert Hamilton, “Does Arminianism Diminish God’s Glory?”
Does Arminianism Diminish God’s Glory? One charge often heard against Arminianism is that by allowing for human agency to play a significant role in the process of salvation, Arminians decrease the scope of God’s agency…
Norman Geisler, Entry on “Free Will” in the Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics
This article was take from http://www.johnankerberg.org/Articles/theological-dictionary/TD1100W3.htm
Free Will
by Dr. Norman Geisler
(from Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, Baker Books, 1999)
Concepts of the nature of human choice fall within three categories: determinism, indeterminism, and self-determinism. A determinist looks to actions caused by another, an indeterminist to uncaused actions, and a self-determinist to self-caused actions.
Determinism
There are two basic kinds of determinism: naturalistic and theistic. Naturalistic determinism is most readily identified with behavioral psychologist B. F. Skinner. Skinner held that all human behavior is determined by genetic and behavioral factors. Humans simply act according to what has been programmed into them.
Eric Landstrom, The General Theory of Relativity and the Nature of God Pokes Openness in the Eye
It is argued by proponents of Openness as well as Calvinists that claim Openness is the logical conclusion for Arminianism that in order for people to be free the future must be somehow open. Their argument claims that if God’s knowledge of future unactualized contingencies is perfectly known, then creaturely freedom is a farce and whether we like it or not, our Lord has effectively predestinated all of creation. Countering the argument Arminians point out that simply knowing for sure that a person will freely do something is not enough for God to control or predestinate the world. This is because foreknowledge of an event does not imply direct influence or omnicausality, or absolute determination, but merely knows what other wills are doing. In other words, foreknowledge doesn’t mean absolute determination. Yet a fine point should be sharpened at this time: God not only grasps and understands what actually will happen, but also what could happen under varied possible contingencies.
The Early Church and Calvinism
This is a detailed study of Calvinism in light of the earliest Christian writers (Ante-Nicene Church Fathers). It demonstrates that the primary features of Calvinism were not taught by the Ante-Nicene Fathers but were actually considered heretical by these early Christian writers (often connected to various forms of gnosticism). Numerous quotes from these Ante-Nicene writers are provided for the reader to carefully consider.
Getting Past Monergism to Helping a Perishing World
For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek: for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him. For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord…
Synergism as a Model for God’s Glory
Several common accusations we hear from Calvinists are that a Synergistic view of faith (as opposed to regeneration) ‘robs God of the glory;’ “It’s man-centered,” they say, “and gives man room to boast in saving…
J.C. Thibodaux, “Does Granville-Sharp’s Rule Indicate That ‘Foreknowledge’ is Synonymous With ‘Determinate Counsel’?”
A claim made by many Calvinist authors concerns the terms used in Acts 2:23, “Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and…
J.C. Thibodaux, “If Our Actions Are Inevitable, Do We Really Have Free Will?”
Calvinists reject the idea that God bases His divine election on His foreknowledge of people, as well as the idea that God has given men free will. One tactic used to refute these concepts is to try to confuse the issue:
“For example, before the foundation of the world, God knew that Joe would make a free decision to become a Christian. Somehow, then, before Joe was born, God knew of his free decision. So even at that time, Joe’s free decision must have been inevitable. Why was it inevitable? Not because of Joe’s free will, for Joe was not yet born. Not because of God’s predestination, because the Arminian denies that possibility from the outset. It would seem that the inevitability in question had some source other than either Joe or God.”
Excerpt From Apologetics to the Glory of God by John Frame pp. 44-45 (P & R Publishing)
Freedom of the Will (Part Three)
In his book Primitive Theology, John Gerstner, in the chapter entitled “A Primer on Free Will,” writes, “Dear reader, you have in your hands a booklet entitled A Primer on Free Will. I don’t know you, but I know a good deal about you. One thing I know is that you did not pick up this book of your own free will.
“You have picked it up and have started to read it, and now continue to read it, because you must do so. There is absolutely no possibility, you being the kind of person you are, that you would not be reading this book at this time.”1
So, at the outset today, let me also say to you, dear reader, I do not know you, but I do know some things about you. One thing I know is that you did in fact choose to visit this site of your own free will.
Freedom of the Will (Part Two)
In their book Why I am not an Arminian, Peterson and Williams writes, “That God sovereignly superintends and controls all things and that human beings are responsible for their choices and actions is repeatedly taught and demonstrated throughout the biblical record. God is sovereignly active in every moment.
“Yet that sovereign agency does not annul or limit human responsibility. Conversely, human agency is affirmed. We are not automatons. Human actions are not coerced or programmed at every moment by mysterious forces such that we wact contrary to our natures and desires. Yet this human freedom does not negate or limit God’s agency” (emphases mine).1
Freedom of the Will (Part One)
In his blogpost on The Absolute Sovereignty of God, John Piper recalls a time in seminary when his notion of free will was challenged. According to Piper, this experience was one of “two experiences in…
Critique of Edwards
This article is a brief critique of Jonathan Edwards’ views on the will and freedom. I won’t be presenting the alternative view, LFW, nor will I attempt to demonstrate the logical outcomes of Edwards’ view (i.e. God is the author of sin, God’s offer is insincere…). Instead I will just be looking at the internal consistency of Edwards’ view. I really think that the more people understand Edwards, the less they will agree with him.
Brief Outline of Edwards’ view of Freedom
Causeless Cause or Infinite Regression of Causes
Brief Outline of Edwards’ Arguments in Part II of Freedom of the Will
Edwards attacks LFW in two broad categories: causation and divine foreknowledge. Under causation, Edwards argues that LFW either leads to an infinite regression of causes or is an action without a cause. Edwards then argues that actions without causes are absurd because: 1) they would violate the common sense idea that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause, 2) then we wouldn’t be able to reason from cause to effect, 3) all proof of God’s existence is taken away, and 4) actions produced by a causeless cause would be both random and irrational, and therefore not a basis of moral accountability.
Infinite Regression of Causes or Causeless
Edwards on Impeccability and Hardening
In part 3, scections III.I, III.II, and III.III, Edwards argues against the link between LFW and responsibility by appealing to divine impeccability as well as judicial hardening. He argues if God cannot sin, and a…
Edwards’ Arguments against Libertarian Free Will Based on Divine Foreknowledge
In part 2 section 12, Edwards attempts three demonstrations of the incompatibility of LFW and God’s foreknowledge: 1) based on the connection between foreknowledge and the event, 2) based on the impossibility of knowing things without evidence and 3) based on knowing a contingent event with certainty.
The Connection between Foreknowledge and the Event
Edwards’ Argument:
P1: Things in the past are now necessary
P2: In the past, God infallibly foreknew our future choices
C1: therefore, God’s foreknowledge of our future choices is now necessary
P3: if something necessary is infallibly connected with something else, that something else is also necessary
P4: God’s necessary foreknowledge is infallibly connected with our future choices
C2: therefore, our future choices are necessary
My Response
Commands and Invitations for the Impossible
Outline of Edwards’ Arguments in Part III.IV Commands inconsistent with LFW God commands the acts of the will, not the acts of the body executing the will’s commands. If there’s a sequence of acts of…
Desire Isn’t Good Enough
Outline of Edwards’ arguments in part III.V Some falsely argue we can’t perform our spiritual duties, but desire these things, so they are excusable. This entails the contradiction that we are inclined and disinclined to…
Edwards on Habits
Background – LFW and responsibility
Under LFW, we are the causal source of our choices (i.e. nothing causally predetermines our choices); we are responsible for our choices. There’s nowhere else to go to. We can’t back track to something else – we are responsible. Under CFW, since our actions are causally predetermined, we can trace back the cause of our actions to something outside of us. Thus, we keep searching for the source of our actions to find out what’s ultimately responsible. When Calvinists say God is the ultimate source, we say they make God ultimately responsible for sin. Even if God establishes a system in which only secondary causes get punished and the primary cause does not (as Calvinists suppose), that doesn’t change the fact that God is ultimately responsible for sin. The issue isn’t one of God’s power or sovereignty, it’s a matter of His goodness and holiness.
Edwards on Responsibility
Outline of Edwards Arguments in part V.I Arminians say if something causally predetermines our choices, we are not responsible. But responsibility is not the cause of choices, it’s in the nature of choices If responsibility…
