Fatalism

The Lazy Man’s Guide to Refuting Edwards and Compatibilism

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Recently we posted a list of resources that refute Jonathan Edwards and Calvinistic compatibilism and defend genuine free will (http://evangelicalarminians.org/refuting-edwards-and-calvinist-compatibilism-and-arguments-against-genuine-free-will/). Some of them are pretty hefty. So if you would like to get to the…

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Interesting Links 11-01-09

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The Spokane Examiner has an article entitled: A Methodist’s Take on Predestination and Free Will. (HT: Wesley Wong) Richard Coords takes a look at a dissertation that explores the potential Gnostic influence on Augustine’s doctrine…

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Free Will and the Why of Creation

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Free Will and the Why of Creation

I am not a big fan of arguing for free will. In general, I think it is a given for the moral character of humanity. Even Calvinists postulate some degree of freedom through the concept of secondary agency to present some kind of intelligible concept of morality. So generally, we are debating what everyone seems to really accept when we look at it rationally. But a conversation prompted me to post the following.

An acquaintance was listening to a Youtube presentation by a popular Calvinist concerning God’s knowledge of the future and its relationship to sin and free will. The Calvinist posed the common question posed by many Calvinists, which I have paraphrased below.

    If, as Arminians believe, God infallibly knew exactly what was going to happen when he created, and knew that sin would occur as a result of his creation, then why did he create in the first place?

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Causeless Cause or Infinite Regression of Causes

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Brief Outline of Edwards’ Arguments in Part II of Freedom of the Will
Edwards attacks LFW in two broad categories: causation and divine foreknowledge. Under causation, Edwards argues that LFW either leads to an infinite regression of causes or is an action without a cause. Edwards then argues that actions without causes are absurd because: 1) they would violate the common sense idea that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause, 2) then we wouldn’t be able to reason from cause to effect, 3) all proof of God’s existence is taken away, and 4) actions produced by a causeless cause would be both random and irrational, and therefore not a basis of moral accountability.

Infinite Regression of Causes or Causeless

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Edwards on Responsibility

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Outline of Edwards Arguments in part V.I Arminians say if something causally predetermines our choices, we are not responsible. But responsibility is not the cause of choices, it’s in the nature of choices If responsibility…

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Thomas Ralston on Freedom of the Will Part 8: Can Free Agency be Harmonized With Divine Foreknowledge?

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Thomas Ralston now tackles the necessitarian objection that God’s foreknowledge of our actions renders the power of self-determination impossible. My comments are in bold print.

II. The next grand objection to the doctrine of free agency is, that it is supposed to be irreconcilable with the Scripture account of the divine prescience.

Necessitarians argue that free agency, in the proper sense, implies contingency; and that contingency cannot be reconciled with the divine foreknowledge. It is admitted by Arminians, and the advocates of free agency generally, that the foreknowledge of God extends to all things great and small, whether necessary or contingent – that it is perfect and certain.

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Thomas Ralston on Freedom of the Will Part 7: Is the Doctrine of Free Agency Absurd?

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Thomas Ralston now begins to examine and respond to various objections posed by “necessitarians” against the Arminian view of self-determinism. My comments are in bold print.

WE propose in this chapter, to examine some of the principal objections which have been urged against the view taken in the preceding chapter of the freedom of the will. Those most worthy of notice are the following, viz.:

I. It is said to be absurd in itself.

II. It is said to be irreconcilable with the Scripture account of the divine prescience.

III. It is said to conflict with the doctrine of motives.

We propose a respectful attention to each of these grand objections.

I. It is alleged that the view we have taken of the proper freedom of the will is absurd in itself.

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