is yet able, out of the infinite perfection of it, to act all that variety and diversity of action and effect which the creature is wont to act out of such affections, and by means of such organs or members respectively.

To come in to the particular in hand. The Scripture is wont to ascribe knowledge unto God, to inform the world, that what kind of contentment soever men reap, or receive, by means of any knowledge of things which they have, and that what regular use or advantage soever they make, or are capable of making in any kind of such knowledge, God receiveth the like contentment by, maketh, when and as he pleaseth, the same or the like use of the infinite perfection of his nature or being. For example: men of knowledge and of understanding, so far as their knowledge extendeth, are free from errors, mistakes, and other inconveniences, in reference to the things known, whereunto men that are ignorant are exposed. Again, men that have knowledge of things are hereby, according to the measure and extent of this knowledge, enabled to manage and order their affairs to their best advantage, either in a way of profit, or of repute and honour; yea, and being otherwise furnished with opportunity and means for such a purpose, to communicate and impart the same light of knowledge unto others, which shineth in and to themselves. In like manner knowledge, yea, the "knowledge of all things," I John iii. 20, is in Scripture asserted unto God, not because he knoweth them after the same specifical manner, or upon the same specifical terms, upon which men know or understand the things known by them, (for as "the Lord seeth not as man seeth," 1 Sam. xvi. 7, so neither doth he know as man knoweth,) but because, from and by means of the infinite perfection of his nature, 1. He enjoyeth himself with a scientifical contentment; (I mean, with such a kind of contentment as knowing men enjoy, or might enjoy, by means of their knowledge;) and, 2. Because by the same means he is enabled to manage, order, and dispose of all things, to the best advantage and improvement for his own glory, and for what other end besides he pleaseth; and, 3, and lastly, Because he hath an opportunity also thereby to impart the knowledge of what things soever he pleaseth, unto his creature.

By what hath been said, it is no matter of difficulty either to conceive or to declare in what sense, or upon what ground, one or more, the Scriptures attribute prescience also, or foreknowledge, unto God. For look what regular conveniency, opportunity, or advantage in any kind, the foreknowledge of things in men affordeth unto them, the like doth the infinite perfection of the Divine nature exhibit and afford unto him. Men who have the certain foreknowledge that such and such things will come to pass at such or such a time, if they any ways relate unto them, or be capable of being wrought to such a relation, besides the inward contentment of such knowledge, have an opportunity thereby, not only of making known beforehand unto their friends or others, that at such a time such things
will come to pass (for this they may do, whether the things fore-
known do any ways concern them or no), and by this means gain
the repute of being prophetic, or otherwise very understanding
and discerning men; but also of contriving and ordering other
things in the meantime so and after such a manner, that the things
foreknown, when they come to pass, shall come to pass with
more conveniency or advantage unto them, than otherwise they could
done. Upon such considerations as these, the foreknowledge
of things, yea of all things that are future, is by the Scriptures
ascribed unto God; viz. because through the infinite perfection
of his essence and being, he, 1. Enjoys a delight or contentment
swerable to that of foreknowing men, by means of this their know-
ledge. 2. He is able to impart beforehand at what distance of
time he pleaseth, either to his saints (his friends) or others, such
particularities of what is hid in the womb of time, as himself
judgeth meet to be upon such terms as these revealed; 3, and
lastly, He is able also providentially to dispose of all such things to
the best advantage, both for his own glory, and the benefit of those
who shall be found worthy of this great interest in him.

From the rule that hath been given, and the explication made
according thereunto, for a right understanding how and in what
sense, and upon what grounds, both knowledge and foreknowledge
are in Scripture transferred unto God, a clear light shineth whereby
to discover how, and upon what grounds also, desires, purposes, in-
tentions, or decrees in one kind or other, are by the same autho-
rity vested in God, as likewise how they differ both from his know-
ledge and foreknowledge. That desires, intentions, purposes, and
decrees, as well as knowledge, or foreknowledge, are only anthropo-
pathetically ascribed unto God, not formally, the former part of
this chapter, I presume, hath given the tantamount of many
demonstrations. So that clearly and distinctly to understand, how,
and in what sense they are in Scripture attributed unto him, in-
quiry must be made, and consideration had, how they are wont to
affect or engage men; after what manner, and upon what terms
are usually acted and drawn forth by them. Only before we come
to the explication hereof, this is to be remembered by way of cau-
tion, that though there always be, as hath been said, a ground or
reason, one or more, for that attribution of human actions, affections,
members, &c. which the Scriptures so frequently make unto
God, which reason is still founded in a certain proportion or similitude
found between the nature of God and the nature of man, in respect
of the things so attributed unto him, yet is it not necessary that
all things accompanying, or relating unto these affections or impres-
sions in men, which are attributed unto God, should be paralleled
in him, or have something in his nature corresponding to

* Similitudo non currit quatuor pedibus. Neque illa que important intrinsecam perfe-
tionem, sunt tribuenda Deo proprie et formaliter, nec debemus consuecum modum
omnia cave, cum de Divinis loquimur, si seclusis imperfectionibus, et non alter,
It is a sufficient ground or reason for the attribution, if the human affection, or impression attributed unto him, be in respect of any one particular appertaining to it in men, paralleled or analogised in the nature of God; the proverbial maxim well admonishing, that "similitudes are not wont to run on all four," no, nor always on three, nor yet on two; they do service enough if they stand well on one. To exemplify our caution in a particular or two: anger, as it is incident unto, and sometimes as it is inherent in man, is obnoxious to be attended with unseemly behaviour, inconsiderate and unjust actions, &c., yet it doth not follow from hence, that because God is said to be angry, therefore there is that in his nature which renders him obnoxious in either of these kinds. It is a sufficient ground of the attribution of this passion or affection unto him, that out of the perfection of his simple essence, or nature, he doth any thing upon occasion, which is proper or frequent, for men being angry, to do; as that he sharply expostulates, or reproves, that he smites those who provoke him, with any severe stroke of judgment, or the like, &c. So again, expectation in men is always attended with an apprehension that the thing expected will indeed come to pass; no man expecting that which he knows certainly will never come to pass; yet it doth not follow from hence, that because expectation is ascribed unto God, therefore he must not know but that the thing expected by him will come to pass. It is a sufficient ground of ascribing expectancy unto him, that out of the perfection of his simple essence, or nature, he sometimes deporteth himself, as men under expectation are wont to do, though it be but in some one particular; as that he apprehendeth a probability or likelihood, in respect of means, motives, and engagements, that the thing which he is said to expect will come to pass; notwithstanding he certainly knoweth withal, that what he is said in this kind to expect, will, all that probability or likelihood notwithstanding, never come to pass. Instances hereof we have, Esa. v. 2, 4, 7; Matt. xxii. 37—39, &c. Take yet one example more for the better understanding of the premised caution. Purposes and intentions, where they are in the letter, and in their propriety, as in men, are always found in conjunction with a supposal, that the things purposed or intended shall or will be effected; no man ever intending or purposing that, which he certainly knows beforehand never shall or will be effected. But it doth not follow from hence, that when purposes or intentions are attributed unto God, they must needs be thus attended; I mean, with a supposition or expectation, that the things said to be purposed or intended by him shall or will come to pass. Therefore that saying of Mr. Rutherford, Exercit. p. 224. "Tenetur omnes credere Deum omnipotentem sua intentione excidere non posse," i.e. All men are bound to believe, that God being omnipotent, cannot fail of his intention, is less considerate, yea, and defective in truth, without the help of some further explication. If instead of intention, he had said decree, thus: all men are bound to believe, that God, being omni-
potent, cannot fail or fall short in any decree, so as not to be able
to put it in execution, reason and truth had greeted each other in
such a saying. But God may be said, as we shall see further anon,
to purpose or intend things, in case he affordeth means that are
proper and sufficient to bring them to pass, especially if he com-
mands them to be used accordingly; this being a dispensation of
like consideration and nature with the deportment of men, who are
wont to provide a sufficiency of means, at least so apprehended by
them, for the effecting of what they purpose or intend. So that to
reason thus: God intendeth not the salvation of all men, because
he certainly knoweth that all men will not be saved, no wise man
ever intending that, which he certainly knows beforehand shall
never be effected, is to reason weakly, and upon a false supposition,
viz. that purposes and intentions are attributed unto God in
respect of all particulars, or under all circumstances, wherewith
they are accompanied in men: whereas such attributions are suffi-
ciently salved, as hath been shown, in the analogy and similitude
of one particular only.

Yet before we can conveniently come at our intended explication,
how and in what respect, or sense, desires, purposes, intentions,
and decrees, are by Scripture assignment transferred upon
necessary it is that the difference between them in point of signifi-
cation and propriety of import, together with the signification of
some other terms of near consideration with them, be examined
and clearly stated. For that these words, desire, purpose, intention,
and decree, do not precisely signify one and the same thing, is out
of question: nor are they ascribed unto God in one and the same
signification or respect: though it is true there is a word frequently
also ascribed unto him, I mean the word will, which, in the latitude
of the signification of it, comprehendeth them all; yea and some
other too besides these. For what God more properly may be said
to desire, he is in a more general term often said to will: so again,
what in more propriety and strictness of expression, he might be
said, and sometimes is said, to purpose, intend, decree, and to
command or persuade unto, he is very frequently said to will. So
that this word will, when it is attributed unto God, must be
differenced in point of sense and signification, pro subjecta ma-
teria, according to the different exigency of the context and
in hand, in such places where it is respectively used, as we
shall show presently. But to the four terms mentioned:

First, to desire, according to the precise and strict import of the
word, as it is appropriated unto, and found in men, signifies
an act of appetency in the heart or soul of a man, towards some-
what that is absent, whether in respect of simple being, or of
place only, and withal apprehended by the desirer, as connatural
and suitable unto him, either in respect of his own personal conveniency
and accommodation only, or the accommodation also of some others
whom he wisheth well unto. How it differs from the other three
will plainly enough appear in the progress. Secondly, to purpose
or intend, for between these I conceive there is very little difference, if any at all, in point of signification, properly signifieth such an act of the heart or soul, by which they resolve or engage themselves to interpose and act towards the effecting or bringing to pass of the thing purposed or intended, being always such a thing which is apprehended good and convenient for them, so far as they judge it meet, and agreeable to principles of wisdom and good discretion. If there be any difference between them, it lieth, I conceive, rather in point of strength or degree, than in nature and kind; a purpose, being an intention, in fieri, as the schoolmen's expression is, *i.e.* in the making; and an intention, a purpose in facto esse, *i.e.* completely made. But they are taken promiscuously the one for the other, and so may be, without any inconvenience, as far as yet I apprehend. For the fourth and last of the four words mentioned, decree, this properly importeth such an act of the heart or soul, by which men resolve, determine, and conclude, to act to the uttermost of their strength and might, for the bringing to pass of the thing decreed, which is still presumed to be somewhat that is of grand concernment unto them for good.

Now though the difference between desires, purposes, intentions, and decrees, be discernible enough, by their respective descriptions that have been given, compared together; yet will it, I conceive, appear to more satisfaction, by a distinct assignment of their respective operations or effects which they produce in men. For, if the tree be known by the fruit, the difference of trees may be known by the difference of the fruits also. First, then, the simple desire of a thing, and as such, doth not engage a man to act at all towards the effecting or procurement of it: a purpose or intention engageth unto action in this kind, but under provisos, and with limitation. A decree, strictly and properly so called, doth not simply engage unto action, for the bringing to pass of the thing decreed, but engageth home, without any exception, reservation, or proviso whatsoever, save only that of sufficiency of strength or power for matter of execution. A desire, if it be intense, and raised to any height or strength, and the nature of the thing desired be such that the procurement of it lieth, either in whole or in part, within the power of the desirer, and withal opposeth not, in his apprehension, either the enjoyment or procurement of somewhat more desirable unto him, always advanceth into a purpose or intention of obtaining the thing so desired. Otherwise, if it be either languishing, faint and low, or the thing desired be no ways, in no kind, attainable by any thing the desirer can do; or if his engagement for the obtainment of it be conceived by him as likely to prejudice him in any other matter of greater moment; in all these cases the desire subsists within itself, and advanceth not neither into intention nor action.

Secondly, Desire, when it is boiled up to a consistency or fixed substance of a purpose or intention of obtaining the thing desired, by means of this superadded act or further impression
upon the soul, being in conjunction with it, it engageth the desirer, being now a purposer and intender likewise, to act and give himself in the use of means for the obtaining of the thing desired and intended, as far as he judgeth it meet and well-standing with the rules of wisdom and discretion for him to go. Only this is to be remembered, that there is no man, at least no considering man, that so far desireth any thing as to intend or purpose the obtaining of it but that he so far engageth himself in the use of means for the procurement thereof as he judgeth reasonable and sufficient for such an attainment. If men do not advance such a proportion of means, which, in their own apprehensions at least, is sufficient to compass what they purpose or intend, it argues a vanity, or nullity rather, in their intentions. But, on the other hand, there is no ground or reason to conclude from the non-assecution or non-obtaining of a thing, yea, though a man hath a sufficiency of power in some kind to obtain it, that he did not really and unfeignedly purpose and intend the effecting of it. A man takes a long journey to a person of quality and in great place; the end and intent of his journey is to obtain a suit or courtesy at his hand: in his addressment to him he demeaneth himself with all respects of honour and observance; useth many reasons and arguments of great weight to persuade and overcome him. The person sued unto standeth off, and refuseth to gratify the petitioner unless he will submit to such and such terms, which are very inconvenient and dishonourable to him. The petitioner being a man of conscience and honour, refuseth the terms, and so returns unsatisfied in his motion. In this case, though he might, with making a breach upon his conscience and honour, have obtained that which he had sued for, yet his non-obtaining it upon such terms doth not weigh argue but that he really desired it, yea, and purposed intended the obtaining of it, if it might have been procured upon meet and honourable terms. Many cases of like consideration might be put.

Thirdly and lastly, To decree, (in the strict and formal signification of the word, for otherwise purposes and decrees sometimes interchange significations,) importeth such an act of the mind and will of a man whereby he doth not simply or only purpose or intend the effecting of what he desireth, but this upon such terms, with such strength of intention and resolution, that it carrieth against and above all possible intervention of any dissuasive circumstance whatsoever, one or more, to the effecting thereof. So that a purpose or intention and a decree, in strictness of notion respectively, may be distinguished by their objects thus: A purpose or intention respecteth that which is desirable, yet not simply and absolutely desirable but upon such and such terms, under such and such circumstances: a decree respecteth that which is simply and absolutely desirable, and from the prosecution whereof a ought not to be taken off by any consideration whatsoever. We speak now of regular purposes and decrees, and such which are
conceived and taken up by men according to principles of sound judgment and understanding.

By the tenor and manuduction of these things, which are evident and unquestionable, we may come readily and steadily to conceive and understand how and in what sense desires, purposes, intentions, and decrees are and may be ascribed unto God. First, it is considerable that desires and purposes or intentions, are never separated in God: he never desireth any thing but what he purposeth or intendeth to effect. The reason is, because whatsoever he apprehendeth suitable to him and of tendency to his glory, which is the adequate object of his desire, he always interesteth himself to effect. Matters relating unto his glory being the only object of his desires, impossible it is that any of these should be so weak or faint as not to advance and rise up into a purpose and intention, and consequently into action; especially considering, 1. That there is nothing which concerns his glory but which lieth within the compass of his power to effect; and, 2. That, by reason of his infinite wisdom being in conjunction with a power every ways commensurable to it, he is able so to manage all the concerns of his glory as not to prejudice himself in any, in or by the prosecution of others. But,

Secondly, Though desires and purposes, or intentions, cannot be separated in God, yet intentions or purposes, and decrees, may. God doth not always decree the effecting of what he purposeth or intendeth to effect, though he always purposeth and intendeth to effect what he decreeth. The reason why he doth not always decree to effect what he purposeth or intendeth to effect, is, because he judgeth it meet to act only to a certain degree of efficiency for the effecting and obtaining of some things, by which, if he cannot effect or obtain them, he judgeth it not meet to act any further or higher in order thereunto. But because he never acteth for or towards the effecting of any thing but with a due and full sufficiency of means, (the whole course and compass of his efficiency in this kind taken together,) he may well and truly be said to purpose and intend whatsoever he engageth himself to effect, though with the lowest degree of efficiency, wherein at any time, and in reference to any end, he appeareth.

If you ask me, But what are the things in particular, or any of them, which God may be said to purpose or intend, and yet not to decree? I answer,

1. In general: they are all such things for the procurement and effecting whereof he vouchsafeth means, and these sufficient, (for he never starveth his ends for want of means, as hath been often in effect said,) and yet the things themselves many times are not obtained nor ever come to pass; in which respect he cannot be said to decree them, because his decree, according to the proper notion of the word, formerly opened, carrieth all before it, against and above all opposition and contradiction whatsoever, and never faileth to bring forth.

2. In particular: the faith and repentance of all men, the honest
and upright lives of all men, and consequently the peace, happiness, and salvation of all men, are some of the principal of the particulars inquired after. For, 1. Evident it is that God interposes and vouchsafeth means for the effecting and procurement of these, (of which more hereafter,) in which respect, according to the grounds laid, he must needs be said to purpose or intend them. And yet, 2. Every whit as evident it is, that these things are not effected or obtained, nor ever will; in which respect they cannot be said to be decreed by God, according to the proper notion of a decree, oft specified.

To draw up a full and clear account from the particulars argued, (with as much brevity as may be,) how, in what sense, and upon what grounds desires, purposes, intentions, and decrees are attributed in Scripture unto God: First, in the negative, that none of them are attributed unto him upon any such ground or supposition as this, viz. as being properly or formally in him, i.e. after such a manner as they are in men, really distinct and separable from his nature or being, hath been already asserted, and that, I suppose, with a nemine contradicente. Therefore, secondly, in direct persuasion of our preparatory instructions formerly also delivered in order to the business in hand, the said four particulars must be acknowledged, as attributed unto God upon this ground, viz. because the infinite perfection of his nature and being enableth, yea, and leadeth him to act, and give out himself after some such manner, and with such a kind of efficiency, reasonable allowance being made for the great disproportion between him and the creature, as the said particulars, desires, purposes, intentions, and decrees being found in men, are wont to engage them unto. So that, First, God is said to desire or will, such and such things, because the goodness of his nature leadeth him to act and give out himself, and to vouchsafe means for the bringing of them to pass; it being an essential property of desire in men, 1. When it is cordial and strong, as all God’s desires are, as it was formerly proved; and 2. When men have opportunity to act for the obtaining of the thing desired, which God always hath; 3. And lastly, when their acting for the obtaining of the thing desired, is not like to hinder them from obtaining another thing more desirable than that, a case never incident unto God in respect of any thing desired by him, as hath also lately been shown; it being, I say, in this case, and under these circumstances, an essential property of desire in men to engage them unto action for the obtaining of the thing desired. Because, whentoever men act, or endeavour themselves in any kind to bring a thing to pass, they are always presumed to desire the thing, or the coming of it to pass; therefore, God also, according to Scripture dialect and phrase, may be said to desire whatsoever he any ways interposeth himself or giveth means, to bring to pass.

Secondly, there is the same consideration and ground also of purposes and intentions attributed unto him. He is therefore said to purpose and intend such and such things, because his goodness, wisdom, and power, i.e. the infinite perfection of his nature, which
eminently containeth all these, enableth and induceth him to act for or towards the attainment of them, after such a kind of manner and upon such terms, according to which men, I mean sober and well-advised men, are wont to act and engage themselves for the assecution of such things which they purpose and intend. How, and upon what terms such men are wont to act in order to the obtaining of things properly purposed and intended by them, and not absolutely decreed, was lately declared, viz. so far, and to such a degree of engagement as they judge convenient and meet; consideration being had of the value, worth, and consequence of the things purposed and intended by them in case they be obtained. Therefore, to conclude God's non-intentions from his non-attainments, is a reasoning of no value, and supposeth a non-difference between his purposes or intentions and decrees; between which, notwithstanding, as hath been shown, there is a very emphatical and signal difference. The reason why God engageth not himself to the actual assecution of all things purposed and intended by him shall, God willing, be argued in due time and place.

Thirdly and lastly, God is also said to decree such and such things, because the infinite perfection of his nature and being inclineth him to act and engage himself for the effecting of them, after such a manner and upon such terms, as men are wont to engage themselves for the actual performance and bringing to pass of what they decree. What this manner and what these terms are, we have already shown. What men properly determine or decree, they engage to the uttermost of their might to put in execution and perform, if no lower rate of engagement will do the deed. In like manner God is, and well may be, said to decree such things, the execution and effecting whereof he suspendeth upon no condition or consideration whatsoever, one or more; but declareth himself as one resolved to give being unto them in their respective seasons, whatsoever angels, men, devils, or any other creature shall either do or not do. In this sense, and upon this ground, he may be said to have decreed that all men once shall die; that all men shall be raised from the dead; that men, dying in the Lord, or in the faith of Jesus Christ, shall be everlastingly blessed; that men dying in their sins, or in unbelief, shall be eternally accursed, to omit other particulars without end of like consideration. Only I desire to remind the reader of this, that though we have in our present discourse exactly differed purposes or intentions from decrees, according to the strict importance of the words, and precise notion of the things themselves, yet may not this difference be always so observed, either by other writers or by the Scriptures themselves, but that the terms may be sometimes put indifferently the one for the other; yea, and the things themselves be expressed and held forth by such words and phrases of speech, which will equally admit of either signification; yet as to the Scriptures, hardly, I presume, can any instance be found where either the context or the subject matter in hand will not clearly determine the case, I mean, whether it be a purpose or a decree, according to the regular notion of either,
as they have been distinguished, which the Holy Ghost therefore intends.

Before we pass from the subject in hand, it will not be amiss, I suppose, to take a more perfect knowledge of what was intimated before, viz. That all the four particulars, desires, purposes, intentions, and decrees; yea, and more than these, in their respective attributes unto God, are frequently in Scripture expressed by the will of God. John v. 21, Christ is said to quicken whom he will, i. e. whom he desireth, or intendeth to quicken. See also John vi. 38; xvii. 24. Whereas it is said, John vi. 39, "And this is the Father's will that hath sent me," &c.; and again, ver. 40, "And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life;" evident it is, that the decree, or decreeing will of God is meant. See also Eph. i. 5, 9, 11, and elsewhere. The Apostle Paul speaking thus of God, "who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth," I Tim. ii. 4, and Peter, that he is "willing that all should come to repentance," 2 Pet. iii. 9; speak plainly not of God's decreeing will, but of his purposing or desiring will. But of these Scriptures more hereafter. Other significations of this word will, when attributed or spoken of God, which are divers, besides those specified upon the present occasion, we shall not now insist upon.

For a close to this chapter, let us, from the grounds pre-asserted herein, take into consideration the difference between the knowledge, or foreknowledge of God, and the intentions, or decrees of God. Therefore (not to repeat, but to build upon premised principles and discussions) first, as the knowledge and foreknowledge of God are differenced by their objects, the object of his knowledge being far more large and comprehensive than the object of his foreknowledge, the one extending to all things whatsoever, past, present, and to come, yea, to all possibilities of things; the other, only to things that are future and yet to come; so, likewise, both the knowledge and foreknowledge of God, taken together, are plainly distinguished from his intentions and decrees, by the greater latitude and extent of their object; yea, the object of the foreknowledge of God, which, as hath been said, is far narrower than the object of his knowledge, is yet far larger and more comprehensive than the object either of his intentions or decrees. The object of his decrees extendeth only to such things, which, as was formerly argued, himself purposeth to effect, or give being unto, without any exceptions or provisos concerning any possible interventions whatsoever. The object of his intentions or purposes, extendeth to such things only which he desireth and intendeth to give being also unto, but with condition and limitation, so that the utmost border and extent of the respective objects of the purposes and decrees of God, procurement whereof himself intends operativeness and positiveness of action, or efficiency: whereas the limit of the object of his foreknowledge extendeth unto all things whatsoever that are future, and
taketh in, as well such things which his soul abhorreth, and therefore will not lift up his hand unto, I mean the sinful actions of the creature, as those which himself intendeth to call and bring into being.

If you demand a reason why I make this difference between the object of the knowledge and foreknowledge of God on the one hand, and the object of his intentions and decrees on the other, extending the one to all things future, without exception; restraining the other to such future things only wherein God himself means to be active; my reason and answer is this, according to fore-laid grounds; men generally do know, and commonly fore-know, many things, for or towards the production or procurement whereof they intend no contribution of aid, strength, or means in any kind, viz., when they are such that their coming to pass, and their not coming to pass, are but of equal and indifferent concernment to them, as knowing how to make the same benefit or use of the one and of the other. Whereas some other things there are, the effecting whereof, or at least the attempting and endeavouring whereof, is of special concernment unto them. Now things of this latter consideration are the object of men's desires, intentions, and decrees, and they purpose to be active about the bringing of them to pass, whereas matters of the former are the object of their knowledge and foreknowledge only; and, haply, of their providence, if as well their coming to pass, as their not coming to pass, be contrivable by them into any matter of benefit or advantage. In like manner the sins, and wicked ways, and actions of men, may be called the object of the knowledge and foreknowledge, yea, and of the providence of God, as well as his own most just and holy dispensations, because through the infinite perfection of his nature and being he is enabled, 1. To declare or pre-declare as he pleaseth; and 2. Both enabled and actually resolved to dispose and pre-dispose of them to the best advantage for his own glory, as well as if he formally knew or foreknew them: whereas, notwithstanding he neither was, nor is, nor ever intendeth to be, operative in or about the bringing of them to pass, inasmuch as their non-coming to pass would have been of the same consequence unto him for the advancement of his glory, as their coming to pass is or can be. For, doubtless, God is not so poorly or meanly provided in and of himself, for the exaltation of his name and glory, as to stand in need of the dunghill of sin to make a footstool for him whereby to ascend into his throne. If the goodness and righteousness of men be nothing unto God, profit not him, Psal. xvi. 2; Job xxxv. 3, 7, much less can the sins of men claim part and fellowship in such a business. So then the sins of men, being only known and foreknown by God, and contrivable to his glory, but no ways requisite or necessary hereunto; may well be looked upon as the object (I mean the partial object) of the knowledge and foreknowledge, yea, and of the providence of God, but not of his desires, intentions, or decrees. Whereas his own dispensations, with their natural and proper fruits and consequents, being intrinsically, and with a direct tendency, of
sovereign and high concernment for his glory, may safely, and with the best consistency of reason and truth, be looked upon as the object, not of his knowledge or foreknowledge only, but of his desires, intentions, and decrees also.

CHAPTER IV.

Concerning the perfection of God, in his nature and being, and some things clearly deducible from it; particularly his simplicity, actuality, and goodness in decrees.

"And this is life eternal, that they," or that men, "know the only true God, and him whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ," saith the Lord Christ himself in that most solemn supplicatory address unto his Father, recorded John xvii. 3, yet not for his Father's instruction, but his children's. What knowledge of himself it is, either for kind, quality, or degree, which Jesus Christ here joineth with the knowledge of God, as, together with it, constituting and making up one entire cause or means of salvation unto the creature; or with what kind of necessity he supposeth the conjunction of that knowledge of himself, which he intendeth, with the knowledge of God, to be necessary to that great end and purpose, as whether with an absolute, or an expediential and accumulative necessity only, we shall not for the present inquire, much less determine. This, I presume, will be granted upon demand only, without proof; that as the true knowledge of Christ doth necessarily include, or pre-suppose the like knowledge of God; so doth such a knowledge of God as our Saviour here describes, the knowing of him to the only true God, comprehend in it an implicit or virtual knowledge of Christ also. This might be brought into a clear light by the helping hand of the Scriptures, but that the contemplation of it is a little eccentric to our present design. However, let those who doubt consult these oracles, with their fellows, John xiv. 1; John v. 23; Psal. ix. 10; Jer. ix. 23, 24; Heb. xi. 6; Rom. i. 19—21; besides many others.

But what is it to know God, or God the Father, μαθησιν ἀληθείαν τοῦ, "the only true God?" First, to know God, or the Father, the only true God, may admit of a double construction, or meaning: either, 1. As if the truth of this proposition, God, or God the Father, is the only true God, were the terminus, or intended object of the knowledge here spoken of; or, 2. As if God the Father's being the only true God were presupposed to this knowledge, and some further particulars concerning him the object hereof. The former sense hath both most men, and doubtless most reason also to plead for it. For when God is perfectly known to be the only true God, there is very little or nothing more to be known concerning him. Therefore, secondly, To know God,
or God, the Father, the only or the alone true God, is I conceive, 1. To know (viz. upon substantial and demonstrative grounds) that his nature or being every way answers the true and regular notion of a God, i. e. that he is infinitely gracious, infinitely wise, infinitely just, infinitely powerful, infinitely blessed, infinite in all manner of excellency and perfection, and all this in the most absolute simplicity of essence, without any plurality, multiplication, or composition in what kind, or of what things soever; and, on the other hand, that there is nothing in him, in one kind or other, in one consideration or other, which reason duly informed, and judging like itself, can think unmeet or unworthy to be found in a true God. This is to know God, or God the Father, to be a true God. 2. To know him to be the only true God, implies further a like knowledge that there is no other nature or being whatsoever but his, or that wherein he partakes, that in excellency or perfection in any kind is equal unto his, or either formally or virtually the same with his.

That God is perfect, is one of the philosophers' *kowai ɛvouai*, of those common impressions of light, or inbred principles of reason, wherewith nature (in their language) or God himself (in the dialect of Christians) upon the account of Christ's merit and mediation (in which respect it is attributed unto him also,) "Enlighteneth every man that cometh" (or, ἐρχόμενον, as he cometh, or coming) "into the world," John i. 9. The united light of which principles, or impressions, is said, ver. 4, to be that "life of men," i. e. the means of that life of men, or the means whereby men were to attain that life, which is there said to have "been in Christ," viz. as in a fountain of merit, or as in a designed purchaser, for them. For the meaning of the latter clause of this verse, καὶ ἡ ἐνότητα τοῦ φως τῶν ἀνθρώπων, which our English rendereth, "and the life was the light of men," is, I conceive with submission, this, or to this effect, viz. that that life and salvation which Christ, in reality of design, and with semblable acceptance in the sight of God, had from the beginning purchased by his death for men, did, or doth as it were in the first break or dawning of it, appear and discover itself in those principles of natural light, reason, judgment, conscience, understanding, &c., which are found in the generality of men upon their "coming into the world;" these being granted and given unto them by God for that great and blessed end and purpose, viz. that by them they might be made capable of attaining that life and salvation, which was procured and purchased for them by Christ, and intended to be really conferred upon them, upon their believing and continuance therein unto the end: though it is true, that men generally as they grow up in the world, convert these principles of light and understanding to other uses, and not to those for which they are given them, as viz. to "make provision for the flesh for the fulfilling of the lusts thereof," and not to the obtaining of that life and happiness which is in Christ for them; as foolish children, which fall to play, or quarrel amongst themselves,
by the opportunity of that candle which their parents allow them for their studies and books. Yea, men generally do not only mis-spend those talents of light we speak of, about the impertinencies of this present world, but partly through an unmanlike oscillation and inconsiderateness, partly out of an inordinate propensity to comport with the world without any fear or sense of danger hereby, suffer their judgments and understandings to be corrupted, adulterated, imbased and abused by many false and foolish principles and notions, which turn them quite aside from a regular and prosecution of that life and salvation which is in Christ for them, and might have been obtained by them; yea, and subject them to a sad incapacity of the things of their peace, when they are proposed with the greatest evidence and power unto them. Inso-much that though the life which was in Christ is said to be “the light of men,” yet it immediately followeth, that “the light shineth in darkness,” (i.e. the doctrine of life and salvation is clearly preached to an ignorant world,) “and the darkness comprehended it not,” i.e. that ignorance, or incapacity rather, of the things of eternal life, which men have voluntarily contracted and brought upon themselves, is so exceeding great and strange, that they understand little or nothing of this doctrine so preached unto them. But occasionally only, and by the way. As to the work in hand, doubtless there was never any man touched with any competent sense, or enlightened with any tolerable notion of a deity, that ever put it to the question in himself, whether God was perfect or no. “All men,” saith Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, “without any demur or delay, ascribe that unto God which they conceive to be most perfect.” And indeed that very sense and notion of God which nature prompteth her children with, though many of them are dull of hearing in this kind, doth not admit of any thing looked upon as defective or imperfect within the verge of it.

Therefore having so firm, and so generally-approved a foundation to build upon, as the perfection of God, let us see what it affordeth unto us by way of evident deduction, toward the advancement of our great design, the magnifying of God in his gracious intendersments of salvation unto all men, without exception, in or by the death of Christ.

First, if the nature, essence, and being of God be most perfect, then must it needs be most simple, most entirely, absolutely, perfectly one, not admitting any plurality or composition whatsoever. The reason of this is plain, because all plurality and composition, whether of parts or of natures, suppose imperfection. For if any one of these parts or natures were perfect, absolutely or infinitely perfect, it were able to do whatsoever is necessary, yea, or possible to be done, (for without this there is no simple or absolute perfection,) and then what need were there of any thing to be added unto it, or joined with it? That a man hath ears as well as eyes, and eyes as well as ears; and so, hands as well as feet, and feet as well as hands, clearly proves, that no one of these
members is simply and absolutely perfect, i. e. can do or perform, and this with a like comeliness and conveniency, whatsoever is necessary to be done and performed by man; for then all the rest should be superfluous. They may all be perfect in their kind, i. e., with a determinate and limited perfection, and in order to such or such a particular action and service, and yet one stand in need of another, as the apostle speaketh; but if any one of them were simply and absolutely perfect, i. e., could do all things whatsoever upon the same terms of convenience which both itself and all the rest can do together, certainly all the rest were needless. So if an angel could understand by his mere essence or substance of his nature, without any endowment or gift of understanding distinct therefrom; or could perform any other action, or do any execution immediately by his essence, without the intervening of those natural endowments or qualities of strength, power, activeness, &c., all these endowments and appendices to his nature and essence would be merely superfluous. The necessity which the angels have of wisdom, knowledge, reason, strength, &c., over and besides their mere essences and beings, plainly declareth and showeth these essences and beings of theirs to be imperfect, (I mean in respect of a simple and absolute perfection,) and that they stand in need of such additional properties and endowments, as we speak of, to make them perfect even in their own kind. Nor is it indeed possible for God to make any such creature, or to speak somewhat more properly, no such creature can possibly be made, which shall be able to act or work immediately by its essence, or otherwise than by the mediation of some virtue, property, or quality, in one kind or other, inherent therein; it being the glorious and incommunicable property and prerogative of the Divine essence or Being itself so to work. So then this absolute and infinite simplicity of the nature of God supposed, as without which he cannot be absolutely and infinitely perfect, it plainly followeth,

First, That all those attributes of God, commonly so called, as wisdom, knowledge, justice, mercy, goodness, power, &c.; and so all those passions and affections, as of anger, grief, repentance, love, hatred, &c.; and again, all those parts or members, as eyes, ears, hands, feet, mouth, &c., which are so frequently attributed unto him in the Scriptures, are all one and the same thing in God, though they be very different things in men; nor is any one of them, nor all of them together, any other thing but only his single, simple, and pure essence.* But therefore all this variety and diversity, both of attributes, affections, and parts, is attributed unto him, because by means of this one simple and single essence being infinitely perfect, he can, when he pleaseth, and pleaseth, when he judgeth meet, give forth himself, and act all that variety and diversity of action which these different principles are wont to produce

* Deo idem est esse, et format esse, vel sapientem esse, vel justum esse; et si quid de illa simplici multiplicitate, vel multipli simplicitate dixeris, quo substantia ejus significetur.—Aug. de Trin. 1. vi. c. 4.
in men. As for example; a man that hath wisdom is able to act, and doth act when he pleaseth, in a regular proportion, or due order unto his ends. So a man that hath knowledge, whether of things past, present, or to come, being wise withal, manageth and disposeth his affairs according to the exigency of such knowledge, and with the best advantage that such knowledge affords unto him. A man that is just, doth things that are just and equal; and so he that is angry, frowns, threatens, or strikes. He that loves, doth good unto and kindly by those who are loved of him; he that hates, acts to the prejudice or hurt of the person hated when he hath opportunity; and so in the rest. Now because God, out of the infinite perfection of his nature, though it be, as hath been said, most singly and simply one, is yet able to act, and doth act, when he pleaseth, all this variety of action, acts as wise men act, as men that have knowledge of things act, as men that are angry, as men that love, as men that hate, are wont to act, &c. Therefore all these principles of action, as wisdom, knowledge, anger, love, hatred, &c., are by the Holy Ghost ascribed unto him. Suppose there were in physic such a simple, as, for example, an herb, root, drug, mineral, or the like, which had such a precious or sovereign virtue in it, that the use of it were a certain cure of all diseases, as gout, stone, fever, apoplexy, &c.; and further, that there were particular medicines or receipts besides appropriated to every disease respectively, and were all of them sufficient to cure their appropriated diseases; in this case that simple we speak of, might be said to have the several virtues of all those other medicines or receipts in it, because it is able to do alone as much and as many things, in a medicinal way, as all those taken together; yet can it not be said to have the virtue of any one of them in the specifical or formal nature of it, but only eminently, i.e., in respect of that sovereign property, which, though it be simply and formally but one, yet answereth in value, worth, and variety of operation, unto all the several virtues, and healing properties in all those other receipts.

In like manner, all that great variety of faculties, powers, properties, virtues, endowments, excellencies, and all principles of action whatsoever, that are scattered in their proper and distinct natures amongst the creatures, may be attributed unto God, though not so much as any one of them be properly and formally in him, viz., because there is that sovereign and supertranscendent perfection in his nature, being but simply and most singly one, which for power and variety of action in every kind, answereth them all, yea, and far exceedeth them also.

Secondly, From the simplicity of the nature of God, as it hath been argued and explained, it clearly followeth, that love and hatred, and so mercy and justice or severity in God towards his creature, do not argue any different affection or inclination in him towards it, (the simplicity of his nature not admitting of any such difference,) but only a different dispensation, answerable to the different effects or expressions of such principles in men. So that
there is no inconvenience nor untruth in it at all, to affirm that
God at one and the same time, may both hate and love, and so
again, love and hate the same person, viz., in respect of several
dispensations of a contrary nature and import. As, for example,
when he severely punisheth a godly person for some sin or sins
committed, and yet withal continues such a measure of his grace or
good Spirit unto him, whereby he is enabled still to believe in God
and to love him, his sore affliction notwithstanding; in respect of
this latter dispensation, God may be said to love; and in respect of
the former, to hate him.

If it be demanded; but can God in any sense be said to hate a
person that is godly? I answer, that hatred in God, importing not
matter of affection, but of dispensation only, agreeable to the
effects of hatred in men, to deny that God can in any sense be said
to hate a godly person, is to deny that he can punish him for sin,
or act to the prejudice of his comfort and peace in any kind,
howsoever he provoketh him.

If it be yet said; But the Scripture will not justify or warrant
any such assertion as this, that God hateth a godly person. I answer,
1. By concession, that the Scripture doth not indeed, to my best
remembrance, justify or warrant such a saying, by way of example
or sameness of expression. But,

2. By way of exception, I answer, that the Scripture warranteth
many things by way of reason or ground, which it doth not warrant either by example, precept, or otherwise than by ground, as is
famously known in the case of infant baptism, and of women's ad-
mission to the Lord's table. Now wherever either the perfection or
simplicity of God is asserted in the Scriptures, whether expressly, or by way of consequence, as both the one and the other
frequently are, there is a sufficient ground laid to warrant both
truth and also aptness enough of expression in such a saying as
this, that God may be said both to love and to hate the same per-
son; yea, and both these at one and the same time, as hath been
sufficiently explained.

Thirdly and lastly, from the simplicity of the nature of God, the
truth of that common maxim in divinity, quicquid est in Deo,
Deus est, i. e., whatsoever is in God, is God, is fully demonstrable: and consequently that neither from eternity was there any
thing, neither for the present is there any thing, nor ever shall be
any thing in him to eternity, inferior to himself, any thing which
is not God. And if so, then both the justification of men from
eternity, and so the condemnation of men from eternity, are but
idle fancies, with which some men, partly through weakness, partly
through incomconsiderateness, commit spiritual fornication. Yea,
though I will not say that any of the persons who hold either of
these opinions do blaspheme, yet the opinions themselves, narrowly
examined, will not be found innocent from this great offence: inas-
much as both the one and the other do apparently give the honour of
the glorious God in his incommunicable attribute of eternity, a parte
MEN NOT JUSTIFIED OR CONDEMNED

...as divines call it, to weak and contemptible creatures, men: they make these co-eternal with God, and to subsist from eternity. For that which is not can neither be justified nor condemned.

If it be demanded, in favour of these opinions, but had not men some kind of being or subsistence from eternity? were they not in the mind of God, and present with him, after some such manner as the idea or model of a house is in the mind of the architect, before there be so much as a stone of it laid?

To this I answer, according to the tenor of what hath been lately argued and proved concerning the simplicity of the Divine essence, that if they had any being from eternity, it could be none other than the Divine Being itself; for there were no plurality of beings from eternity. All beings without beginnings may be numbered by the figure of one, and this unmultiplied. Therefore, if God justified any from eternity, it must be himself; if he condemned or reprobated any from eternity, it must be himself likewise. Nor can men be said to have been in the mind of God from eternity after any such manner as the idea or platform of a house is in the mind of the artificer, before he begins to build; because such an idea is no part of the artificer, nor yet of his mind, but is clearly separable from both; whereas there was nothing in God from eternity but his own essence, and that which is altogether inseparable from him. Or, if it should be granted that men were in God, or in the mind of God, from eternity, after such a manner as is contended for, yet could it not be said that men, men themselves, i.e. those creatures which consist of bodies and souls, and have sinned on earth, were either justified or condemned from eternity, but only their ideas or representations in the mind of God. Yet how, or in what sense or notion, these should be said to be either justified or condemned, whenas they never sinned, nor are capable of sinning, is out of the reach of my understanding to conceive.

If it be yet further demanded, But were not men (and all things besides) in some consideration or sense in God from eternity; and may it not be said, that in this sense, whatever it be, they were some justified and some condemned? I answer,

1. By concession, that men, and all things besides, were in God from eternity tanquam in fonte, seu radice, vel causâ productivâ, i.e., as in the fountain, root, or productive cause of their respective beings. There is nothing capable of receiving an existence, or actual being, but what had a potential or seminal being in some productive cause or other, one or more, before. Therefore, if this universe, with all the parts and members of it, had not been in God, as in the productive cause, doubtless they had never been produced, or received being. But

2. I answer further, by way of exception, that men, considered in that being which they had in God from eternity, were no ways capable either of justification, or of condemnation, or of any such difference or distinction between them, as these two acts or conditions infer. For as God himself, the common root or producent
cause of all men, was one, singly, simply, and most undividedly one from eternity, so were all men singly and simply one in him; all alike holy, all alike innocent, and free from sin; and consequently all alike beloved of him, all being yet nothing but himself. It cannot be said of the roses, which in the winter time were virtually and seminally in one and the same root, that some of them flourished and prospered, and others were blasted or eaten up with worms, whilst they were together in the root; though, afterwards, when they come to receive actual production, and to subsist extra causas, respectively, this difference may very possibly befall them.

Yea, but were not some men justified, and others condemned, in the counsel, purpose, and decree of God, from eternity? I answer:

If the meaning of the question be only this, whether God, from eternity, did not purpose or decree to justify some men, and condemn others, that God from eternity did purpose and decree to justify in time all those who should in time believe; and to condemn all those who, living to years of discretion, should die in their unbelief; yet these decrees, though in their respective executions they make a great difference indeed between persons and persons, yet in their making or enacting by God, they made none at all. This decree of God, whosoever believeth shall be justified, doth neither make, nor suppose, any one man any whit nearer, either to believing, or to justification than another: nor, on the other hand, doth this decree, he that believes not, shall be condemned, either make or suppose one man nearer, either to unbelief, or condemnation through unbelief, than another. A law that is made for the punishing of murder, or adultery, with death, relates no more, in the intention of the law-makers, at the time of the making or enacting of it, to one man than to another, i. e. they intended no more the punishment or death of one man than of another, (personally considered); much less did they intend to make any man, or to permit any man to become a murderer or adulterer by the enacting of such a law, but the contrary; yet this law, when it comes to be put in execution for the crimes made punishable by it, and voluntarily committed by men, makes as great a difference between men and men (and somewhat greater) as is between the living and the dead.

If the meaning of the question last propounded be, whether God did not from eternity decree the justification of such and such particular men by name, and so the condemnation of others after the same manner; I answer that, doubtless, he did from eternity decree equivalently, though not formally, the justification of all those particular persons by name who in time come to be justified; and so again, the condemnation of all those by name who in time come to be condemned. My meaning is, that no particular person, whatsoever his name be, who comes to be justified, but his justification flows from that decree of God from eternity, wherein he
decree to justify all those by their names who should believe. For
had not God made such a decree as this, and make it he must from
eternity if he made it at all, certainly no man could ever be justified
upon such terms. In like manner, God from eternity decreed the
condemnation of all such particular persons, whatever their names
be, who living to maturity of years should die in unbelief. In this
sense and consideration, and in this only, as far as yet I apprehend,
God may be said to have decreed both the justification and the con-
demnation of particular men and women from eternity, viz. because
he made two such decrees from eternity; by the one of which, all
particular persons come to be justified who ever are justified; and
by the other, all particular persons to be condemned who are con-
demned. But we shall have opportunity to argue the unsoundness
of both the opinions, especially of the latter, upon other grounds; in
reference whereunto, we supersede any further inquiry into them for
the present.

Secondly, If God in his nature or essence be simply, absolutely,
and infinitely perfect, then must he needs be a most pure and simple
act, without any potentiality at all; i. e. he must needs be actually,
et de presenti, as they say, and so have been from eternity, what-
soever he is capable of being, or whatsoever it is possible for him
to do anything more, or any thing besides what a person
or thing is, for the present argueth imperfection, which is clearly
proved thus: whatsoever it is possible for a person or thing to be,
which at present he is not, must needs be something which will
either add unto his being and make it better, or else take away from
his being and so make it worse; or else be a thing merely indifferent,
and so of no concernment unto him at all. So then, if a man be
capable of being any thing which yet he is not, for the bettering of
his condition, it is a clear case that his present condition or being is
imperfect, for he is as yet destitute of that which should add perfection
unto him. If he be capable of any thing, or of being any thing,
which yet he is not, to the making of his present condition worse,
here the case is yet more clear that such a man's condition is not per-
fect. For to be obnoxious to the deprivation or losing of any
which a man enjoyeth for the present, manifestly argueth weakness
and imperfection. Thirdly, and lastly, If a man be capable of
any thing which yet he is not, suppose it be without any relation at all
to his condition, either for the better or the worse, yet this also plainly
argueth imperfection. For it supposeth that a man hath something,
hath a capacity, which is a mere superfluity to him, and doth him
no good, yea, which he knoweth not how to improve for his
and this, as apparently as either of the former, argueth imperfection.
So that certain it is, that if the nature and being of God be ab-
solutely and infinitely perfect, he must needs be a pure and
act, all in present and actual being, whatsoever it is possible for him
ever to be.
AND UNCHANGEABLE.

This most entire and complete actuality of the divine nature and being is, I presume, generally subscribed by all reformed divines. "God," saith Zanchie, "is a most pure and most simple act, and no ways capable or in any possibility of being any thing, more or less, than what he is."* And from this actuality of God, he infers both his absolute immutability and infinity of his perfection. "It is affirmed," saith Peter Martyr, "as with one mouth, of all that are godly, that God is not changed, inasmuch as this would be a certain sign as well of imperfection as constancy in him."† The reason why God is not changed, nor capable of any change whatsoever, is because he is a most pure, absolute, and complete act, i.e. he is for the present whatsoever it is possible in any respect for him to be; so that, notwithstanding his omnipotency itself, He hath no power to make the least alteration or change in himself, either in nature, will, or action. Upon the account of this author's credit, who interesteth all the godly in the assertion and belief of God's unchangeableness, and, consequently, of that perfect actuality which we assert, I judge it needless to make any further levity of testimonies in this behalf.

Only, I conceive, it may be worthy our pains to vindicate this doctrine of the actuality of God from the incumbrance of an objection or two. First. If God be so pure, mere, and perfect an act, that no mutation in any kind is incident unto him, how can He be said to act or do any thing to-day which He did not yesterday or before, yea from eternity? As for example, to give faith unto a person or make him a believer to-day, who was an unbeliever yesterday? Or doth God work no more, no otherwise in or upon a man when he is made an actual believer, than he did whilst he was yet an unbeliever? And if God changeth his action or manner of action, or acteth at all where he acted not before, is he not someways mutable, and consequently no such pure or complete act as hath been asserted?

I answer: 1. What mutations, changes, or differences soever be at any time found in men or in other creatures, whether in their natures, qualities, motions, actions, or in what respect soever, most certain it is that God is uniformly and unchangeably the same, both in his nature, or essence, properties and actions. "God," saith Peter Martyr, "defers his assistances as seemeth good unto Him, and moves the hearts of men at a certain time, whereas he moved them not before; which, notwithstanding, we question not but He doth

* Cum igitur Deus purissimus sit, et simplicissimus Actus, et nullo modo in potentia ad aliquid, evincitur, Deum nullo modo mutabilem esse.—Zanch. De Nat. Dei. 1. ii. c. 4, qu. 1. Preterea cum tria sint communia omnium, quae sunt, genera: supremum, est tanti actus simplicissimus, sine uta potentia passiva.—Ibid. ca. 6. Et paulo post; Adaeuc, Deus Actus est purissimus, sine uta potentia passiva. Ergo nullum habet, aut habere potest, sua perfectionis finem.

† Ad putes omnibus, uno proptermodum ore, dictur, Deum nequaquam mutari, quandoquidem id cum imperfectionis, tum etiam inconstante certum est indiciem.—Pet. Mart. loc. Class. 1. cap. xi. sec. 23. Imo purus et simplex est Actus, nec unquam sitius felicissima ejus actio.—Ibid. Class. 2. c. vii. sec. 1. Deus est purus Actus, non habens aliquid do potentialitate.—Aqu. Sum. part. i. qu. 3, art. 2.
without any change of himself."* The essence or being of God being altogether unchangeable, and his operations or actings being really and formally the same with His essence, impossible it is that the one should be more changeable than the other. Therefore.

2. When a man believeth to-day, who believed not yesterday, or before, though God now inclines and moveth his heart to believe, which he did not before, yet he doth it not by any new act, or exertion of himself, but by that first great eternal act of his, "quo totum Ens, et omnes ejus differentias profudit," as Aquinas speaks, i. e. by which he poured out, as it were, from himself at once, the whole and entire body of entity or being, with all and all manner the differences of it. For we are not to conceive, that upon the multiplication or new production of entities or beings, the acts of God are multiplied, for or in their production; but that whatsoever is produced by him, or receives being from him, as all things have being do, when, or at what time soever they receive this being, they receive it by virtue of that one creative act of his, by which at once, in the beginning, as the Scripture phrase is, he gave being to all things, past, present, and yet to come. Nor are we to conceive, that when Moses reporteth the history of the creation, thus, "And God said, Let there be light," Gen. i. 3; and afterwards, viz. after a day's space, that he said, "Let there be a firmament," Gen. i. 6; and again, after the same distance of time, "Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together into one place," &c. Gen. i. 9, that he spake these things at three several distinct times, or that he waited the just space of a day between speech and speech; but that Moses' intent, in this description or relation, was to declare, by what successive spaces or distances of time, that one creative word of God which he spake at once, took place, and gave being to the several and respective parts of the universe. So that, for example, when, by way of preface to the second day's work, he writeth thus: "And God said, Let there be a firmament," &c., his meaning only was, to signify what that one creative word of God, once and at once spoken, did produce, or give being unto, towards the completing of the universe, the second day after the creation was begun; not that God rested, or kept silence for a day's space, and then fell to work again.

This truth, I mean, that all temporary and successive effects in the world, whether produced by the intervening and concourse of second causes, or without, are produced by the impression and vigour of that one great act of God we speak of, and not by any new act, exercised or exerted by him, in order to their several and particular productions, is frequently insinuated in the Scriptures themselves: yea, and is demonstrable by ground of reason; and nothing but what hath been the judgment of several learned men, and of Augustine, by name. The context

* Deus auxilia sua differt, prout illi videtur: et hominum corda movet certo tempore, cum ea antea non moverit. Quod tamen ab eo absque sui mutatione fieri non dubitamus.—P. Mart. loc. Class. 3. c. ii. sect. 8.
of Moses, Gen. ii. 4, tenoueth thus: "These are the generations of the heavens, and of the earth, when they were created; in the day that the Lord made the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field, before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field, before it grew." Here he plainly affirmeth, that God created the earth and the heavens in the same day, and every plant of the field, before it was in the earth, &c., clearly implying, that though the earth and the heavens received their respective beings on two several days successively, yet that which God acted, or did, towards their productions, was done by him in one and the same day, i.e. at once: and again, that although no plant of the field was actually produced, before it was in the earth, (for no plant was made out of the earth, and afterwards by God put into it,) yet that on God's part, and in respect of what he contributed towards their actual production, they were produced before, viz. by that one creative act we spake of. Consonant to this deduction from, as also to the exposition lately given unto that the context of Moses, is this passage of Augustine, "When thou hearest, all things were then made, when the day was made, conceive, if thou beest able, that six or sevenfold repetition which is made, or to be made, without any intervals, of delays or spaces of time; or if thou beest not able so to conceive of it, leave it for those to conceive who are able; and go thou forward with the Scripture, which forsaketh not thine infirmity, but walketh a mother's pace slowly with thee; and which so speaketh, that with her height she laughs at the proud; with her depth she amazeth the considerate; with her truth, she feeds the strong or well grown; and with her affability nourisheth little ones."* The same author, elsewhere: "For God," saith he, "made all time with all corporeal creatures, together or at once: which visible creatures are signified by the name of heaven and earth."† This, to have been his positive and clear judgment, many other passages in his writings give plenary and pregnant testimony: and more particularly his 105th tractate upon John, and his books upon Genesis. But to return to the Scriptures. Those words, Psa. cxv. 3: "He," God, "hath done whatsoever he pleased," in the best sense and interpretation of them, and that which is closest to the letter, are thus to be understood, viz. that whatsoever God willeth or hath willed, should at any time come to pass, he hath already done; viz. all that he meaneth, or which is any ways necessary for him to do, towards the effecting of it. In this sense, also, that of the apostle, Rom. viii. 30, with many other places of Scripture of like

* Et cum audis tunc facta omnia, cum factus est dies, illam senarium, vel septenarium repetitionem sine intervallis morum spatiorumque temporum factam, si possis, apprehendis; si autem non possis, hae relinquas consciendam valentibus; ut autem, cum Scriptura non desereit inseminatur tuam, et materno incessus tecum tardius ambulante, proficias, quae sic loquitur, ut altitudine superhis irrigat, profunditate atentos terrestre, veritate magnos pascat, affabilitate parvis nutrit.—Aug. de Gen. ad lit. 1. v. c. 3.

† Fecit enim Deus omne tempus simul cum omnibus creaturis corporalibus, quae creature visibles, nomine coeli et terrae significantes.—Aug. lib. i. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 3. Quod futurus est, jam factum est.—Idem. Solig. c. 26.
phrase and consideration, is to be understood. "Moreover, whom he hath predestinated, them also hath he called: and whom he hath called, them hath he also justified; and whom he hath justified, them hath he also glorified." God is said to have, already called, justified, glorified, all those whom he did foreknow, (ver. 29.) i. e. preapprove, (viz. as lovers of God, ver. 28,) and so predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son, because he already done whatsoever is requisite for him to do, for the curement and effecting of them in due time.

By the way, lest the table of this doctrine should prove a snare of error or mistake unto any, four things are diligently to be minded. First, that that one great act of God, by which he being, in time, unto the world, and unto all things that either been or ever shall be produced or done in it, was not exercised or acted by him in time, but from or in eternity. The reason hereof is, because being really and formally one and the same thing his essence and being, as learned men generally acknowledge, it could not be of any later or other edition than so. Secondly, that this act, though acted or put forth by him from eternity, is not, therefore, to be conceived as an act that is passed, or finished long since, but as permanent, and continued in him or by him, yet without any succession or continuity of time, according to that of our Saviour, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," John v. 17. There is nothing perishable or changeable in God: what he worketh once he worketh always, though the products or effects of his working alter and change, rise and fall. The late learned Bishop Davenant asserteth these propositions as true, in the opinion of all divines: 1. That God can will nothing in time. If so, then that will of his, by which the world was at first created, and by which all things are in continuance and succession of time produced, must needs be from or in eternity. 2. That God cannot but have that will which he hath. If so, then that will, by which he created the world, and gave being unto all things that were to receive being in time, is unchangeably permanent in him. 3. And, lastly, That God cannot have any will which for the present he hath not.* If so, then that will of his, by which he operateth or worketh faith in Peter, in time, as for instance to-day, was in him from eternity; and, consequently, God wrought as much towards the making of Peter a believer, before he did believe, as he did when he was actually brought to believe.

A third thing to be considered for a right understanding of the point in hand is, that that act of God we speak of, though from eternity, and the effects or productions of it in time, yet is it not to be conceived as precedaneous in time to these effects or productions themselves. Though God, for example, willed that would

* Deus potest nihil velle ex tempore; Deus non potest non habere volitionem, quam habet: non potest habere volitionem, quam non habet.—Denavent, Animadversions upon a Treatise, entitled "God's Love to Mankind," p. 484.
from eternity which was efficacious to make Peter a believer in

time, yet is not the act of this will in God to be looked upon or

conceived as preceding in time that act of Peter’s will by which he

became or was made a believer. The reason hereof is, because

there is no succession, nothing sooner, nothing later, nothing be-

fore, nothing after other in order in time, in eternity, nor yet

in those things which are measured by eternity, as by their proper

and adequate measure, as all the acts of God are. This is the

constant and known doctrine of the ablest and best divines, as well

modern as more ancient.* The priority or precedence which the

act of God hath before the act of Peter, by the mutual coincidency

or joint concurrence whereof Peter is made a believer, is only a

priority in worth, dignity, excellency, eminency, &c., not in time.

God doth not will the conversion of Peter before he is converted,

nor the glorification of Peter before he be glorified, though he

willed, or rather willeth, both the one and the other from eter-

nity. The reason of the seeming strangeness of these things to

our apprehensions is, our ignorance and unacquaintedness with the

nature of eternity, which being nothing else but God himself,

considered as his own measure, in point of duration, and in this

respect exceeding difficult to be rightly and fully apprehended and

conceived by us; men in the mean time being generally averse

from intense and deep speculations, it is no great marvel if it

seems a kind of uncouth mystery unto them. But that which we

here affirm, viz., that that act or operation of God by which Peter

was made an actual believer, though it were in God, and put forth

by him from eternity, yet was not in order of time before that act

of Peter himself whereby he believed, but only in a kind of trans-

cendent excellency or dignity, proper to eternity, is nothing but

the avouched doctrine of many learned and judicious men; yea,

and clearly follows from the very nature of eternity, as it is gene-

* In Deo non est vicissitudo temporum.—P. Mart. loc. Class. 3, c. i, sect. 6. *Et-

ernum est, quod principio et fine caret, ut Deus.—*Ursinus, Explic. Cat. qu. 58. (Quod autem

principio et fine caret, non potest habere medium, nec prius, aut posterius.) *Etetnitas, neque

habet, neque habere possit prius aut posterius.—Zanch. de Nat. Dei, l. ii. c. 8, qu. i, thes. 1.

Et paulo post: Ila vere dicuntur aeterna, quod principio et fine carentia, cedem semper sunt, ab

omnia successione libera. Vid. plura huc spectantia in seqq. In ipsa aeternitate nulla spatia

temporis cerno; quia spatia temporis, praeteritis et futuris rerum motibus, constant. Nihil

autem praeterit in aeterno, et nihil futurum est. Ita quod praeriter, esse desinti: et quod futu-

rum est, nondum esse cepit. *Etetnitas autem tantum modo est: nec fuit, quasi jam non

sit: nec erit, quasi jam non sit.—Aug. de Vera. Rel. cap. 49. *Etetnitas ipsa Dei substantia

est, quae nihil habet mutabile: ibi nihil est praereturum, quasi jam non sit: ibi nihil est futu-

rum, quasi nondum sit: sed non est ibi, nisi est: non est ibi fuit et erit, quia et quod fuit, jam

non est: et quod erit, nondum est: sed quicquid ibi est, non nisi est.—Idem. in Psal. ci. Præsens

autem tempus, si semper esset præsens, nec in praereturum transiret, jam non esset tempus, sed

aeternitas.—Idem, Confess. l. xi. c. 14. Etsi aliquid semper vivat, tamen si mutabilitate

patiatur, non proprie aeternum appellatur, quia non semper ejusmodi est; quamvis immortale,

quia semper vivit, recte dici potest.—Aug. lib. qu. 83, qu. 9. Carere initio, et fine, et omni

mutabilitatem, dat aeternum esse.—Rich. de S. Victor, l. ii. de Trin. c. 9. In illo (Deo) nec

praeretiri, nec futura reperiri quaeant, sed cuncta mutabilia immutabiliter durant: et quae in

epsis simul existere non possunt, illi simul omnim adistant: nihilique in illo praereti, quod

transiti: quia in aeternitate ejus, modo quodam incomprehensiibili, cuncta volumina seculorum

transactia maneat, currentia stant.—Greg. Moral. l. xx. c. 23.


rally defined and described by our reformed divines themselves, yea, even those that are esteemed most orthodox. “But if,” saith Austin, speaking unto God, “there was no time before heav-

en and earth, why do men ask, What didst thou then?” meaning,

before heaven and earth were made, “for there was no then where there was no time. Neither dost thou precede times in time; for, if so, thou couldst not precede” or be before “all times. But thou precedest all times that are past with the stateliness” or tran-
s-cendent height “of thine eternity, which is always present; and art above all times that are future, because they are yet to come; and when they are come, they will be past, ‘but thou art the same, and thy years fail not.’”* Consonant hereunto is the saying of

Boetius, a philosopher: “Nor ought God,” saith he, “to be con-

ceived by us more ancient than his creatures in respect of any quantity of time, but rather in respect of the propriety of his simple nature.”† Fr. Arriba, a late writer, and acute, thoroughly

versed in the learning of the fathers and schoolmen, hath notably cleared this point, and fully answered all objections which, as far as I am able to apprehend, can be brought against it. I shall pre-

sent the reader with two or three passages from him relating unto it. “When the holy Scripture,” saith he, “and our school-
doctors with it, say and teach that things which are eternal are be-

fore things made in time, they speak truly not of a priority for-
mally so called, such as that is which is found in those things which the consideration of what is before and what is after does belong, which I have often said cannot agree to eternity, but they speak of a kind of eminential priority, in respect of which those things which never fail, but are always the same indefinitely, are truly said to be before things that are temporal,” or in time, “not indeed formally, but eminently: for speaking properly of this emi-
nential priority, or of an eternal permanency, that which is indefi-
nitely,” i.e. without end or ceasing, “is before that which some-
times is and sometimes is not.”‡ In another place he expresseth himself thus: “Our former doctrine supposed, it manifestly fol-

 lows from thence that those words of Christ, John viii. 58, ‘Before Abraham was, I am,’ and that of Paul, Eph. i. 4, ‘He chose us in him before the world was made,’ with many other like places of Scrip-


† Neque Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quantitate, sed simplicia potius proprietate naturae.—Boet. de Consol. Philos. 1. v. pros. 6.

‡ Dum Scriptura sacra, simulque doctores scholastici, dicunt, aeterna esse priora temporali

bus, vere loquentur, non de prioritate formali, quibus est illa que reperitur in his rebus, quibus convenit ratio prioris et posterioris (quod sepe diximus aternitati convenire non possit), sed loquentur de prioritate, sub quaedam eminentiali ratione, quatenus illa que nunquam deficiunt, et que indecimenter sunt, vere dicuntur priora temporali, non quidem formaliter, sed eminenter. Propri enim loquendo de ista prioritate eminentiali sive de aeterna permanenti, illud quod indecimenter est, prors esse dictur quam illud, quod aliquando est, aliquando vero non est.—Franc. de Arrila, Opusis Con. 1. iii. c. 15, sect. 7.
Necessitateth Free Causes.

ture, every where obvious, are to be taken according to the manner of our understandings, as meant of this eminential priority, not of an antecedency in respect of time, not of any priority properly and formally so called."* The same author elsewhere hath these words: "Inasmuch as the proper and formal reason," or nature, "of mutability, wherein the ratio" or nature "of time consisteth, is intrinsical" or essential "unto time and to the differences of it, as past, present, and to come, and consequently imperfection must needs be intrinsical to them also," (mutability always including imperfection,) "evident it is that fuit and erit, was and will be, whereby that which is past and that which is to come are signified, cannot" with truth, "formally or properly be attributed unto God."† This, then, is the third thing to be diligently considered, to prevent all misprision about the point in hand: no act of God is before any act of the creature in respect of time.

The fourth, and last thing of like necessity to be considered for the same end is this: No act of God, nor co-operation of his with his creature, imposeth any necessity upon any free-working cause (I mean upon any cause which is free in the nature or constitution of it to work, or not to work, and to work variously) to act so, or so, determinately; nor yet supposeth any necessity or infallibility of any act or effect producible by such causes, before, or until they be actually produced. Nor is this any thing but the received doctrine of orthodox and approved divines. "God," saith Austin, "so administereth, or governeth all things which he hath created, that he suffereth them to exercise and act their own proper motions."‡ This saying of Austin is frequently cited and made use of by our best reformed divines, as P. Martyr,§ Polanus,|| and others, in their explications of the providence of God, and the manner of his concurrence with second causes in their motions. Now if God, notwithstanding any influence of his upon, or any co-operation with his creatures in their motions or actings, yet so far comports with them as to leave them to their native principles, properties, and propensions, in their actings, doubtless, he doth not necessitate, or determine with any strong or irresistible hand, the wills of men in their respective actions or elections; it being the innate and most intrinsical property of these to determine themselves, or make their elections freely. There is every whit as much, if not much more, in this

* Ex presupposita doctrina manifeste deductur, illa verba Christi, "Antequam Abraham ficeret, ego sum," et illud Pauli ad Eph. i., "Elegis nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem," et plurima alia Scripture sacra similia loca, que passim occurrunt, accipienda esse, nostro modo intelligendi, de ista eminentiali antecedentia ad tempus, non vero de antecedentia proprie et formaliter sumpta, &c.—Ibid. sec. 11.

† Cum temporis ejusque differentiae, quarum sunt praeae, praeeritum, et futurum, sit intrinsca formalis ratio mutabilitatis, in qua consistit ratio temporis, et consequenter sit illis intrinsecus imperfectio, non debet tribui Deo formaliter, fuit, vel, erit, quibus praeeritum et futurum significatur.—Ibid. c. 14, sect. 7.

‡ Sic administrat omnis, quae creavit, Deus, ut eisam ipsa proprie exercere et agere motus sint.—Aug. de Civil. l. vii. c. 30.

§ Loc. Com. Class. i. cap. 14, sec. 2.
|| Symph. Cathol. cap. vi. thes. 5.
passage of Anselm. "And when," saith he, "we deny that there he means in eternity, "is any thing either past or future, which hath been, or is to be hereafter, in time, we do not affirm that what hath been, or is to be hereafter, is in no sense or consideration there; we only say that these things are not there, after the manner, or in the consideration of things, either past or to come, but indesinently and as present, with such a presentiality which is proper to eternity. And in this there appears no contrariety at all.* So then, that may, without any repugnancy or contradiction, be said to be changeable, or alterable in time, before it is, which remains unchangeable and unalterable in eternity; not before it is, or after it is, but indesinently; because here, viz. in eternity, there is nothing according unto time," (or any the differences hereof.) The same author, to the same purpose, and in the same tract where the recited passage is extant, writeth thus:—"For as, although in eternity, there is nothing which was, and is now past; or that shall be hereafter, but only that which is, and yet in time something hath been, and something shall be, without any repugnancy: so may it be proved without any inconvenience, that what cannot be changed or altered in eternity, may yet in time, before the being of it, be changed or altered, by the liberty of the wills of men. Though there be no thing there, in eternity, but what is present; yet presence there is not a presence in time like unto ours, but an eternal presence," (which neither admits any thing past nor to come,) "in which all times are contained. So that, as the present time comprehends every place, and whatsoever is in any place, so is all time, and all things that are, or are done in time, comprehended and shut up in the present" (or now) "of eternity."† He that speaketh such things as these, clearly supposeth that no act of God whatsoever, how unchangeable, how potent soever, imposeth any necessity upon the wills of men, to act so or so, to will this or that determinately, before they have acted or willed; but that Judas, for example, notwithstanding any act of predestination in God concerning him, was at as much liberty at the first, whether he would betray his Lord and master or no, as any other of his fellow-apostles, or any other man; yea and at any time, before he did betray him, he was, notwithstanding any act of God in suspending or withdrawing his grace from him, at

* Et quando negamus fuuisse, vel futurum ibi esse aliquid, quod in tempore fuit, aut erit, non asserimus id quod fuit, aut erit, nullo modo ibi esse; sed tantum praeterito vel futuro modo dicimus non ibi esse, quod ibi indesinenter est suo presenti modo: in his vero nulla videtur adversarii contrarietas. Sic utique sine sula repugnantia dicitur, aliquid esse mutabile in tempore, antequam sit, quod in aternitate manet immutabiliter, non antequam sit, vel postquam est, sed indesinenter, quia nihil est ibi secundum tempus. Nam hoc ipsum est ibi aternaliter, quia temporaliter aliquid est, et antequam sit, potest non esse, sicut dixi.—Anselm. Opusc. de Concord. c. 1.

† Sicut enim quamvis in aternitate non fuit, aut erit aliquid, sed tantum est, et tamen in tempore fuit, et erit aliquid, sine repugnantia: ita quod in aternitate mutari nequit, in tempore aliquando per liberam voluntatem, antequam sit, esse mutable, probatur absque inconvenientia. Quamvis ibi nihil sit, nisi praesens, non est tamen illud praesens temporale, sicut nostrum, sed aernum, in quo euncta tempora continentur. Sic quidem quemadmodum praesens tempus contingit omnem locum, et quae in qualibet loco sunt, ita aern primo simul clauditur omnem tempus, et quae sunt in qualibet tempore.—Ibid.
liberty whether he would have proceeded to the actual betraying of him or no? "The Jews," saith Gaudentius, an author much more ancient than the former, "were willing to do the evil which they did. And certainly, had they been unwilling, they had not done it. Doubtless it is no less than high sacrilege so much as once to think that God who is not only good and just, but goodness and justice itself, should either command or constrain that to be done which himself condemneth."* So that, in this author's sense also, the wills of men are left free by God either to will or not to will, things that are sinful.

Nor is this contrary to the doctrine of our later and best reformed divines, when they speak like themselves, and drive out of the rut or worn path of common credulity and unmanlike pre-occupation. "For God," saith Peter Martyr, "indeed draws all things" (along with him,) "but yet he yields or gives way after such a manner, that he troubles or disturbs nothing" (in its course.) "So things, though in respect of their natures they incline indifferently to either side, yet they are by God bowed" (or brought over) "more" (or rather) "unto one."† It is clear from the instance which he immediately subjoins, that he here speaketh of the wills of men; and, consequently, that the import of the passage cited is, that God acts no further, no otherwise towards the determination of the wills of men, but only by swaying, or inclining them more, or rather, to the one side than the other; and consequently leaveth them free not only from all co-action or force, but from all necessitation also in their actions, or elections. For he that is only swayed or bowed more, or rather, to one thing than another, hath, this notwithstanding, a liberty or power left him, whether he will conclusively pitch upon that whereunto or towards which he is swayed and bowed, or no. The mind of the same author in the same discourse is delivered in these words. "God," saith he, "will alter or change the will of a man; being evil; he makes use of admonitions, sermons, chastisements; for these are the organs and instruments of the providence of God," &c.‡ If admonitions, sermons, &c., be the instruments and means which God useth to change the evil hearts and wills of men, certainly he doth not change them by an irresistibleness of power, nor in any way whereby the change is necessitated; because then there could be left no place for any usefulness or serviceableness at all of his instruments in or about the change. Nothing can be instrumental in or about the producing of an action or effect, but only in a way of, and according to, such an efficiency which is proper to the nature of it. Charms and spells

* Voluerunt Judaei facere malum, quod fecerunt. Et utique si noluerant, non fecissent. Certe ingentes sacrilegiae est vel cogitare, quod Deus, qui non solum bonus et justus, sed ipse benitas est, et ipse justitia, vel jubeat aliquid, vel cogat fieri, quod ipse damnat.—Gaudentius, serm. 3. ad Neophyt.
† Trahit enim Deus quidem res omnes, sed ita quodammodo cedit, ut nihil turbet. Ita res quamvis natura sua aegue propendeat in utramque partem, tamen a Deo inclinatur magis in alteram.—P. Mart. loc. Com. Class. 1. c. 13. sect. 4.
‡ Vult [Deus] mutare malam hominis voluntatem; adhibet admonitiones, sermones, castigationes. Hae enim sunt organa et instrumenta Providentiae Dei, etc. Ib. sect. 16.
written in paper and hung about the neck, are not instrumental in the cures which are wrought by Satan, there being no property or quality in them which holds any proportion of causality with such effects as the cures of diseases are; nor can such cures be truly said to be wrought by them, though, haply, they would not be wrought without them. In like manner, the nature and property of admonitions, exhortations, chastisements, &c., being to persuade or work the hearts of men to a change, contingently only, and not in a way of necessitation, much less of compulsion, impossible it is that these should be instrumental in the hand of God in changing the hearts of men, unless it be supposed that this change is wrought by him contingently, and with a possibility at any time, before it be effected, that it should not be effected; and this not only in respect of his liberty, whether he will go through with the work and effect it or no, but in respect of the liberty of the will itself, whether it will be persuaded to a change or no. But concerning the uselessness of exhortations, &c., in case conversion be wrought by an irresistible or necessitating hand, we shall have occasion to speak more at large hereafter. To the point in hand, Polanus, another reformed divine, as orthodox by repute as Mr. Calvin himself, prefixes this title to his fifth thesis in the sixth chapter of his Sympohy. "God so worketh by the means of nature, that he worketh nothing contrary to their nature: and therefore the providence of God constraineth not the will of the creature."* The nature of the will is to work, I mean to assent and dissent freely, contingently, and without any necessitation, either from within or without. Therefore, if God worketh nothing contrary to the nature of the will, the will still consents unto him upon such terms that she is at liberty to dissent, any thing that he worketh to procure this consent notwithstanding. Besides, if God worketh nothing contrary to the nature of second causes, then he needs, according to the common expression of divines, as necessary causes, work necessarily, so with contingent causes contingently. Take the acknowledgment of the same truth from Ursine also, another late writer, no less orthodox than the former. "The will of man," saith he, "even moved of God, is able not only to resist, but also to assent unto and obey God in his motion, by her own and proper motion; which doing, she doth not only suffer, but acteth also, and raiseth up, or springs, her own actions; although she hath the power of assenting and obeying from the Holy Ghost."† A little after these words he saith, "For God so moveth men, that yet they are not ravished by force or might, but they move themselves also." No man can more clearly

* Deus sic agit per media natura, ut nihil contra eorum naturam; ac proinde Providentia Dei non cogit voluntatem creature.
† Potest enim voluntas morta Deo non tantum repugnare, sed etiam abscondiri et obsoléti Deo moventi, non secundo motu: quod faciens, non tantum patitur, sed etiam agit et ciet ipsa suas actiones; et si viri assensendi et obsequendi non ex se habet, sed ex gratia Spiritus sancti accepist. — Ursin, Catec. part 1, qu. 8. Et paulo post: voluntas humana regitur non tantum, ub alio, sed etiam a se. Deus enim sic movet homines, ut tamum non vi rapiantur, sed et ipsi se moveant.
assert the perfect contingency or non-necessity of the actions of
the wills of men determinately, under the movings and actings of
God, than this author hath done in the words presented. He that
saith, "the will moved by God is able not only to resist, but also
to obey God in his motion," doubtless meaneth, or supposeth, that
the will is able to resist him in or under those very motions, under
which, and by means whereof, she is able also to consent unto
him and obey him. Besides, saying that the will receives power
of consenting and obeying from the grace of the Holy Ghost, doth
he not plainly imply, that she receives from hence no necessitating
impressions unto these actions? A man that is unavoidably carried,
or acted in or towards an action, can in no tolerable construction
be said to receive power for the performance of this action; inas-
much as the conferring of a power to do that which a man was not
able to do before, doth noways infer the taking away of that power,
such as it was, which this man had before, not to act. Notwith-
standing my sense and judgment in the point is, that the will
receives from the grace of the Holy Ghost not only a power of
consenting, and obeying God in his gracious movings, but,
sensu sano, these actings themselves. But of this hereafter. It
is, I suppose, needless, and would be more tedious than difficult,
to make the pile of testimonies from our best and most approved
authors, for the confirmation of the truth last asserted, any whit
greater. He that is afraid to believe the truth, unless he hath an
arm of flesh to encourage him, may find many more quotations
from several authors of best acceptance with himself, for his encou-
ragement in this kind, drawn together by me in my late Answer to
Mr. Jenkyn, from pp. 67 to pp. 74. But for the truth of this
assertion, hitherto managed, and credited by the authority of men,
that no act of God is either destructive to the contingency of, or
impositive of any necessity, or infallibility in the event, upon the
actions or the wills of men, it hath been in part already, and may
in place more convenient in the progress of our present discourse,
be further evicted and confirmed by dint of argument and demon-
stration. In the meantime my request to him, that shall, haply,
undertake to answer these discussions, is, that he will not needlessly
trouble either himself, his reader, or me with producing the authors
lately either named or referenced, or any others, as asserting the
contrary to what I have argued and proved from them in other
places; for I can more willingly grant than question that they have
many inconsistencies, in other parts of their writings, with those
things which I quoted for them. So that for any man to quote
them in oppositum, is to gain nothing to their cause but what is
already granted to their hand; only it may prove the easing of the
truth from the burthensomeness of their authority in other points,
inasmuch as the speaking of contradictions is a plain confession of
our ignorance or doubtfulness, at least, of the truth.

We have now done with those four cautions so necessary, as was
said, for the keeping our apprehensions and understandings upright
under the reception of this great truth, absolutely necessary to be believed for the vindicating and clearing the perfect actuality and immutability of God, viz., that, how, or after what manner soever God acteth, or is interested in the successive and new productions of actions or beings in the world, that which he doth in this kind he doth it not by any new influx, operation, or exertion of himself, but by that one great creative act, wherein he gave out himself from eternity. This opinion, because it may seem strange unto many, yea, and nothing less than a truth, though we have already sufficiently, I trust, established it upon the foundations of the Scriptures, we will further show to have been clearly held and asserted by very judicious and considering men; and, secondly, add a reason or two for the proof of it.

For the first, no man I presume will deny, that great light of the church and agent for Christ in his days, Austin by name, to have been a judicious, considering, and learned man. How full of the opinion now asserted he was, his writings in many passages declare, I shall insist only upon some few. "So then," saith he, "day was made in what day God made heaven and earth, and every green thing of the field before they were upon the earth. Before, seven days were reckoned: here, one day is spoken of, which day God made heaven and earth, and every green thing of the field and every herb, by the name of which day all time may well be conceived to be signified; for God made all time, with all creatures that should be in time, together, or at once," &c. If God made all time, and all things that were to be in time together, he must needs make all things by one and the same act. Elsewhere the same author demands, "And how" (or after what manner) "did God say, 'Let there be light?' in time, or in the eternity of his word? If in time, it must be mutably" (or with the change of himself): "and if so, he must speak it by the creature, because he himself is unchangeable." Not long after he inquires further about the same point, thus: "Or whether doth not this belong to the nature of that word of his, of which it is said, 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.' For when it is said of him, 'All things were made by him,' it is evident enough that the light also was made by him, when God said, 'Let there be light;' which if so, that which said, 'Let there be light,' is eternal, (or from eternity,) because the Word of God, God with God, the only Son of God, is co-eternal with the Father, although God speaking in (or by) his eternal Word, the creature was made in time."† From this piece of dis-

* Factus ergo est dies, quo die fecit Deus celum et terram, et omne viride agri, antequam essent super terram, et omne pabulum agri. Superius septem dies numerabantur, nunc unus dictur dies, quo die fecit Deus celum et terram, et omne viride agri, et omne pabulum, cujus diei nomine omne tempus significari bene intelligitur. Fecit enim Deus omne tempus simul cum omnibus creaturis temporalibus, etc.—Aug. de Gen. contra Manich. l. ii. c. 3.

† Et quomodo dixit Deus, Fiat lux: utrum temporaliter? an in verbi aeternitate? et si temporaliter, utique mutabiliter, etc.—Aug. de Gen. ad lit. 1. i. c. 2. Et paullo post: et utrum hoc
course, these three things are evident: 1. That the author's judgment was, that God did not give being unto things, by any multiplied or distinct acts or workings, but by one and the same most simple word, the efficacy and force whereof extendeth itself to the production of all particular creatures or beings, when, and at what time or times, the speaker pleaseth. 2. That this word was not spoken by him in time, but in or from eternity. 3, and lastly, That notwithstanding the word was spoken from eternity, yet the effects or productions of it received their respective beings in time. The same author, in the progress of the same tractate, relating, as it seems, to the last-recited words, demandeth thus (upon occasion of Moses' reducing the works of creation to one day, Gen. ii. 4, whereas in the former chapter he had digested them into six), "Is not this that which we endeavoured to show in a former book, that God made all things together, or at once?"* And presently after, glancing by the way at those words (as the Latin translation readeth them), "He that liveth for ever hath created all things together," Eccles. xviii. 1, he plainly affirmeth, that the reason of this expression, "In the day that the Lord created heaven and earth," &c. Gen. ii. 4, "was, that we might understand how that this day was seven times repeated," (or mentioned before) "that so seven days might be made up."† To save the labour of transcribing, the reader may please to peruse from the same pen another testimony, as full and pregnant to the point in hand as any of these in the sixteenth section of this chapter. So that Augustine was grounded on this foundation of truth, that no multiplication of effects argueth any plurality or multiplication of acts or exertions in God, in or for the productions of them.

Let the judicious reader consider, whether the same truth lieth not at large also in these words of Ambrose: "There is not in God," saith he, "any accident, motion, or new will, or temporal counsel; nor is his thought varied according to the inequality of mutable things."‡ If there be no motion, or new will in God, he cannot be conceived to advance, or put forth any action, or operation in

* ipsum ad naturam pertineat verbi ejus, de quo dicitur. In principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat verbum. Cum enim de illo dicitur, Omnìa per ipsum facta sunt, satis ostenditur et lux per ipsum facta, cum dixit Deus, fiat lux: Quod si ets est, aternum est quod dixit Deus, fiat lux: quia verbum Dei Deus apud Deum, filius unicus Dei, Patri co-æternus est: quamvis Deo hoc in aeterno verbo dicente, creatura temporalis facta est. Cum enim verba sint temporis, cum diciamus, quando et aliquando, aternum tamen est in verbo Dei, quando fieri debeat aliquid; tunc fit quando fieri debuisset in illo verbo est, in quo non est quando, et aliquando, quoniam illud totum verbum aeternum est.

† An forte hoc illud est, quod in libro superiore mollebamus ostendere, simul Deum fecisse omnìa; quandoquidem narrationis illa contextio cum sex dierum ordine cuncta creata et constituentia memorasset, nunc ad unum diem omnìa rediguntur? e.t.c.—Aug. de Gen. 1. v. c. 3.

‡ Ita jam non ex alio Scriptura sancta libro profertur testimonium, quod omnia simul Deus creaverit, sed quædam testificatio paginis consequentis, et ex hac re, nos admonet dicens, cum factus est dies, fecit Deus caelum et terram, et omne viride agri; ut istsim diem septies intelligas repetitum, ut fierent septem dies.—Aug. de Gen. 1. v. c. 3.

‡ Non est in Deo accidents, motus, aut nova voluntas, aut temporale consilium: nec cogitationo ejus cum rerum mutabilium inaequalitate variatur.—Amb. de vocat. Gent. cap. 10.
or from himself, for the effecting of any thing in time, which he did not put forth from eternity. Nor is this saying of Bernard less conscious of the same opinion, be it error or truth; "God cannot deny himself, nor not do the things which he hath already done, as it is written, 'Who hath done the things which are yet to come?'"* In this citation from the Scripture, "Who hath done the things which are yet to come?" he followeth the translation of the Septuagint, as the ancient writers more generally did, who make the Scripture so to speak, Isa. xlv. 11. In saying, that "God hath done the things that are yet to be done," or to come, he clearly supposeth that God by one and the same simple act, which is really the same with his essence or being, giveth being to all things whatsoever, that either have been, are, or shall be hereafter. D'Arribâ, an author formerly mentioned, as one that profited more than many of his fellows in the learning of the fathers and schoolmen, is more clear and distinct in the business than any of the former; yea, and asserts the opinion now contended for, as confessed with one mouth by all divines. "Secondly," saith he, "I suppose that, which all divines with one mouth confess and teach, though many of them, conversing too much with temporal things, very hardly comprehend" (or understand) "what they most truly herein affirm, viz. that although the things which are properly created by God be multiplied, and distinguished in themselves" (one from another), "not only in respect of their proper and respective" (natures, or) "beings, but also in respect of the" (several) "times and places in which they receive the beginnings" (or first) "of their beings by a true creation, yet the act of the Divine will, or the command or decree of God, by virtue whereof things are created, and begin to be, are not therefore multiplied, or distinguished between themselves."† This supposition of his he further explains and argues in that which follows. It were easy to multiply testimonies from this author, yea, and not hard to do the like from many others, of more credit haply than this, for the confirmation and countenance of the matter in hand. But for authorities I shall conclude, with that confident though brief assertion of an approved author of our own, formerly touched.

"For in all divines' opinions," saith the late Bishop Davenant, "these propositions are true; God can will nothing in time; God cannot but have the will, which he hath; he cannot have any which he hath not."‡ If God can will nothing in time, nor have

* Non potest seipsum negare Deus, neque non facere, quae jam fecit, ut Scriptum est, Qui facit, quae futura sunt.—Bernard. Serm. 68, super Cant.

† Secundo suppono illud, quod universi Theologi uno ore consentinunt, et docent, liceat multi eorum temporalibus assueti, difficillimem comprehendunt sensum, quod verissime enunciunt, hoc scilicet, quod quamvis res, quae proprie creatur a Deo, multiplicetur et distinguatur inter se, non solum penes proprias entitates, sed etiam penes temporum et locorum, in quibus per veram creationem existere incipiant, non propteram Divinam voluntatem actus, sive imperium et decreta Dei, cujus virtute res creantur, et incipient esse, multiplicantur, et distinguantur inter se, etc.—Fr. de Arrib. Op. Concil. l. iii. c. 8, sect. 6.

‡ Deus potest nihil velle ex tempore; Deus non potest non habere volutionem, quam habet; non potest habere volutionem, quam non habet.—Davenant, Answ. to Mr. Hoard, p. 484.
any will which he hath not, then must needs that act of his will, by which he gives being unto all things, be from eternity: nor doth any thing which is produced, or receiveth being in time, receive this being, by virtue of any presentaneous, or new act of the Divine interposal or concurrence, other than that which was exercised and put forth by him from eternity.

Give me now leave to add a reason or two, briefly, for the further clearing and asserting of this doctrine. First, it is a known maxim in reason, that every thing must needs act in proportion, or according to the manner of the being of it. Now the being of God being most absolutely perfect, the manner of his acting or working must needs be most perfect also. So then all repetition, or multiplication of acts in the creature, for the obtaining of such ends which it desireth, arguing imperfection, (a principle upon which the apostle himself builds, Heb. x. 1-3: "For the law having a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of them, can never, with those sacrifices which they offered year by year continually, make the comers thereof unto perfect. For then would they have ceased to be offered," &c.,) it must needs be agreeable both to reason and truth to conceive that God, by reason of the infinite perfection of his being, must needs reach and compass all his ends, and, consequently, give being to whatsoever he intended should be at any time, by one and the same simple act or dictate of his will.

Secondly, the being of God being an eternal being, the formal consideration whereof, as all the diligent surveyors of eternity unanimously agree, standeth in an incommutability, i.e. in an absolute and utter impossibility of admitting the least alteration or change of being, impossible it is that he should act any thing in time other than what he acted in or from eternity; because any new acting in time supposeth an alteration or change in that being which so acteth. To act that afterwards which a man acted not before, infers a manifest alteration or change in his being, as viz., from the posture, habit, or condition of a man at rest, to the state or posture of a person in action. So that if it should be conceived, that God produceth or giveth being to those various and multiplied effects which successively receive being, and are produced in the world, by a multiplicity or plurality of acts, it must be conceived withal, that all this multiplicity of acts was levied and raised by him from eternity. But that God from eternity did not multiply productive acts according to the number of things produced in time by him, for if he multiplied them at all, it must in reason be according to this proportion or number, is evident from hence; because these supposed multiplied acts must be conceived to have been exerted and put forth by him, either together, and, as it were, at one and the same instant, or else successively, one after another. Successively raised they could not be, because all succession and divisibility are wholly inconsistent with eternity,† in which there is nothing before or after

* Modus operandi consequitur modum essendi.—Vid, Thom. 1. part. qu. 89. Art. 1. in cor.
† Ratio æternitatis ab ævo et tempore, distinctam dicit rationem: æternitas autem nec habet
other. Together and at the same instant they could not be raised; it being repugnant to a cause that is most singly, simply, and indivisibly one, without all manner of composition of parts, or otherwise, as God or the divine essence is, to exercise a plurality of acts together, especially really distinct, and differing one from another as the acts we speak of, in case they were supposeable in God, must needs be.

If any man shall yet demandingly object, But how can these things be? How is it possible to conceive that God by one and the same act, and this acted from eternity, should give to all that infinite variety of creatures, motions, and actions, which are produced successively in the course and current of time? I answer, 1. It is very possible to conceive that an infinite power may do any thing, which imports perfection. Now as it imports a degree of perfection in men, as in point of wisdom, strength, power, &c., by one and the same action or engagement of themselves to bring several ends to pass; so doth it argue nothing but pure and mere perfection that God, by one act or word speaking, should bring forth a world of such and such a duration, so furnished in all respects, in every part of this duration of it, as seemed best suited to himself, with creatures, motions, actions, and events of all kinds.

2. To aid and ease our imaginations a little, in conceiving the manner how that great wonder we speak of may be, Augustine remember, somewhere in his writings, findeth a kind of shadow or resemblance of it in the art, as he calleth it, or principle, by virtue whereof, or out of which, a man prays or speaketh, in respect of the several syllables, words, or sentences which, in praying or speaking, he uttereth successively by means of such a principle. The art or skill of praying is but one and the same principle in a man; yet, by virtue of it, even whilst it remains fixed and unmoved in the mind, the man produceth words successively as he pleaseth, such and such words in the first place, such and such other in the second, &c. In like manner God, by one and the same eternal act, eternally permanent in him, may express and utter himself unto the world by the producing of such and such things in every kind, according to all variety of times and seasons as himself pleaseth.

This for answer to that great and difficult objection against the perfect actuality of God, raised from the successive production of things by him.

Another objection seeming to war against the same property and perfection in God is this. If God be a pure and complete act, admitting no kind of potentiality in his nature or being, how then can he be a free agent? much less the freest of all others, as he is commonly affirmed to be? And if it be impossible for him to act otherwise than as he acteth, or to give being to any other things...
than what are produced by virtue of that one act which he put forth from eternity, must he not needs be conceived to act out of the necessity of his nature, and not out of the liberty or freedom of his will?

To this I answer more briefly, 1. To act out of the necessity of nature, imports not only the ignorance or nescience of what is so acted, but an utter incapacity in him that acteth, to reflect with understanding upon his action. And therefore no intellectual nature can be truly said to act out of the necessity of their natures, but out of the liberty of their wills, because they are capable, at least, of knowing what they act, and by denying, or withholding the consent of their wills, may prevent or forbear any action that passeth from them. Nor doth that of the apostle, Rom. vii. 19, "the evil which I would not, that I do," any ways imply the contrary; because his meaning is not, that when he did that which was evil, and which he hated, his will for the present did not consent to the act; for had not his will now consented, impossible it is that such an act should have been done by him; but the evil which he would not, or which he hated, viz., in the standing and habitual frame of his heart, and out of the case of surprisal, this he did, viz., through temptation, or being prevented with human infirmity.

2. God is said, and truly, to be agens liberrimum, the most free agent of all others, 1. In respect of the exercise of his act, or execution of what he willeth; he is obnoxious to no disappointment in what he willeth to effect, by any wisdom or power whatsoever; whereas all other agents are liable, in what they intend to put in execution, to suffer a check and failure from him. 2. He is the most free agent, in respect of the elicit acts of his will (such are his purposes, decrees, intentions, desires, &c.) two ways, 1. As these are not occasioned or raised in him by means of any necessity or dependence which he hath upon any of their objects, or the things purposed, decreed, intended, or desired by him, but proceed out of the mere goodness of his will; whereas the elicit acts of created wills are (for the most part, if not always) begotten by some necessity or other of the things willed, lying upon him that willeth, as not being complete in the enjoyment of himself, without the willing or obtaining such things. 2. As these acts of his will arise and flow from their principle or fountain, with a greater enlargement thereof, and more strength of exertion, than the like acts proceeding from the wills of any other agent or agents whatsoever.

3. and lastly, The immutability of his will, or the determination of it to things actually and de facto willed by him, is no impeach-
able rectitude of the will of God, excluding all possibility of sinning, excluding no degree at all of liberty or freedom from it, but only weakness, imperfection, and defectibility, which are the indelible characters of created wills.*

Having thus cleared this foundation of truth, the perfect actuality of the Divine essence or being, let us consider what we may safely, and with evidence of deduction, build upon it. If then God be a pure and mere act, without all potentiality or possibility of change, in one kind or other, then those volitions or acts of his will, which, with the Scriptures, we call election, reprobation, predestination, &c., are not to be conceived as acts that are past,† or like to the volitions, purposes, or intentions of men, which, being once fulfilled and put in execution, die and cease to be in them; but are to be looked upon as being really and in truth one and the same thing with His essence and being, which is unchangeably permanent, only with relation to the effecting of such things in time which answer and hold proportion with the actings of men, when they elect, reprobate, or predestinate. So that, for example, when God prevails by his word and Spirit with men in time to believe, and during this their believing, continueth the same gracious means towards their further establishment and edification, he is said to have elected them, not because he had formerly passed any act of election concerning them, which is now at an end and ceaseth; but because he doth by them or to them as men use to do by trees, when they have chosen them out of the forest for building, they fell, saw, hew, and every ways prepare and fit them for such places in the building they intend, for which they are most proper and useful. Again, when God, upon men's neglect, refusal, or abuse of the means of grace vouchsafed unto them, shall withdraw these means to such a degree that they fall to open profaneness, looseness, &c., he is now said to have reprobated them, not because he had at any time before passed an act of reprobation against them, which was now put in execution, and consequently expired and over; but because he now acteth, or rather forbears to act, in relation towards them, as men are wont to act in reference to what they disallow, refuse, or reject, whether things or persons.

Hence it is that the apostle Paul professeth his care of doing those things which might exempt him, not from under any decree of reprobation, which had already passed against him, but from falling under any such displeasure of God, which putth men into an estate of reprobation, i. e. alienateth the heart, will, and care of God from them. "But I keep under my body," saith he, "and bring it into

* Non habet liberam voluntatem is, qui consilium mutare non potest impeditus a causa externa, et si mutare velit. Deus autem consilium suum non mutat, nec mutare potest, nec proper impedimentum causa externa, nec proper naturae, aut facultatis defectum: sed quia non vult, nec velle potest, consili sui mutationem, propter immutabilium rectitudinem voluntatis sua, in quam neque error, neque ulla mutationis causa potest cadere.—Ursinus, Expl. Catech. part. i. qu. 8.

† Cavendum est, ne falsa quadem imaginacione, actum voluntatis Divinae quasi praeteritum cogitemos.—Solves, in. 1. Dissert. 40.
subjection, lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself” ἀδέλφος γίνομαι, “should be” (or rather become, or be made) a “cast-away,” or reprobate, 1 Cor. ix. 27, as the word in the original properly signifieth, and is elsewhere so translated, Rom. i. 28; 2 Cor. xiii. 5—7; 2 Tim. iii. 8; Tit. i. 16.

Nor doth that expression of Paul concerning God’s choosing men in Christ before the foundation of the world, Eph. i. 4, import any act in God that is past, and now ceaseth to be in him, but only the standing counsel and good pleasure, which is eternal in him, being nothing else but himself and his Divine essence, of giving life and salvation unto all those who believe in Jesus Christ, by the means which he graciously purposeth also to vouchsafe unto them, and accordingly vouchsafteth for this end. The reason why the Scriptures usually express the acts of God which are eternally permanent in him, by verbs of the preterperfect tense, and in phrases importing time past, is, as Anselm long since well observed, because there being no words used, or known amongst men, which signify that kind of permanency or presence which is proper to eternity, words signifying the time past, are taken up by the Holy Ghost to express matters of that consideration and import rather than others, which signify either the time present or to come, because that which is past, being unchangeably past, and in no possibility of being any other than past, holds better agreement with, and is more like unto that which is eternally (and so unchangeably) present, than either that which is present in time or future; inasmuch as that which is present is not unchangeably present, but will shortly be past; and that which is future is not unchangeably future, but will in time be present, and after this, past.*

Secondly, If God be a perfect, pure, and complete act, all in present being and doing, which is any ways possible for him either to be or to do, then must his counsels and decrees concerning men, and particularly those lately mentioned, election, reprobation, predestination, &c., of necessity respect them and relate unto them, not as individually or personally considered, or as such or such men by name, but in a specifical consideration, or as persons so or so qualified, or of such or such a condition; so that, for example, God cannot be said to elect or to have elected Peter, simply considered as Peter, or as a person consisting of that individual body and soul of which Peter consisteth, but as an individual or person of such or such a species, sort, or kind of men. The reason why an election of men in a mere personal consideration, must needs be inconsistent with the perfect actuality of God, is because it evidently supposeth a mutability or possibility of change in him, as, viz. in

* Unde cognosci potest eum (Apostolum) propter indigentiam verbi significantis aeternam præsentiam, usum esse verbis pretertere significatio, quoniam que tempore præterita sunt, ad similitudinem aeterni præsens, omnino immutabilia sunt. In hoc si quidem magis similis sunt aeterno præsenti temporaliter præterita, quam præsentia: quoniam que ibi sunt, non quam possunt non esse præsentia, siquum temporaliter præterita, non valent unquam præterita non esse: præsentia vero tempora omnia qua transcendent, sunt non præsentia.—Ansel. Opusc. de Concord. c. i.
point of affection, as from hatred unto love; which an election of them, according to a specifical consideration, doth not.* For if God, for example, shall be supposed to have chosen Peter, simply and merely as Peter, and not as a believer, or as a godly or righteous person; and if it shall be supposed withal, that Peter before his conversion was a wicked and ungodly man, as the greatest part of men are before their conversion, especially at some distance of time from it, it will follow, that God in time comes to love that person which sometimes he hated, which evidently supposeth a mutability or changeableness of affection in God, according to a change made in the creature. The Scripture saith expressly of God, that “He hateth all workers of iniquity,” Psal. v. 5. Therefore, whilst Peter was a worker of iniquity, most certain it is that God hated him. But upon this Peter’s conversion, it must be supposed that God laid aside his affection of hatred towards him, and put on the affection of love instead thereof, which imports a palpable and plain change in him.

If it be said, that such an election as I plead for, viz., of men under a specifical consideration supposeth such a mutability in God as this, because according to the notion and tenor of this election, God must be supposed one while to hate Peter, viz. during the time of his non-conversion, and whilst he is a worker of iniquity, and another while to love him, viz. when he is regenerate; I answer, no, the election asserted infers no mutability or change in God at all. The reason is, because it doth not make the persons of men merely and simply as such, the precise and formal object of election; but considered as the individuals of such a determinate species, sort, or kind of men, or rather the species itself of such and such men. Now, as it is as truly, as commonly, said in logic, that though all the individuals of a species be corruptible, may change or die, yet the species itself remains incorruptible and cannot be changed; so in the case in hand, the love of God in election, and there is the same reason of his hatred in reprobation, being primarily and directly pitched and set upon a certain species of men, and not upon the persons of men, save by accident, and indirectly only and in a consequential way; hence it follows, that the proper and formal object of God’s love, and so of his hatred, being unchangeable, his love itself cannot be said to be changed, nor yet his hatred, though the persons of men change never so often from good to evil, or from evil to good. Though all the righteous persons on the earth should apostatize and turn wicked, yet the species or kind of righteous men would be still the same, the same in nature, definition, worth, loveliness, and in whatsoever is essential or proper unto the species. And as God loved this generation or species of men with this love of election, before the foundation of the world, as the Apostle’s phrase is, and consequently whilst as yet no individual person thereof was in actual being, in like manner were all the righteous persons in the world dead or degenerated into wicked men, the love of God towards the species would be still the same; yea, and towards all

* Concerning the unchangeableness of God, see more, chap. x. of this discourse.
NO REPROBATION FROM ETERNITY.

particular persons of men that should at any time rise up in this species. According to this notion of election, it argues no mutability or change at all in God, either in respect of his love or hatred, that one while he loves, and another while hates one and the same person; because it supposeth no person of men to be any otherwise, or in any other consideration, the object of his election or of his elective love, but only as righteous; nor any person of men the object of his reprobation or reprobating hatred, but only as wicked or ungodly. As it argueth no change or alteration in the heavens, or in the climates thereof, that a man removing himself by travel out of a cold climate where he felt the inconvenience of cold into a hot, partakes here of the accommodation of warmth, it only argues a change in the man in respect of his residence and place; so neither doth it argue any change at all in God, nor of any affection in him, in case a man passing from sin, where he lived under the hatred and displeasure of God, unto righteousness, enjoys in this condition the love and favour of God. This only imports a change in such a man, but no change at all in God or in any affection of his. He now loves, but where and what he loved before, and hates still, as before he hated. Nor doth this notion or doctrine of election and reprobation any ways suppose, either righteousness to be the cause of the former, or sin of the latter, as opportunity may be given in the process of the discourse more fully to show.

Thirdly, If the actuality of God, or the Divine Essence, be so absolute and full, as proof hath been made, then can there be no such act or decree in him, as the reprobation of men, personally considered, from eternity. The reason is, because all men being in the loins of Adam, whilst he was yet standing, just and righteous, were partakers of the same condition of righteousness with him; and, consequently, of all privileges, amongst which the love and favour of God are predominant, equitably belonging to this condition. So that all men, whilst they were found in this condition or estate of righteousness, were the objects of God's love, who is frequently in Scripture said to "love the righteous," Psal. cxlvi. 8, to "bless the righteous," Psal. v. 12, "with his favour to compass the righteous as with a shield," &c. Ibid. Therefore, all this while, I mean during their innocency and integrity in Adam, there was none of them that could possibly be the objects of God's hatred, or, consequently, of his reprobation. So that if any of them be reprobated, it must be afterwards, and in time: for upon the same supposition, which is manifestly true, viz. that they were all the objects of his love whilst they were righteous and innocent, it could not be from eternity. And, besides, if God loved them, personally considered, it is impossible that, without a change in his affection, which is absolutely inconsistent with the perfect actuality of his nature and being, he should ever hate them, or reprobate them, under the same consideration, or under any other, than as changed personally from righteousness unto sin, from innocency unto transgression. In which case God may be said to
hate them, though he loved them formerly, without the least shadow of a change, either in himself or in his affection, as was lately proved.

Fourthly, and lastly, From that complete actuality of the Divine Essence, which hath been argued and asserted, it plainly follows, that all God’s counsels, purposes, and decrees are absolute, unchangeable, irreversible, upon any terms, suppositions, or conditions whatsoever. Any change, or possibility of change, in any of these, supposeth a change, or possibility of a change in him; either of which are diametrically inconsistent with a complete actuality, which excluded all potentiality, and capacity of change in what kind soever. It is true, many of the purposes and decrees of God have conditions essentially included in them, and which are parts of them; but, taking the whole body or system of the decree, they are all absolute, irrevocable, indispensable. It is one of the great purposes and decrees of God, that if men believe, they shall be saved. Here is a condition, viz. believing, essentially included in the decree. But this condition doth not make the decree conditional, in reference to execution, nor any whit less absolute than those decrees are, which have no condition at all framed into them. For let the world stand or fall, let men, angels, and devils interpose, and oppose their utmost, this decree of God shall stand, and be put toties quoties in execution: If men believe, they shall be saved. There is the same reason of all others, which are of like tenor and frame. And thus, from the perfection of the Divine nature, we have evinced, 1. The simplicity thereof: 2. The most pure and absolute actuality thereof; and from both these, in a way of lawful, clear, and evident deduction, inferred several considerations and conclusions for the support and strengthening of our main building in this discourse: we have only one thing further to argue, from the infinite perfection of the nature of God. Therefore,

Thirdly, and lastly, If God in his nature and essence be absolutely and infinitely perfect, then can he act nothing, order, decree nothing, to the prejudice or hurt of any creature whatsoever, but only in a way of righteousness and equity, i.e. upon the consideration of some demerit or sin preceding. For not only to act, but to be able to act, unrighteously, or to intend evil, to or against the innocent, argues imperfection, and that in a very high degree. Because, as Job reasoneth and demandeth on the one hand, “Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?” and concludes, “not one,” Job xiv. 4; so may we on the other, who can bring an unclean thing out of that which is perfectly clean? surely not one. If the nature of God be infinitely perfect, there can be nothing in it, there can nothing proceed from it, or be done by it unjust, unequal, nothing hard, nothing that any bendeth or inclineth to the hurt or damage of the creature, being yet innocent. And if so, then can there be no such purpose, no such decree in him, as men commonly call reprobation, or an irre-
versible decreeing or ordaining of men, much less far the greatest part of men, to eternal destruction from eternity; no, nor yet any such preterition of men, whether we conceive it under the notion of an act, or of a mere negation, which even in the sense of those men, who think to qualify the harshness of the matter with the softness* of such a term, tendeth every whit as infallibly, as unavoidably, to the everlasting ruin and misery of the creature, as a positive reprobation could do. And indeed, the exchange of the word reprobation for a preterition no more easeth God, or vindicates the honour of his grace, goodness, love, bounty, towards the creature, than it would the justice or clemency of a judge, to plead on his behalf, that though he sentenced guiltless men unto death, yet he takes special care that execution shall not be done upon them with hempen, but with silken halters. For, as not to feed a man's enemy, when he is an hungry, or when he is thirsty, not to give him to drink, is interpreted by God, to be an avenging of a man's self, (Rom. xii. v. 19, compared with v. 20,) in like manner, for God to leave men in such a condition, or upon such terms, in and under which it is simply impossible for them to escape the vengeance of eternal fire, is constructively, and, as we used to say, neither better nor worse, than to ordain or decree him in a positive way to the suffering of this vengeance.

But here it is commonly pleaded on God's behalf, and said, Yea, but it is no unrighteous thing, no unequal or hard thing in God, to reprobate, or predestinate to destruction, and that from eternity, which or how many of his creatures he pleaseth, without any consideration of sin at all. This is his lawful and just prerogative, as he is the absolute Lord of his creatures: and if he useth it in reference to such or such of them, who can say unto him, "Why dost thou so?" Or, however, if he be conceived to have looked upon men, as lapsed in Adam, and so sinful, when he passed by so many of them, and left them in the hand of eternal ruin, without all possibility of an escape, is there so much as any appearance of unrighteousness or hardness in this? I answer,

1. As some men importunately officious unto kings and princes, and desirous to make their faces to shine above their native lustre in the world, have attempted to vest such prerogatives, as they call prerogative, in them, as a lawfulness of power to impose what taxes they please upon their subjects, to take away any man's estate they have a mind unto, to exempt such malefactors from death, which by the law of God ought to die, with many the like which have proved snares of dishonour and of danger unto them otherwise; in like manner, some men desirous to commend themselves unto God, as men zealous for his glory more than others, study and invent notions and senses of some Scripture expressions, to bestow upon him in the name of prerogatives, which they presume are much for his honour and glory in the world, which yet upon due

* Lenitate verbi tristitiam rei mitigante.—Civ. Offic.
consideration are found most unworthy of him, and of a broad inconsistency with his glory indeed. For what relish or savour of honour or glory unto God can there be, in bringing him upon the great theatre of the world; speaking thus, I will cast out of my favour and devote to everlasting burnings, to torments endless, ease-less, intolerable, insupportable, thousand thousands, and ten thousand times ten thousands of my most excellent creatures, men, women, and children, though they never offended me, otherwise than children may offend many thousands of years before they are born; yea, though I thus in the secret of my counsel intend to leave irrecoverably to the most exquisite torments that can be endured, and these to be suffered by them to the days of eternity, without all possibility of escaping, though they shall do the uttermost they are able to please me, and to reconcile themselves unto me; yet will I in words speak to their hearts, proclaim and profess myself unto them, to be a "God merciful and gracious, long suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth"; and Elentary also, to make the days of eternity

2. That prerogative, or prerogative will, as some call it, which God stands upon in the Scriptures, and claims to himself as a royalty annexed to the crown of heaven and earth, either in the ninth to the Romans or elsewhere, in reference to the condemnation and eternal destruction of his creature, standeth not in any liberty or power claimed by him to leave what persons he pleaseth to inevitable ruin, only upon consideration of Adam's sin, much less before or without any such consideration, but to make the terms, and conditions as of life, so of death, as of salvation, so of condemnation, and these indifferently and equally respecting men, not such as men are apt to think meet and fitting for him to do, but what himself pleaseth, i.e., such as the counsel of his own will adviseth and leadeth him unto. For he is said not to work all things, or any one thing simply "according to his own
but "to work all things according to the counsel of his own will," Eph. i. 11. So that in whatsoever God acteth or willeth, we are to look, not only for will, but counsel, i. e. wisdom and tendency unto ends worthy of him; and these discernible enough, as was lately said, by men to be such, if they were diligent and impartial in the consideration of them. As for example; the Jews thought it most equal, reasonable, and best becoming God, that he should constitute and ordain the observation of Moses's law to be the law of justification, life and salvation unto men; and the neglect, or non-observation of this law, to be the law of condemnation and of death. God here interposeth with his prerogative, and declares to them that his will and pleasure is otherwise, and that he constitutes and ordains faith in his Son Jesus Christ, to be the law of justification and life, whether joined with the observation of Moses's law or without it; and on the other hand, unbelief to be the law of condemnation and of death, though in conjunction with the strictest observation of Moses's law. This prerogative, indeed, God himself pleads and asserts to himself, with a majestic and God-like authority, speaking thus to Moses, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion," Rom. ix. 15. As if he should say, men shall not prescribe unto me laws or terms of showing mercy; I will not be advised or obliged by them, whom, i. e. what manner of persons, or how qualified, I shall justify and save; I mean to follow and to keep close to the counsel of mine own will in these great and most important affairs, which concern the life and death, the salvation and destruction of my creature. The same prerogative the Apostle also vindicateth unto him afterwards in the same chapter, in the similitude of a potter. "Hath not the potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?" Rom. ix. 21. Meaning that God had a like equitable power or prerogative over the great mass of mankind in Adam, to make what laws of life and death unto them he pleased, and to appoint who, or what manner of persons should be saved, and what manner of persons should be condemned, which the potter hath over the lump of clay which is before him, to make what vessels he pleaseth for honour, and what again he pleaseth for dishonour. But of this passage, as also of that, verse 18, we shall speak more at large towards the close of the discourse, where we intend an entire explication of the 9th to the Romans, from the beginning of verse 6, to the end of the 23rd. In the meantime, let this be taken along by way of caution, about what hath been delivered in this section, viz. that though the Jews thought it most equitable and most besemiing God, to justify men by the works of the law, rather than by faith in Jesus Christ, which notwithstanding, was the counsel and good pleasure of God about justification; yet this counsel and good pleasure of God, especially being from time to time so signified unto them by God himself as it was, might very well, had they not been negligent or willingly blind, have been apprehended and submitted unto by them, as a way
and means of justification far more rational, more full of wisdom and equity, and every ways more honourable unto and becoming God, than that way and method of their imagination, I mean by the observation of Moses's law.

3. Though it be not to be denied, but that God hath an absolute sovereignty and lordship over his creature, i. e. a lawful power to dispose of it as he pleaseth, yet it is an horrible indignity and affront put upon him, and no less than a constructive denial of his infinite grace, goodness, mercy, bounty, love, &c., to affirm that he exerciseth or administereth this sovereignty and power upon the hardest terms, and most grievous unto his creature that can lightly be imagined, yea and no ways conducing unto his own which, notwithstanding, they affirm, in effect, who maintain that from eternity he left, or purposed to leave, the far greatest his most excellent creatures, men, to everlasting misery and without any possibility of making an escape therefrom. Suppose that God should grant an absolute power unto parents over their children, as that if they pleased they might slay them, or dispose of them to be slain, which some learned men are not far from suppos- ing that God did grant unto parents under the law,* or else to ex- pose them to the wide world as soon as they are born, to suffer all the extremities that are incident to flesh and blood; can it be imagined, that persons of loving, kind, and tender dispositions by nature, would ever marry out of a desire to have children, that they might show their prerogative or absolute power over them, either in disposing of them unto death, or exposing them unto misery as soon as they should be born? Or are such intentions or desires as these any ways consistent with sweetness, goodness, and tenderness of disposition? How prodigiously then, and portentously inconsistent must it needs be with the grace, goodness, mercy, bounty, and love of God, which are all infinite, to create millions of men-creatures with a desire or intention to declare his prerogative over them, in leaving them irrecoverably, irrevocably, unavoidably, to the easeless, endless torments of hell?

4. Suppose such a preterition or dereliction of the creature as this could be reconciled or argued into some tolerable consistency with the grace, goodness, sweetness, love, bounty, and mercy of God, yet the wisdom of God will not bear them, as being most disadvan- tageous unto him in point of glory; or at least, comparatively dis- advantageous, I mean, in respect of that other most wise, just, and equal disposition of them, wherein, and according unto which, he is asserted to have predestinated or purposed so many of them, be they fewer or be they more, as should truly believe unto life and the residue, be they fewer or be they more, viz., all those who should not believe, being capable through years of believing, and otherwise competently rational, unto destruction. Such a predesti- nation of men from eternity as this the Scriptures clearly and fre- quently hold forth; yea, those that are contrary minded in the

present controversies, subscribe hereunto: and without controversy such a predestination as this is fairly and fully consistent with the glory of his wisdom, and highly commends and magnifies either all or the greatest part of his attributes, without the least disparagement or obscurcation unto any. Whereas that doomfull preterition, that blood which many wring out of the Scriptures instead of milk, hath no rational or intelligible comport at all with any of them, but casts a kind of spirit of obscurity and contristation upon them all. Nor did any of those, I verily believe, who have been the rigidest and most confident assertors of it, ever so much as undertake to show how, or wherein, it gratifieth or compleith with any of them; no, nor have they all been able, with any tolerable satisfaction to men of impartial and free judgments, to discharge it of those imputations of malignancy against the glory of the Divine attributes which the dis-assertors of it have charged upon it.

5, and lastly, The Scriptures are so far from countenancing or asserting any such exercise of prerogative in God over his creature, which consists in a most severe and dreadful dereliction of them from eternity to unavoidable and endless misery, that they still present him as a Creator of far another spirit, yea, of a spirit directly contrary to that such a dereliction notoriously imports. These frequently commend him as a Creator very gracious, loving, merciful, and bountiful towards all the works of his hands, and towards men above all; insomuch that our Saviour himself recom-mends him unto his saints, in his deportments even towards the worst and most unworthy of men, as an absolute pattern for them to imitate in doing good and showing mercy even to their enemies. "But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust," Matt. v. 44, 45. If it shall be supposed that God from eternity hath irreversibly doomed to eternal destruction those evil and unjust ones on whom he maketh his sun to rise, and sendeth rain, it must be supposed withal, that he intends the greatest evil unto them that can be imagined, even whilst he doth these good things unto them. If so, then must they who imitate him in such ways be the most accursed hypocrites and dissemblers under heaven; making show of love and kindness in their outward deportments, whilst war and blood are in their hearts, towards men; yea, and doing good unto them, with a purpose and desire of bringing so much the greater evil and destruction upon them thereby. But the Scripture everywhere abounds in giving testimony to the love and goodness of God towards all his creatures. The apostle Peter styleth him πιστόν κρίστην, a faithful Creator, and willeth Chris-tians to commit their souls unto him in well doing, 1 Pet. iv. ult., upon that account, viz., as one, or as a God, that would faithfully perform and discharge the relation of a Creator unto them. In
calling him a faithful Creator, he clearly intimates that there is a kind of natural tie or engagement upon every author of being, whether unto persons or things, which promiseth unto those receive being from them in any kind, a regular and due care in them for their preservation and good. The relation of a parent, father or mother, promiseth unto the child a regular care, desire, and endeavour in the parent for the comfort and well being of it. By virtue of this promise it is that, as the apostle informs parents stand bound to provide, and lay up for their children, 2 Cor. xii. 14. And parents who do carefully perform such engagements as these unto their children, may well and properly be called faithful parents. So the relation of a mother promiseth unto the infant born of her, and that with much asseveration and natural solemnity of protest, all care and tenderness for the we\being of it. In respect of this solemn promise it is, that God himself demandeth, “Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb?” Isa. xlix. 15, implying that such women are very unnatural and unfaithful that can. Yea, God himself speaking thus of the ostrich, “She is hardened against her young ones, as if the y were not hers.” Job xxxix. 16, clearly implies, that this creature only excepted, there is an universal tenderness and care in all others towards their young ones. In like manner every creature hath a very great and rich assurance from that very relation wherein it stands unto God, as a Creator, that upon a regular deportment of itself towards him, and such as any ways becomes a creature towards the Creator or Maker of it, it shall receive protection, preservation, and every good thing from him. Yea, the Scripture plainly implieth, that there must be a very great breach on the creature's part in point of degeneration and unworthiness before God looks upon himself as discharged from that care for the preservation and well being of it, which he promised, as it were, unto it, in his being the author of being unto it. Consider that passage in the Prophet Isaiah: “For it is a people of no understanding; there-fore he that made them will not have mercy on them; and He that formed them will show them no favour,” Isa. xxvii. 11. Doth not this clearly imply, that had not this people been very enormously and intolerably corrupted and degenerated, as it were, into the spirit and actions of brute beasts, suffering the glory of the work of God in their creation utterly to sink within them, had they but quitted themselves like a people of any competent reason or under-standing, the relation of a Creator in God towards them, would have wrought so effectually in him on their behalf, that he would have showed them mercy and favour in delivering them. The creature must depart and go astray very far from the Creator, and grow, in a manner, quite out of kind, before the Creator will or can cease to know, love, and respect it, as his creature. Hence it is that we find God himself so frequently mentioning and insisting upon his relation of a Creator unto his people, when he seeks to
satisfy and comfort them, as touching his love towards them, and care over them. " Thus saith the Lord that made thee, and that formed thee from the womb, which will help thee, fear not, O Jacob, my servant," &c., Isa. xlv. 2. So again, "Hearken unto me, O house of Jacob, and all the remnant of the house of Israel, which are borne by me from the belly, which are carried from the womb; and even to your old age I am he, and even to hoary hairs will I carry you: I have made, and I will bear, even I will carry and will deliver you," Isa. xlvi. 3, 4. "Thus saith the Lord, the Holy One of Israel, and his maker," &c. Isa. xlv. 11. Once more (to pass by many other places of like import) "But now, O Lord, thou art our Father; we are the clay, and thou our potter, and we are all the work of thy hand," Isa. lxiv. 8. As in the former passages, God strengthened the faith of his people by remembering them that he was their Creator and Maker, and consequently bare the affection and love of a Creator towards them; so in this last, they themselves declare how effectually that consideration, viz., of the relation of a Creator in God towards them, had wrought upon them to the strengthening of their faith in his love towards them, and care over them; and accordingly plead the same in their requests to him.

Nor is it prejudicial in the least to that demonstration which we intend to make from the said passages (with their fellows) viz., of the love and care of God as a Creator, to all the works of his hands, to pretend, that in these places and the like, God speaks only to his Church, and his elect ones. For, 1. The relation of a Creator in God is uniform, one and the same, towards the elect (believers) and towards reprobates, or unbelievers; the one being the workmanship of his hands, as well as the other; and therefore as promising to the one as to the other, if they understood or considered the voice of this promise. 2. If God, notwithstanding the relation of a Creator in him, were likely to have reprobated his creatures from eternity, especially had this people believed that he had de facto so reprobated millions of them, it had been a very slender support and encouragement to their faith, that he should remember them of his relation unto them, as their Creator. For might not they, upon such a supposition as this, have replied unto him, Lord, why dost thou so much inculcate into us the consideration of thy being our Maker and Creator, as if there were any thing in this to comfort us, or to relieve our faith concerning thy love to us, or care for us? Do we not know that thou art a Creator to many thousand thousands in the world, whom notwithstanding thou hastest, and castedst out of thy love without any cause given on their parts, from eternity? Therefore what assurance of grace and favour with thee can we receive upon any such account as this, that thou art our Maker and Creator? So that evident it is, that God himself doth acknowledge a gracious tie and engagement upon him, as a Creator, to love, respect, and take care for his creatures, until they voluntarily renounce and
disclaim their relation unto him, as his creatures, by walking rebelliously against him, or suffering the god of this world to deface the glory of his workmanship in them. And whereas he compareth himself in tenderness and care over his creature, unto a hen, which gathereth her chickens under her wings, they who make him like unto the ostrich, which leaveth her eggs in the earth, and forgettesth that the foot may crush them, or that the wild beasts may break them, and is hardened against her young ones, as if they were not hers, Job xxxix. 14, 15, (which astorgy God himself imputeth to want of wisdom and understanding in her,) have the greater sin, representing him altogether unlike unto himself.

Other scriptures there are exceeding many, which testify aloud the grace, and love, and goodness of God, as a Creator, towards his creatures. “The Lord,” saith David, “is good to all; and his tender mercies are over all his works,” Psal. cxlv. 9; erga omnia opera ejus, as Piscator; i. e. are extended and shown unto all his creatures. But had he intended from eternity to abandon the far greatest part of the best of his works, men, to the vengeance of eternal fire, could his tender mercies, in any tolerable sense, be said to be over these? Especially, can those men justify David in such a saying as this, who conceive and teach that whatsoever God doth in a providential way for such men so abandoned, as in causing his sun to rise or his rain to fall upon them, in filling their hearts with food and gladness, in giving them health, wealth, liberty, peace, &c. he doth all with an intent to harden them, and so to bring that heavy destruction upon them with the more severity and terror in the end, whereunto they were predestinated and appointed from the beginning? Will men call health, peace, liberty, meats, drinks, &c. given with an intent to become snares unto men, and to bring inevitable damnation upon them, the tender mercies of God? The holy man Job, being conscious to himself of no signal departure from God by unrighteousness in any kind, looked upon that dispensation of God in so severely afflicting him, as very strange, and that only upon this account, that he was his Creator. “Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me together round about,” meaning, that he was the sole author of being unto him, “yet thou dost destroy me. Remember, I beseech thee, that thou hast made me as clay; and wilt thou bring me into the dust again?” Job x. 8, 9. If Job thought it strange that God, being the author of life and being unto him, should, without any grand offence or provocation given him, handle him with so much severity, as he conceived, in the outer man, how incredible would the doctrine of those men have been unto him, who teach that God from eternity hath irreversibly consigned over to the merciless torments of hell fire millions of millions of men who never offended or provoked him in the least? The same author doth elsewhere also assert the universal love, care, and respects of God as a Creator towards men, alleging the consideration of these, as a grand en-
gagement upon him to deal justly and equally with his servants.

"If I did despise the cause of my man servant, or of my maid servant, when they contended with me, what then shall I do when God riseth up? and when he visiteth, what shall I answer him? Did not he that made me in the womb, make him? and did not one fashion us in the womb?" Job xxxi. 13—15. Clearly intimating a tender care and regard in God towards men, even the poorest and least considerable of them. After the same manner, Elisha also advanced the poor into equal respects with princes, before God; viz., because they, as well as these, are the works of his hands. "How much less to him who accepteth not the persons of princes, nor regardeth the rich more than the poor: for they are all the work of his hands," Job xxxiv. 19; clearly implying, that that relation wherein every man standeth towards God as his creature, is a pledge of security unto him that God tenderly loveth and respecteth him (excepting only the case before excepted).

From the Scriptures lately produced, (unto which double their number, confederate in the same truth with them, might be added,) it manifestly appears that such a hatred or rejection of the creature by God from eternity, as is commonly taught and received amongst us, is broadly and wholly inconsistent with that love, tenderness, and respect which the relation of a Creator to a creature every where imports; and consequently is not to be looked upon as any prerogative worthy of him.

CHAPTER V.

Four several veins or correspondences of Scriptures propounded, holding forth the death of Christ for all men, without exception of any. The first of these argued.

The premises considered, methinks it is one of the strangest and most importune sayings that, to my remembrance, I ever met with from the pen of a learned and considerate man, which I find in the writings of a late opposer of universal atonement. "I know," saith he, "no article of the gospel which this new and wicked religion of universal atonement doth not contradict." That which he calls a "new and wicked religion," the doctrine of universal atonement, I shall, God assisting, and granting life and health for the finishing of this present discourse, evince both from the main and clear current of the Scriptures themselves, as likewise by many impregnable and undeniable demonstrations and grounds of reason, to be a most ancient and divine truth; yea, to be none other but the heart and soul, the spirit and life, the strength and substance, and brief sum of the glorious gospel itself: yea, I shall make it appear from ancient records of best credit, and from
the confessions of modern divines themselves, of best account, ad-
versaries in the point, that universal atonement by Christ was a
doctrine generally taught and held in the churches of Christ for
three hundred years together next after the apostles. And if I
conceived it worth the undertaking, or were minded to turn the
stream of my discourse that way, I question not but I could make
it as clear as the sun shining in his might, that there is no article of
the gospel,” as this man’s dialect is, I mean, no great or weighty
point of the Christian faith, can stand with a rational consistency
unless the doctrine of universal atonement be admitted for a tru-
Yea, upon a diligent and strict inquiry it will be found, that, if any
man holds such a limited redemption as is commonly taught and
believed amongst us, and yet withal lives holy and like a Chris-
tian, he acts in full contradiction to such a principle, and happily
denies that in practice which erroneously he holds in judgment.
God, in such cases as these, makes grapes to grow on thorns, and
figs on thistles; nor doth there want any thing but sense and visi-
bility of the disproportion between the cause and the effect, to
make the lives and ways of such persons miraculous. Neither
doth any thing nor all things that I could ever yet meet with,
either from the tongues or pens of the greatest patrons of particu-
lar redemption, deliver me from under much admiration, that con-
scientious and learned men, professing subjection of judgment to
the Scriptures, should either deny universal or assert particular
redemption; considering that the Scriptures, in particularity,
plainness, and expressness of words and phrase, do more than ten
times over deliver the former; whereas the latter is no where as-
serted by them, but only stands upon certain venturous conse-
quences and deductions, which the weak judgments of men, so
much accustomed to error and mistake, presume to levy from
them; together with such arguments and grounds, which, upon
examination, will be found either to have no consistency with the
sound principles either of reason or religion, or else no legitimate
coherence with the cause which they pretend unto. Let us first
hearken unto the Scriptures lifting up their voices together for the
redemption of all men by Christ without exception: we shall af-
terwards, in due process of discourse, give a fair consideration to
those inferences and consequences of men wherein the strength of
their Scripture proofs standeth for the support of the contrary
opinion.

And first it is considerable, that the Scriptures do not only
speak to the heart of the doctrine asserted in great variety of texts
and places, but also in great veins and correspondences, or consorts
of texts, each consort consisting of several particulars of like notion
and phrase. I shall recommend only four of these companies
unto the reader; which when we shall have pondered in some
or all the particulars respectively relating unto them, we shall
add, to make full measure, the contributions of some single texts
besides.
The first division or squadron of Scriptures which speak aloud the universality of redemption by Christ, are such which present the gift and sacrifice of Christ as relating indifferently unto the world. The name of this kind of Scriptures, for the number of them, may be Legion, for they are many. Some of the principal and best known of them are these: "God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten," &c., John iii. 16; "that the world through him should be saved," ver. 17. "This is the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world," verse 29. "My flesh, which I will give for the life of the world," John vi. 51. "And he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world, 1 John i. 22. "And we have seen and do testify that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world, 1 John iv. 14. "For I came not to judge the world, but to save the world," John xii. 48. "For God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself," &c., 2 Cor. v. 19. To omit many others.

The second post of Scriptures standing up to maintain the same doctrine with uniformity of expressions amongst themselves, are such which insure the ransom of Christ, and the will or desire of God for matters of salvation, unto all men and every man. Some of these are—"Who gave himself a ransom for all," 1 Tim. ii. 6. "Because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead; and that he died for all, that they who live," &c., 2 Cor. v. 14, 15. "That he, by the grace of God, should taste of death for every man," Heb. ii. 9; "who will have all men to be saved," &c., 1 Tim. ii. 4; "not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance," 2 Pet. iii. 9. "Therefore, as by the offence of one the judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to the justification of life," Rom. v. 18; with some others.

A third sort or party of Scriptures, confederate with the former, (for substance of import, and between themselves for matter of expression,) are such which hold forth and promise salvation indifferently to him, and to whosoever will or shall believe. Of this sort are these, with their fellows: "And him that cometh unto me, I will in no wise cast out," John vi. 37; "He that believeth in me shall never thirst," ver. 35; "He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved," Mark xvi. 16; "That whosoever believeth in him should not perish," John iii. 16; "That through his name, whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins," Acts x. 43; "Even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all, and upon all that believe; for all have sinned, Rom. iii. 22, 23. It were easy to make this pile also much greater.

A fourth association of Scriptures, all pregnant with the doctrine we assert, consists of such places where Christ is said to have died for those who yet may perish, yea, and actually do perish:
and again, where such men are said to have been bought by him, their own negligence and willfulness in sinning, bring destruction upon themselves, and perish everlastingly. Places of this kind are famously known. “Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died,” Rom. xiv. 15; “And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died?” 1 Cor. viii. 11; “Even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring themselves swift destruction,” 2 Pet. ii. 1; “For if after they have escaped the pollutions of the world, through the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, they are again entangled therein, and overcome, the latter end is worse with them than the beginning,” 2 Pet. ii. 20; “Of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace?” Heb. x. 29; “Then his lord, after he had called him, said unto him, O thou wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt because thou desiredst me. Shouldest not thou also have had compassion on thy fellow-servant? And his lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due to him. So likewise shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye from your heart forgive not every one his brother their trespasses?” Matt. xviii. 32, 33, &c.

Let us begin with the texts of the first of the four orders mentioned, where the death of Christ is presented as relating unto the world. From the tenor and import of all the Scriptures of this denomination and tribe, it will be made evident that Christ died for all men, without exception of any, the word world in these places being necessarily to be understood in the proper and comprehensive signification of it, (I mean, for all men and women in the world, in and according to their successive generations,) and not for any lesser or smaller number, as for some of all sorts, for the elect, for those that shall believe, or the like. We shall, for brevity’s sake, argue only some of these places, and leave the light of their interpretations for a discovery of the sense and meaning of the rest.

The first proposed of these, was that place of renown, “God so loved the world, that he gave,” &c. John iii. 16. Evident it is from hence, that Christ was given, viz. unto death for them, or for their sakes, whoever they be that are here meant by the world. There are but three significations of the word, that to my remembrance I ever heard of as competitors in this place. First, some by the world, here understand the elect dispersed up and down the world. By the elect, they mean all those, and those only, who shall in time actually be saved, whom they call the elect, because they judge them to have been chosen by God from eternity out of the generality of mankind, with an intent to be by him with a strong hand and power irresistible, 1. Brought to believe; 2. Caused, or made to persevere believing unto the end; and, 3.
Hereupon eternally saved, the residue of men being absolutely rejected, and left to that unavoidable and heavy doom of perishing everlastingly. But that this is not the sense of the word world in the Scripture in hand, will appear by the light of these considerations.

1. The word κόσμος, here translated world, was never known to have any such sense or signification in the Greek tongue; nor was it, nor is it to be found in any author who wrote in this language, before, or about the time, when John wrote his gospel, in such a signification, nor yet in any near to it. Now the gospel, as is generally acknowledged, and that upon sufficient grounds, being written in the Greek tongue chiefly for the gentiles' sake, amongst whom this language was known and understood far and near, that they might be brought to believe, and so be saved by it, it is no ways likely that the evangelist should use words, especially in such master veins and main passages of it, as this is, in an uncouth, unknown, and unheard of signification.

2. Nor can it be proved, that it is to be taken in the sense now opposed, in any other place of the Scriptures themselves; but in very many places it signifies the universal system, body, or generality of men in the world, (we shall not need to instance for the proof of this, places being so frequent and obvious,) as also for that part of the generality of men which is opposite, and contradistinguished to the saints, i.e. to the elect, in their sense of the word elect, who yet would have these signified by the world. This latter signification of the word world, is evident in these Scriptures:—"We know that we are born of God, and that the whole world lieth in wickedness," 1 John v. 19; "Even the Spirit of Truth, whom the world cannot receive," &c., John xiv. 17; "If ye were of the world, the world would love her own; but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you," John xv. 19; to omit many others.

3. If by the world in the Scripture in hand be meant the elect, in the sense of the assertors of this signification, then it will follow, that God out of his great love gave Christ unto those, or for those, who stood in no need of him, at least either to preserve them from perishing, or to invest them with a right or title to eternal life, which yet are here laid down as the two only, or at least as two main ends of that great gift. For if exemption from perishing, or salvation, be absolutely, and without all consideration, awarded or decreed by God unto men before, or from eternity, they have a full right and title unto them, or unto the possession and enjoyment of them, by virtue of this award or decree, without the intervening of any thing else whatsoever. For what better right or title can there be to the enjoyment of any thing than a decree of heaven? or the award of him who hath an unquestionable right and power to dispose of all enjoyments whatsoever, as, and to whom he pleaseth? But more of this consequence hereafter.
4. The structure itself of the sentence, and tenor of the words, riseth up against this sense of the word in question. For (1.) If by the word world we understand the elect, we destroy the very grammar of the place, and make it an uncouth and harsh sentence, such, doubtless, as cannot be paralleled in any author, nor yet in the Scriptures themselves. Read we then the place thus, “So God loved his elect, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever.” —I demand how, or in what regular sense, that universal distributive particle, whosoever, or \( \pi\alpha\varsigma\delta \), every one that, shall be understood? It is a thing generally known to those that understand any thing in the rules of grammar, yea, the vulgar dialect of those that speak reason or common sense confirmeth it, that partitive or distributive particles of speech always suppose a difference, at least in possibility, between the things parted or distributed, and this in reference to what occasioneth the distribution. As for example. Suppose a great king having many sons, should express himself thus: I so love my children, that whosoever of them shall be dutiful unto me, I will bestow principalities, dukedoms, or other great matters upon them; should he not plainly imply a possibility, at least, that some of them might not prove dutiful unto him? In like manner, if the word world, in the Scripture in hand, should signify the elect, the distributive, whosoever, must needs imply that some of these elect might possibly not believe, and so perish; because believing, and not perishing thereupon, occasion the distribution here made.

(2.) Though our Saviour, in this period of Scripture, mentioneth only the benefit intended by God in the gift of his Son, to those that shall believe, viz., non-perishing and the obtaining of everlasting life; yet he plainly implies, and supposeth withal, the misery and loss which they should certainly suffer who shall not believe. Except this be supposed, we shall altogether misfigure our Saviour’s mind and scope in the place, and make him speak more like a man void of understanding than himself. For then the taste and savour of his words would be this: “God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth or not believeth in him should not perish, but,” &c. Therefore, certain it is, that he in the place in hand as well insinuates the condemnation or perishing of those who shall not believe, as asserts the salvation or non-perishing of those who shall believe. And besides, it is contrary to reason, especially in seriousness of discourse, in a positive and strict manner to suspend that upon the performance of such or such a condition which may be had without any such performance. This then being granted, that our Saviour here supposeth the certain perishing of those who shall not believe, the place, according to their sense, who by the world will needs understand the must run thus: “So God loved the elect, that whosoever of them believed should not perish;” but on the contrary, that whosoever of them should not believe, should perish. Which, according to their principles, against whom we now argue, is as if a man should say,
whichsoever of my sheep is no sheep, but a goat, shall have no pasture with his fellows.

(3.) They who by the world here understand the elect, must, if they will not baulk with their principles, suppose that Christ speaks at no better rate of wisdom or sense in this Scripture than thus: "So God loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever did that which was not possible for them to decline or not to do, should not perish, but," &c. Whoever, being serious and in his wits, required that in the nature of a condition from any man, especially in order to the obtaining of some great and important thing which he, of whom it was required upon such terms, was necessitated or had no liberty or power but to perform? What father ever promised his son his estate, either in whole or in part, upon condition that whilst he rode upon a horse he should not go on foot? or upon condition that he would do that, which a force greater than he was able to resist should necessitate him to do? So that the whole tenor and carriage of the verse renders the interpretation of the word world, hitherto encountered, a mere nullity in sense, reason, and truth.

5. The context and words immediately preceding, will at no hand endure that sense of the word world, against which we have declared hitherto. This little word for, "For God so loved," &c., being causal, importeth not only a connexion of these words with what went before, but such a connexion or relation as that which intercedes between the cause and the effect. So that the words in hand must be looked upon as assigning or exhibiting the cause or reason of that effect, which was immediately before mentioned. This being granted, as without breach of conscience it can hardly be denied, it will appear as clear as the light of the sun, that by the word world, in the place under contest, cannot be meant the elect only. The tenor of the two next foregoing verses, for together they make but one entire sentence, is this: "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in him, or every one believing in him, should not perish, but have everlasting life." So that the effect here mentioned and expressed is the salvation and everlasting happiness of what person or persons soever of men, or of mankind, shall believe in Christ. The reason or cause hereof our Saviour discovers and asserts in the words in hand: "For God so loved the world, that he gave," &c. If now by the world we shall understand only the elect, the reason or cause here assigned of the pre-mentioned effect will be found inadequate to it, and insufficient to produce it. For God's love to the elect, and his giving his Son for their salvation only, is no sufficient cause to procure or produce the salvation of whosoever shall or should believe on him. For certain it is, that there is salvation in Christ for no more than for whom God intended there should be salvation in him. If there be salvation in him for none but for the elect only, then is it not true that whosoever believes in him shall be saved. For certain it is,
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that no man's believing puts any salvation into Christ for him; therefore if it were not there for him before he believed, yea, or, whether he believed or not, neither would it be there for him, though or in case he should believe.

6, and lastly. That by the word world, in the Scripture in hand, is not meant the elect, nor any thing equivalent hereunto, is evident also from the context in the verse and words immediately following, where our Saviour goeth forward in his doctrine, thus: "For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved," John iii. 17. This particle, for, being, as we lately noted, causal or ratiocinative, plainly show that he useth the word world, or speaks of the world in this verse, where he speaks of the condemnation of it, in the same sense, wherein he spake of it in the former, and the means of the salvation of it; otherwise he should not argue ad idem, i. e. to the point in hand. Now then to make him here to say, that God sent not his Son into the world, i. e., to take the nature or to live in the condition of the elect, to condemn the elect, but that the elect, &c., is to make him speak as never man, I suppose, spake, but not for excellency of wisdom or gracefulness of expression, but for weakness in both. To say that God sent not his Son into the world to condemn his elect, were but to beat the air, or to fight against a shadow; I mean, solemnly to deny that, which no man was ever likely to imagine or affirm. For how, or by what way of apprehension, should it ever enter into any man's thoughts that God should send his Son into the world to condemn those, whom out of his infinite love he had from eternity decreed to save with a strong hand, out-stretched arm, and power omnipotent and invincible? Or are not these the elect, in their notion of election, with whom we have now to do? Therefore certainly, the world, in the Scripture before us, doth not signify the elect.

A second interpretation of this word asserted by some, is, that by the world is meant genus humanum, or mankind indefinitely considered, i. e., if I rightly understand the mind of those who thus interpret, as neither importing all, nor any of the individuals or persons contained in or under this species or kind, but only the specifical nature of man common to them all; as when the Jews said of the Centurion, that he loved their nation, Luke vii. 5, their meaning was not, either that he loved all that were Jews, without exception of any; nor yet that he loved any particular person of them more than another; but only that he was lovingly disposed towards them as they were such a particular nation, as viz., Jews. But that this interpretation either falls in, in substance, with the former, and so is already condemned with the condemnation thereof; or else, with the third and last, which, as we shall hear presently, findeth in this Scripture a love in God towards all the individual persons of mankind, without exception of any; or else, that it vanisheth into nothing, and hath no substance at all in it, may be thus demonstrated. If by mankind, indefinitely con-
sidered, be neither meant a special or determinate number of the persons of men (which the former interpretation asserteth) nor yet the universality, or entire body of men, consisting of all the particular persons of men which either have been, now are, and shall be hereafter, (which the third interpretation avoucheth,) then is it only the nature of man abstractively considered, which we may, with the schoolmen, call humanitas, humanity, or the specific nature of man, not the persons of men, some, or all, which God precisely loved with that love, out of which he gave his only begotten Son. If so, then it undeniably follows, that Christ was given out of as much love to one person of mankind as to another, or, which is the same, not out of any love to any at all. For certain it is, that humanitas, or the specific nature of man, is not the person of any man. And so, according to this interpretation, God should love the reprobates as much as the elect, and consequently give his only begotten Son to death, as well for the one as the other. Besides, if it were the human nature, indefinitely considered, (in the sense pre-declared,) which God is here said to have loved with that love, out of which he gave his only begotten Son, from hence also it must needs follow, inasmuch as the reprobate (so called) partakes every whit as much in this nature as the elect, that Christ was given as much for the one as for the other. Again, if by the world, be meant the human nature, in the sense distinguished, the distributive particle, whosoever, with the following words, will be found incongruous, and no ways answering the former part of the verse, either in sense or regularity of construction. For the human nature is but simply one and the same nature or thing, nor doth it contain any plurality of species, or individual human natures under it; whereas a distribution cannot be but of some general, which containeth many particulars under it. And upon the supposal of such a sense of the word world, to make the construction regular in the latter part of the verse, the tenor of the whole must run thus: So God loved the human nature, that he gave his only begotten Son, that what human nature soever believed in him should not perish, &c. If this construction be ridiculous, so must that interpretation needs be which produceth it. Lastly, (to answer the illustration of this interpretation from Luke vii.) the Jews, who said the Centurion loved their nation, did not suppose that he loved only a handful or small number of their nation, and hated all the rest with an irreconcilable hatred; nor did they say, that he so loved their nation, that whosoever of this nation should trust him, he would be a signal benefactor unto them, or the like: nor did they, by their nation, understand the Jewish race, lineage, or descent, abstractively considered, and without reference to any person or persons whatsoever of this nation (for their nation, in this sense, was wholly incapable of any fruit or expression of his love, or of having a synagogue built to it or for it.) So that this instance no ways parallels or fits the interpretation of the word world, for the illustration or confirmation
whereof it is brought. But the plain meaning of the Jews saying that the Centurion loved their nation, was this, that he was ready and willing to do any office or service of love to any person or persons of their nation, because of their national relation, rather than to any other, upon such a consideration, when he had opportunity. The two pretenders being nonsuited, a sufficient way, I presume, is made for the admission of the right heir. Therefore,

The third, and last, interpretation of the world, in the Scripture under debate, is, that by it is signified universum genus humanum, the whole compass of mankind, or all and every individual person subsisting at any time in the human nature, without exception of any. This exposition stands with the ordinary and best known signification of the words, and withal gives smoothness and regularity of construction unto the period or sentence, which both the former (as upon examination hath been found) take from it, is of perfect accord with the context, and besides magnifies the love of God in the freeness, fulness, and extent of it incomparably above and beyond either of them; for,

1. The word world, κόσμος; very frequently and familiarly both in the Scriptures themselves, and in other authors, signifieth the generality of mankind, or of men: in the Scriptures especially, when it relates unto persons, it seldom or never signifieth any thing else, but either the generality of men simply and absolutely, or else that generality of men which comparatively comprehendeth all men, I mean the whole number of wicked and unregenerate men, who, in respect of their vast multitudes, and inconsiderable number of the godly (in comparison of them) are by John termed the whole world, “And we know that we are of God, and the whole world lieth in wickedness,” 1 John v. 19. Or, lastly, the promiscuous generality of persons, good and bad together, be they fewer or more, where a man converseth, or hath opportunity to come amongst, or speak unto. Several instances were lately given instances of the first signification also there are many. “Ye are the light of the world,” Matt. v. 14. “And the world knew him not,” John i. 10. “And I speak to the world those things which I have heard of him,” John viii. 26. “But I have chosen you out of the world,” John xv. 19. “Whom thou hast given me out of the world,” John xvii. 6. “God forbid: for then how shall God judge the world?” Rom. iii. 6. “As by one man sin entered into the world,” Rom. v. 12. “But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world, and the weak things of the world,” 1 Cor. i. 27. “There are, it may be, so many kinds of voices in the world,” 1 Cor. xiv. 10. The word being never used in the Scripture for the elect or godly party in the world, considered by themselves, or apart from others, but either for the wicked of the world alone, or apart by themselves, or else for both godly and wicked taken together, and as mixed one with another, it were very strange that our Saviour should use it in that by-sense, and unheard of else-
2. This interpretation of the word accommodates the whole verse or sentence with clearness of sense and regularity of construction, as is evident unto those who understand what the one and what the other of these mean. For by it the genuine and proper use and import of the distributive particle, whosoever, is fully salved, which is destroyed by either of the former, and such a distribution of a general made by it, which supposeth a possibility of a difference between the particulars contained under it, and into which the said general is distributed, according to the exigency of those things, in reference whereunto the distribution is made. As for example: here is a distribution made of this general, the world, i.e. of all mankind, by this distributive pronoun, whosoever; the occasion of this distribution is to show who, or what particulars contained under this general, i.e. what particular persons of mankind shall not perish, but have everlasting life; and withal, by a tacit antithesis or in a consequential way, as hath been already noted, to show what other particulars contained under the same general shall perish, and not have everlasting life. The former are said to be such as shall believe on the only begotten Son of God; the latter are clearly implied to be such who shall not so believe. Now, if it should be supposed that there was, or is, no possibility that any such difference should be found between the particulars, into which the general is here distributed, as believing, and not believing, the distribution would be altogether needless and vain; yea, and would dissense the whole sentence. These things are plain and sensible to every understanding that knows what belongs to common sense or regularity of syntax.

3. This exposition of the word world, makes a clean joint, a rational and pleasant coherence, between this verse and that which follows; as also between this and the two verses immediately preceding. The words of the two preceding verses are these, "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up; that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life." Now, certain it is, that Moses did not lift up the serpent with an intent of healing to be conferred by it upon such or such a definite or determinate number of persons; nor with an intent, either on his part or on God's part, that none should look upon it but only such a parcel or determinate number of men; but with an intent, not only that whosoever in the event did look upon it, and could not but look upon it, might look upon it; but that whosoever would, might look up unto it, and that whosoever, being stung with the fiery serpents, did look up unto it, should be healed thereby. This is evident from the story. "Make thee," saith God to Moses, "a fiery serpent, and set it upon a pole; and it shall come to pass, that every one that is bitten, when He looketh upon it, shall live," Numb. xxi. 8. Now, then, all men without exception being stung
with that fiery serpent, sin, unless Christ should be lifted up upon the
cross, with an intent on God's part and in himself; 1. That every
man, without exception, might believe in him; and 2. That every
man that should believe in him, should be saved by him. He
could not be said to be lifted up, as (i.e. upon the same terms of an
universal accommodation on which) Moses lifted up the serpent in
the wilderness. Therefore, our Saviour, to give the world a satis-
ifying account how it comes to pass that the Son of man, meaning
himself, should be lifted up upon such terms, viz. for the universal
benefit of salvation unto all mankind, he assigns the love of God to
the world, as the reason or productive cause of it. For God so
loved the world, that, &c. Therefore, by the world, he must needs
mean all mankind, or the generality of men, that were bitten or
stung with sin, unless we will say, that God gave his Son for the
salvation of those whom he loved not.

The tenor of the following verse is this, "For God sent not his
Son into the world to condemn the world, but," &c. In these words
our Saviour confirms his former assertion, touching the love of
God to the world, in giving his Son for the salvation of it, by re-
jecting that reason or motive of his sending him into the world,
which men might imagine did occasion this his sending by God, and
besides which, there could none other well be imagined, but only
that which he had asserted, viz. an intent or purpose in Him, in
God, of condemning the world by Him. Now to make Christ to
say, that God sent not his Son into the world to condemn mankind,
or the generality of men, as having sinned against him, is to make
him say that which is savoury and comfortable, and that which op-
poseth, or is apt to prevent such a sad imagination, as was very in-
cident to the minds of men through a consciousness of the guilt of
sin, viz. That if God ever did, or should, send his Son amongst
them, it would be to judge or condemn them. But to make him
say, that God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the elect,
i.e. those few whom he infinitely loved, and to whom he had
peremptorily, and without all possibility of reverse, decreed non-
condemnation before this sending of him, is to make him speak
at an extreme low rate of sense or reason, and to labour, as the pro-
verb is, in lifting a feather; insomuch as no such thought or imagi-
nation as this was ever like to bear upon or trouble any man's spirit.
Inasmuch then as no other interpretation of the world, in the for-
mer verse, but only that which hereby understandeth the generality of
men-sinners, will accommodate this verse, in respect of the connexion
between them, with any tolerable sense, evident it is, that that
needs be the true interpretation thereof.

By the way, when Christ saith, "For judgment I am come into
this world," &c., John ix. 39, He no ways opposeth what he here
saith, viz. "That God sent him not into the world to condemn the
world." For in the former place, he speaks not of the intent, but
of the event; in this, not of the event, but of the intent of his
sending or coming into the world. Christ was not sent into the.
world with any intent on God's part, nor came with any intention of his own, to make those which see to become blind, meaning either to augment or to discover to their shame the spiritual blindness and ignorance in such men, who being ignorant, presume of their knowledge by one means or other; but with an intent to heal the blindness of all, to their comfort, peace, and glory. Therefore, if any man through a foolish and proud conceit of his own knowledge and wisdom, shall stumble at, or reject the gospel and doctrine of Christ as foolishness, and so discover himself to be blind, ignorant, and foolish in the end; this is merely adventitious and accidental, in respect of the antecedent, primary, and direct intention of God in sending Christ into the world, as Calvin himself affirmeth.*

If it be demanded, But did not God intend, that whosoever should stumble at or reject Christ, should, in such a sense, be made blind? I answer, Yes, doubtless: God did intend to punish all manner of sins with judgments suitable to them. But his intention of making those blind, in the sense declared, who should reject Christ or his doctrine, was not that intent or purpose, out of which he sent Christ into the world, which was the genuine and natural product of his love, but such an intent which his perfect hatred of sin, especially of sin committed against the law of grace, formed in him.

4. The interpretation of the word world, now under assertion, magnifies that divine attribute, the love of God, incomparably more and above either of the former. They, who by the world understand the elect only, (which is the substance, also, of the second interpretation, unless it chooseth rather to resolve itself into this third, as was lately proved,) allow a very small, narrow, and inconsiderable sphere, for so noble, active, and diffusive a principle, as the love of God is, in comparison of those who extend it to the whole circumference of mankind. The whole element, and vast body of the air, in all the dimensions of it, height, depth, length, and breadth, make but a proportionable sphere for the sun, wherein to display the fulness of the glory, and to express the activity of his abundant light: nor will the whole universe of creatures, take the whole number and entire host of them, a primâ ad ultimam, et ab ultimâ ad primam, make a theatre any whit too large, capacious, or extensive, for the abundant riches and fulness of the love of God to act like themselves upon. They who present the love of God in the gift of his Son Jesus Christ, as contracted to the narrow compass of the elect, i. e. of those only who shall in the end be saved, and preach this for the gospel unto the world, do by men, in respect of their spiritual accommodation, as God should do by the world in their temporal, in case he should keep his sun

* Quod autem alibi docet Christus, se in judicium venisse, quod vocatur Petra scandali, quod dictur positus in mutilorum ruinam, id accidentale est, vel ut sua loquar, adventitium.—Cate. in Joh. iii. 17:
in a continual eclipse, suffer ten parts of the light of it to be perpetually obscured.

5. This interpretation, we now plead, is of fair and full consist-
ency with those things which the Scriptures so frequently and
constantly teach and affirm, concerning the nature of God, his
mercy, sweetness, love, goodness towards all his creatures, his
equal and impartial administration of rewards and punishments in
the world, his non-acception of persons, his ardent, serious, and
compassionate desires that none should perish, but that even the
vilest and wickedest of men should return from the evil of their
ways, and be saved, his not delighting in the death of those who do
perish, with much more of like consideration and import. There is
an obvious and manifest agreement between the exposition we
contend for, and all such veins of Scripture expression, as these:
whereas the other interpretations are at an absolute and manifest
defiance with them.

6. And, lastly, the sense now argued for is attested by Calvin
himself upon the place, with several other Protestant divines.
"Both," saith he, "are here distinctly delivered unto us; namely,
that faith in Christ is of a saving nature unto all; and that Christ
therefore brought life, because his heavenly Father would not have
mankind to perish, which he loveth." And more plainly afterwards:
"He useth a note of universality, both that he may invite all to
the participation of life, and that he may cut off matter of excuse
from unbelievers. The word world, which he useth before like-
wise, importeth as much. For though there will be nothing found
in the world worthy the favour of God, yet he showeth himself
propitious, or favourable, unto the whole world, in that he calls all
men without exception to believe in Christ, which is nothing else
but an entrance into life."* In the former of these passages, the
interpretation we stand for, is largely enough asserted; but in the
latter, we have it with measure heaped up, pressed down, and
running over. For here, he doth not only say that God showeth
himself propitious, or favourable unto the whole world, but further,
that he calls all men to faith in Christ, and invites all men to
participation of life. Therefore, doubtless, his judgment was, at
least whilst he had this Scripture before him for his steerage, that
there was life and salvation in Christ for all men, and that such terms that all might partake of it, as well one as another:
and, consequently, that he died for all men; inasmuch as there can
be no life in him for those to partake, for whom he died not, no
more than there is for the devils. Gualter, another Protestant

* Utrumque hic distincte nobis traditur: quod scilicet fides in Christum omnibus sit vivi-
ifica: et quod idea vitam atulirt Christus, quia celestis Pater genus humanum, quod
amavit, perire nonolit. Et postea: Universalem notam apposuit, tum ut promiscue omnes ad vitam par-
cipansionem invitet, tum ut præcidat excusatam incedulcis. Eodem etiam pertinent nomen
mundi, quo prius usus est. Tametsi enim in mundo nihil reperitur Dei favore dignum, se
tamen toti mundo propitium ostendit, cum sine exceptione omnes ad Christi fidem vocat, qua
nihil aliud est quam ingressus in vitam.—Cato. in John iii. 15, 16.
author of approved learning and worth, avoucheth the same sense. "And this," saith he, "he more clearly expresseth, when being to name those whom God so loved, he doth not mention Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob, Moses, David, the prophets, the Virgin Mary, the apostles, or holy martyrs, but the world, which our evangelist in his epistle affirmeth to lie wholly in wickedness, and of which Christ himself more than once affirmeth the devil to be the prince."*  

So that this writer, by the world, doth not understand the elect only, or the world of the elect, whereof the devil is no where affirmed by Christ to be the prince, nor which is any where affirmed by John to lie wholly in wickedness, but the world at large, and which comprehended reprobates as well as the elect. But of all our reformed divines, there is none speaks more expressly and professedly to the mind of the interpretation held forth, than learned Musculus. "By the world," saith he, speaking of the Scripture in hand, "he understands the universe of mankind: so that here his love of the world, and his love of men, is the same."  And elsewhere, thus: "After the same manner it is in this redemption of mankind whereof we speak. That reprobates and desperately wicked men partake not of it, is not through any defect of the grace of God: nor is it meet that, for the sons of perdition' sake, it should lose the glory and title of an universal redemption, since it is prepared (or procured) for all, and all are called to it."†  

Nor were there men wanting in the Synod of Dort itself, who, though anti-remonstrants by profession, yet frequently by expression did plainly close with that doctrine which they would be thought to oppose concerning the particular in hand. Our English divines lay down this thesis: "God, out of compassion to mankind being fallen, sent his Son, who gave himself a price of redemption for the sins of the whole world." In the explication of this thesis they say, "That price which was paid for all, and which shall certainly benefit all that believe, yet shall not benefit all men," &c. And presently after, "So then Christ died for all men, that all and every one, by the mediation of faith, may, through the virtue of this ransom, obtain remission of sins and eternal life."‡  

* Et hoc quidem clarissim exprimit, quando eos nominaturus quos ita dilexerit Deus, non Abrahami, aut Isaac, aut Jacob, Mosis, Davidis, prophetarum, Marie Virginis, apostolorum, deique et sanctorum martyrum meminit, sed mundi, quem totum in malo jaeere evangelista Abrahami aeternam vitam, et orationem suam, patefacta in medio universae, linguae orationis, in mecum posuit. —Bened.  

† Sic Deus dilexit mundum, &c. Per mundum enim intelligit universum genus humanum; ut hic φωλοκοσμία idem sit quod φωλοκοσμία.—Musco. loc. de Philanthropia Dei. Ad eum modum habet et redemptionis ista generis humani, de qua loquimur, quod illam homines reprobati ac deplorati impifi non acceperit, neque defectu sit gratiae Dei, neque justum est ut illa proper filios perditionis, gloriam ac titulum universalis redemptionis amittat, cum sit parata cunctis, et omnibus ad ilam vocentur.—Idem. Loc. de Redempt. Gen. Humanis.  

the world," understand his love of compassion to all mankind, in-asmuch as not a part or some, but the whole and all particulars of mankind, were fallen. Besides, saying, "that all and every one" may "through the mediation of faith obtain forgiveness of sins and eternal life through the virtue of Christ's ransom," they clearly imply that remission of sins and salvation are purchased by Christ for all and every man upon the same terms and after the same manner, and with the same intention on God's part, inasmuch as he intends the donation of remission of sins unto no man, not-withstanding the virtue of the ransom of Christ, but through the mediation of faith; and through this mediation he intends, yea, promises, it unto all men without exception; yea, so say our countrymen, that all and every one may through the said mediation obtain it. Nor were these men altogether without company in that Synod in such expressions. Immediately after the suffrage and sentence of the ministers of Geneva upon the second article, I find one (I suppose of those who were sent from Geneva) delivering himself thus: "There is a certain common love of God towards all men, wherewith he loved all mankind, being fallen, and seriously willeth or desireth the salvation of all." Afterwards, speaking of the condemnation of unbelievers, "such an event as this," saith he, "is not of itself intended by God, but accidentally follows through the default of men." Yet again, "If this redemption be not sup-posed as a common benefit bestowed upon all men, that indifferent and promiscuous preaching of the gospel which was committed to the apostles to be performed in all nations will have no true foun-dation."* Doubtless, that which is bestowed upon all men by God, was by him intended for all men in the purchase or procure-ment of it, and this out of love to all those on whom it is bestowed and for whom it was purchased. It were easy to multiply quo-tations of like import with these from many convened in that Synod, who are supposed to have condemned that doctrine which holds forth universal redemption by Christ for an error; but the certain truth is, that if this was their intention or attempt, the truth was at many turns too hard for them, and prevented them, and gained many a testimony from her adversaries.

For the fathers, they who shall please to peruse and ponder the commentaries or exposition of Austin, the chief of the Latin fa-thers, and of Chrysostom, the chief of the Greek, upon the place, will easily perceive that their sense of the word world was the same with that which hath been avouched. "Is not Christ life?" saith the former, "and yet Christ died; but death died in the death of Christ, because life, being dead, slew death: the fulness of life de-

* Est communis quodam Dei φιλανθρωπία, qua dilexit totum genus humanum lapsum, et serio omnium salutem voluit. Et paulo post (locutus de damnatione incredulorum:) Hie autem eventus per se non intendentur ad Deos: sed per accidens hominis culpa sequitur. Et postea: Si hae re-demptio tanquam commune beneficia, omnium hominum impensa, non supponatur, in-ferens et promissa predicatio evangelii apostolis commissa, apud omnes gentes obeunda, nullum verum fundamentum habebit.
voered death: death was swallowed up in the body of Christ."* In all these passages evident it is that the Father speaks of that death which had equally seized upon all men, or whereunto all men, without exception of any, were alike obnoxious: therefore, affirming this death to be dead by the death of Christ, to be devoured by the fulness of life, &c., he supposeth it equally dead, devoured, removed or taken away in respect of all men. Awhile after, having rehearsed these words, "For God sent not his Son to judge the world, but that the world should be saved by him," he infers thus: "Therefore, as much as lieth in the physician, he came to save or heal the sick. He slayeth himself who will not observe the precepts of the physician. He came a Saviour unto the world. Why is he called the Saviour of the world, but that he should save the world?"† Doubtless, he that speaketh these things had not yet dreamt of any signification of the world in the Scripture in hand, but only that which we have asserted; nor did he imagine that Christ was given or sent into the world upon any other terms than those which equally and indifferently respected the healing of all that were sick, or the saving of all that were lost: otherwise why should he insert this provisional clause, "as much as in the physician lieth," meaning Christ? This plainly importeth that he came to heal such sick ones, who notwithstanding slew themselves by neglecting his precepts; yea, and that he could do no more than he did in or by his death to save those from perishing who do perish, and consequently that he died as much for these as for those who are saved.

Nor, doubtless, had the other (I mean Chrysostom) any other notion of the world in the said Scripture than the former: for, describing those whom God is here said to have loved, he gives no other description of them than which agreeeth as well to the reprobate as elect, affirming them to be such "who come from the earth and ashes, who are full of an infinite number of sins, who injured or offended him without ceasing, very wicked," or deserving no pardon. And afterwards, "but we neglect" or despise "him, being naked and a stranger, who died for us. And who then shall deliver us from the punishment" or judgment "which is to come?"‡ clearly implying, that those for whom Christ died may notwithstanding suffer and undergo the wrath and punishment "which

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* Nonne vita Christus? et tamen mortuus est Christus: sed in morte Christi, mortuus est, quia vita mortua occidit mortem: plenitudo vitae deglutit mortem: absorpta est mortis in Christi corpore.

† Ergo quantum in medico est, sanare venit egrotum. Ipse se interimit, qui praecipit mediici observare non vult. Venit Salvator ad mundum. Quare Salvator dictus est mundi, nai ut salvet mundum? &c.—Aug. in Johan. tractat. 12.

‡ O γὰρ ἀθάνατος, ὁ ἀναφέρωσαν, ἡ μεγαλοσβήν ἡ ἀπειραγωγή, τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ σπέρμα, τοὺς μυρίων γίνομαι ἀμαρτημάτων, τοὺς διὰ παντὸς προσπερνοῦσας τοῦ θανάτου, τοὺς ἀγνώσαντας, τοὺς ἂγάπης—Chrys. Homil. xxvi. in Johan. Ἀλλὰ περιμενομεν αὐτὸν γιμνὸν καὶ ἔξων ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀποθανόντα; καὶ τις ἡμᾶς τῆς μελλόντης ξαφνίθεται καλάσεως;—Ibid.
is to come.” It were easy to levy many more quotations, both from the authors already mentioned, and from many others as well ancient as modern, of a full and clear concurrence with the interpretation given; but I take no pleasure in quotations from men, nor do I know any great use of them, unless it be to heal the offence which is always apt to give to prepossessed and prejudice minds. The use which more commonly is made of them is a grand abuse, being nothing else but the interposing or “thrusting of the credits and authorities of men between the judgments of men and the truth, that so the one should not easily come at the other. However, we have, I trust, made it fully evident by many demonstrations, in full conjunction with the judgments of learned men, that the Scripture in hand casteth the light of that love of God, out of which he gave his only begotten Son to death, with an equal brightness upon all mankind; and consequently, that this death of his faceth the whole posterity of Adam with the same sweetness and graciousness of aspect.

The Scripture last opened, speaking so plainly and fully (as we have heard) the point in hand, might well be accepted as a sufficient security, that all its fellows mentioned with it, as in effect they speak, so likewise they intend and mean the same thing. Yet because prejudice is froward, and hard of satisfaction, let us impartially examine one or two more of the company; we shall find universal atonement as well at the bottom as at the top, as well in the heart as in the face of them. The former of the two shall be that of the apostle Paul, “To wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them, and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation,” 2 Cor. v. 19. That by the world, which God is here said to have “been in Christ reconciling unto himself,” cannot be meant the elect only, but the universality of men, is clear upon this account: First, it is not here said, that God in Christ did actually, or in facto esse, reconcile the world unto himself, but that “he was reconciling the world,” &c., i. e. God was, and is, and ever will be (for the unchangeable perpetuation of the acts of God are usually expressed in the Scriptures by verbs signifying the time past, for the reason specified in the last chapter) by, or through Christ, following and prosecuting his great and gracious design of “reconciling the world unto himself.” Participants of the present tense active, import the currency or carrying on, not the consummation, or ending of an action, or endeavour. Secondly, By the “reconciling the world unto himself,” in, i. e. through Christ, which is here ascribed unto God, must of necessity be meant, either such an act or endeavour in him, by which he gains, or rather seeks and attempts to gain the love and friendship of the world, which was and is full of hatred and enmity against him; or else such an act, by which he went about to reconcile himself, i. e. to render and make himself propitious and
benevolent unto the world. Now, take either of these senses, it is impossible that by the word "world" should be signified only the elect, or indeed any thing but the generality of men.

If we take the act of God, here termed the "reconciling the world unto himself," in the former sense, (which doubtless is the true sense of it, as clearly appears from the next verse, and subsequent clause in this,) by the world cannot be meant only the elect, because God doth not by Christ, or in Christ, held forth and preached in the ministry of the gospel, seek to bring over these only unto him in love, or to make only these his friends; neither doth he send the word of reconciliation (as the apostle calleth it) _i.e._ the gracious message of the gospel, by which this reconciliation is to be actually made only unto them, but promiscuously to the generality, or universality of men, without exception of any, "Go and preach the gospel to every creature under heaven," Mark xvi. 15; and, therefore, Paul did but keep to his commission, when, as he saith, he "preached Christ, warning _every_ man, and teaching _every_ man in all wisdom, that he might present _every_ man perfect in Christ Jesus," Coloss. i. 28. And, 2. Evident it is, that in the ministry and preaching of this word, God doth as well and as much, and after the same manner, persuade the obstinate and many of those who never come to believe, as he doth those who are overcome and persuaded hereunto. It is said concerning the ancient Jews, that "the Lord God of their fathers sent to them by his messengers, rising up betimes and sending, because he had compassion on his people, and on his dwelling-place;" and yet it follows, "But they mocked the messengers of God, and despised his words, and misused his prophets, until the wrath of the Lord arose against his people, till there was no remedy." 2 Chron. xxxvi. 15, 16. So that God is every whit as serious, as urgent and pressing in the ministry of his word and gospel, upon those who remain obdurate and impenitent to the last, as he is upon those who in time come to repent and to believe on him. And Paul (Acts xvii.) preached the same sermon, used the same addressment and application of the word to those who mocked which he did to those who believed, Acts xvii. 32—34. Evident therefore it is, that God as well seeks and attempts the reconciling of such unto himself by Christ, who in fine perish, as he doth those who are saved; and that he doth vouchsafe as well the same inward as outward means, at least remotely unto both, shall be proved in due place.

Again, 2. If we shall take the latter sense of the phrase, wherein God is said to be "reconciling the world unto himself," and understand hereby such an act, whereby he renders or seeks to render himself loving, gracious, and propitious unto the world, neither yet can the word "world" signify any thing but the generality or universality of men, or, howsoever, not the elect in particular. The reason is, because God cannot, in any tolerable sense or construction of words, be said to reconcile himself unto those with
whom he is not angry or offended, or to render himself loving and propitious unto those to whom his love is so great already, that by reason of it he peremptorily resolves to give unto them absolutely the greatest and most desirable of all good things, even no less than eternal life itself, which includes in it the richest and fullest enjoyment of God himself, whereof the creature is capable. Now we know this is the posture, or relation, wherein the elect stand before and unto God (at least as is generally held and maintained by those that are contrary minded in the present controversy,) viz. as persons with whom God is so far from being angry or displeased, that he is pleased by absolute purpose or decree to confer eternal life upon them. Therefore certainly God cannot be said by any act whatsoever to reconcile himself, or render himself propitious unto these. But now understand the great bulk or body of men in the world, viz. as persons with whom God is so far from being displeased for their sins, so he may be said to reconcile himself unto them; at least if by a reconciling, we mean such an act, by which he takes a course, or useth means, to bring himself into a complacency, or love of friendship with them, as when a father useth means to recover his son of the phrensy, or plague. It is true, a father loves his son with a benevolent affection, or with a love of pity, as we commonly call it, even whilst he is under a phrensy, and hath the plague upon him; but he takes no pleasure in his company, doth not delight to converse with him as a friend, bestows nothing upon him at the present, but only in order to his recovery; and in case by all that he doth for him in this kind, he cannot recover him, he never proceeds to settle his inheritance upon him. But when and whilst he doth that which is proper to recover him out of such distempers, he may be said, in this sense, to do an act whereby to reconcile himself to his son, viz. to make way for himself to take pleasure in his company, and to converse with him and to deal further by him as a friend. In like manner it is as true that God cannot properly or according to the usual sense or signification of the word, be said to do any act whereby to reconcile himself to the world in general, much less to his elect in particular, because he always bears a benevolent affection to it, as appears, John iii. 16, the Scripture lately opened. So again, Tit. iii. 4, and elsewhere, he was never so far angry or offended with it, but that he seriously and affectionately sought the good of it; yet in such a sense or consideration, wherein, notwithstanding his affection of benevolence or commiseration towards it, he is said to be angry with men for their sins, and to hate them for their wickedness, and to resolve to destroy them everlastingly if they repent not, he may be said to do such an act, whereby he reconcile himself unto it, as, viz., when he doth that by which he is like to take men off from their sins, and to bring them to repentance; and consequently to cause his own anger and hatred for their sins to cease. But however, this is not the
or direct sense of the phrase in the Scripture in hand, as was formerly intimated, but only that which follows upon it. For God by seeking to reconcile the world unto himself, in the former sense, takes a course likewise to reconcile himself unto it, in the latter. But take either the one interpretation or the other, there is no colour or pretence, by the "world," to understand the elect only.

If it be objected and said: Yea, but God is here said to be "in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them." Doth not this imply that God reconciles none unto himself but those only, to whom he doth not impute their trespasses or sins? Now it is certain that God doth impute their sins unto all men, his elect only excepted: therefore he reconciles none unto himself in Christ but these only. To this I answer,

1. By concession; It is true, God doth actually, and in the event reconcile none unto himself by Christ, i.e. he brings no man to faith and repentance, but withal he forgives him his sins; or, which is the same, he imputes not his trespasses unto him. But,

2. By way of exception, I answer further, that it was no part of the apostle's intent in this place to speak of any spiritual or inward act of God, by which particular men are actually, and de facto converted or reconciled unto him, and consequently obtain forgiveness, or a non-imputation of their sins; but only concerning that great and gracious dispensation or act of grace, together with his counsel or project therein, in which or whereby he did, as it were, posture himself, and take a standing with the best advantage to save the world. For this end and purpose, I mean for the saving of the world or of men, upon such terms as he was willing, and as only became him to save them, it was necessary, 1. That he should reconcile them unto himself. It was no ways convenient for God, as neither consisting with his wisdom nor holiness, to take those into part and fellowship with himself in his own blessedness and glory, who should hate him and be full of enmity and hard thoughts against him, and would not admit of terms of reconciliation with him. 2. To effect this reconciliation, and to bring men over unto him in love, who generally through a consciousness of guilt, contracted by their evil works, and because of that contrariety between his holy laws, and their lusts and vile dispositions, hated him, it was necessary that he should take a course, and have a means suitable and proper, and which every ways became a God of infinite wisdom. Now this course or means the apostle here expresseth to be, the non-imputation of their sins unto them, i.e. the tender, offer, or promise of the forgiveness of all their sins, upon their reconcilement. God, by the proposal and tender of such an incomparable grace, favour, and blessing as this unto men, upon such sweet and gracious terms, makes account to reconcile the world unto himself, to bring off his creature, man, from their hatred and hard thoughts, to a love and honourable esteem of him. 3, and lastly, To put himself into a way or capacity of making so rich and glorious a
proposal as this of forgiveness of sins unto the world, he put him-
self, as it were, into his Christ; or, as our apostle's expression is,
he was in Christ; meaning, that that which God did, or intended to
do, by his being in Christ, as mediator, was immediately and in
reference unto a further end, that by means of his death he
might offer free pardon and forgiveness of sins unto the world; mediately,
and as more principally intended, that he might, by means of this
offer, reconcile the world unto himself, i.e. prevail with men to
repent of their sins, and turn in faith and love unto him. Evident
it is from the very letter of the context, that the apostle's
intent or purport of the gospel, or, as he calls it, of that word of reconciliation,
the ministry whereof, he saith, in the end of the verse, was com-
mitted unto him. Do but read in the former verse to this, and you
will clearly see it: "And all things are of God, who hath reconciled
us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given unto us the
ministry of the reconciliation; to wit, that God was in Christ
reconciling," &c. As if he should say, he hath given unto us the
ministry of that reconciliation, the tenor, substance, or purport whereof is
this, viz., or to wit, "that God was in Christ reconciling," &c. So
that here is nothing at all affirmed, or intended to be spoken con-
cerning men actually or effectually reconciled or brought home unto
God, or what their privileges are, in one kind or other; but
only to show how or by what means God hath projected or contrived the
reconciling of men to himself, which is expressed to be, as hath
been said, by the message or doctrine of forgiveness of sins, sent
and preached unto them by Christ.

Nor are the best and most confessedly orthodox of our reformed
divines, dissenters from the interpretation given of the Scripture
in hand, especially as concerning the sense and import of the word
world. "God," saith Musculus upon the place, "inhabiting his
Son Christ, and directing him in all things, reconciled unto himself
not us only, but even the world, i.e., all mankind, which was, is, or
shall be from the beginning of the world to the end thereof, by
giving his Son unto death for all men." And soon after: "It is
most true which the apostle saith, that God reconciled the
unto himself in Christ, not imputing their sins unto them
concerning the work itself of reconciliation, being prepared or made
ready for all mankind, and sufficient for them."* Calvin also,
though not altogether so expressly as the former, yet with clearness
enough, secondeth the same interpretation, writing on the place
thus: "But the fuller and richer sense is, that God was in Christ,
and then, that he reconciled the world unto himself." And a little

* Deus Christum filium suum inhabitans, et in omnibus dirigens, non nos modo, sed et
munendum, i.e. omne genus humanum, quod inde ab initio ad finem usque mundi fuit,
et est, et erit, sibi reconciliavit, dum filium in mortem pro omnibus dedixit.

Verum est omnino, quod dicit apostolus: Mundum sibi in Christo Deus reconciliavit, non im-
putans eas pecata ipsorum, quantum attinet ipsum reconciliationis opus, toti generi
hominis reconciliando paratum ac sufficiens.
after, “To what purpose then did God appear in Christ unto men? for reconciliation, that they who were strangers might be adopted for sons.”* If this were the end of that reconciliation for which God appeared in Christ unto men, that they who were strangers might be adopted for sons, it must needs follow, that the end which God propounded unto himself in this reconciliation, was the adoption of all men without exception, inasmuch as all men were strangers unto him. Among the ancients, Chrysostom expounds the word κόσμος, world, in the text in hand, by the word οἰκουμένην,† which properly signifies the inhabited part of the world, or the persons of men wheresoever inhabiting in all the world; in which sense it is used, Acts xvii. 31, and in very many places besides in the Scriptures.

A third text of that squadron of Scriptures yet in hand, and the last of this character that we shall insist upon, is that mentioned from 1 John ii. 2, “And he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world.” Some, to keep the light of that truth which we have now under assertion, from shining out of this Scripture in their eyes, and in the eyes of others, have essayed, amongst them, a three-fold depravation of the sense and import of these words, the whole world. By the whole world, say some, John means the elect living in all parts of the world; others, men of all sorts and conditions; others, Jews and Gentiles. Some, to avoid the like danger, I mean of being convinced of the truth, and suspecting, as they have cause enough, the security of those interpretations, take sanctuary under the wing of this distinction. Christ, say they, is a propitiation for the sins of the whole world, i.e. of all men in the world in point of sufficiency, but not by way of intention on God’s part. Yet let us afford the honour of a trial to the three interpretations mentioned.

For the first, which, by the whole world, understands only the elect, this hath been resolved into smoke already, pages 132—140, in this chapter; where, if the reader please to look back, he may see it smoking still. The other two being confederate with it, for both the one and the other are the same in substance of matter with it, and differ only in terms of explication, must needs fall with it. For both they, who by the whole world, in the Scripture in hand, understand men of all sorts and conditions, by these men of all sorts and conditions understand the elect only; and they also, who interpret Jews and Gentiles, understand no other, either Jews or Gentiles, but the elect only. So that all the three interpretations are interpretatively but one and the same. And, therefore, as in case Abraham’s son by Sarah had been sacrificed, Isaac could not have escaped; no more can any one of the three interpretations

* Sed plenior est sensus et uberior, quod Deus in Christo erat; deinde, quod ejus intercessione reconciliabat sibi mundum. Quorum ergo apparuit Deus hominibus in Christo? in reconciliationem, ut, sublatis inimicitiae, qui alieni erant adoptentur in filios.
† Ο ό δέ το παν ἐργαζόμενος, Σεός ἐστιν, ο διὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς, τῆν οἰκουμένην καταλαλάτας.
mentioned Stand, if any one of them fall, there being but one and the same faint spirit of life in them all.

That which their respective assertors plead for their legitimacy, is of no value at all. For their plea is, that the word "world," and "the whole world," do in several other places signify sometimes the elect only; sometimes, men of all sorts, ranks, and conditions; sometimes likewise, Jews and Gentiles; and hereupon they conclude, that they may admit of the same sense and signification, both in the Scripture in hand, and in all the other Scriptures usually brought upon the theatre of discourse, for the same end and purpose with it. But the mouth of this plea is easily stopped. For

1. The determinate signification of a word in one place, is no argument of the same sense or signification of it in another place. Elohim, Gen. i. 1, signifieth him who is by nature θεός, John xxvii. 3, a true God subsisting in three persons; but this is a weak proof that it is to be taken, or that it may be taken in the same sense, Psal. lxxxi. 6, where the prophet introduceth God speaking thus to, and concerning the rulers of the earth: I have said, "Ye are Elohim," or gods. That the word κόσμος signifieth, 1 Peter iii. 3, as it is translated, "adorning," is no argument at all that it so signifieth John iii. 16, or in twenty places besides where it is used. Nay, in one and the same period or sentence, where the same word is twice used, it does not follow that because it is used, and must necessarily be taken in such or such a sense, determinately, in one of the places, therefore it must be taken in the same sense likewise in the other. As for example; where Christ saith to the scribe, "Let the dead bury their dead," Matt. viii. 22, because in the first place, by dead, are meant persons spiritually dead, or dead in sins and trespasses; it no ways follows from hence, that therefore it signifieth such as are spiritually dead in the latter place. So likewise in that passage of our Saviour, "Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again; but whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst," &c., John iv. 13, 14; by water, in the first place, he clearly meaneth that common and material element commonly known by the name of water; but in the latter, water analogically only, and spiritually so called, viz. the gift of the Spirit, as himself interpreteth, John vii. 39; iv. 14, compared. Therefore, to heap up a multitude of quotations from the Scriptures, wherein the word "world," or "the whole world," doth or may signify either a certain species, or determinate kind of persons living up and down the world, or men of all sorts and conditions, or Jews and Gentiles; and from either an evidence, or possibility of any, or all of these significations in these places, to infer either a necessity or possibility of a like signification of the words, either in the Scripture in hand, or in those other places argued in this chapter, is but to beat the air, or build upon the sand.

2. If the said words, either may be taken, or necessarily must be taken, in the places so multiplied, in any of the said significations, it is a sign that there is a sufficient ground of reason in the con-
texts respectively, to enforce either the necessity or possibility of such significations. Now then to infer or suppose, either a like necessity or possibility of the same signification, where there is no sufficient ground in the context to enforce either, which is the case in hand, but many sufficient grounds to overthrow such significations, as hath been in part already, and shall, God assisting, be out of hand further manifested, as concerning the texts insisted upon in this and the following chapter, is as if I should prove that such or such a man must needs be a prisoner at London, because he is a prisoner in York; or that he hath the liberty of the Tower of London, because he may walk where he pleaseth within the liberties of York Castle. The signification of words in one place, is not to be adjudged by their signification in another, unless both the contexts stand uniformly, and impartially affected towards this signification.

3. That neither of the two texts already opened, will at any hand endure any of the three significations of the word "world," lately mentioned as pretended unto, hath been argued into the clearest evidence. That the text in hand no whit better comports with any of them than they, appeareth thus:

1. If any of the said three significations of "the whole world," should be here admitted, the apostle (or rather the Holy Ghost by the apostle) must be supposed to speak after no better rate of reason than this, "Christ is the propitiation not for our sins only, but also for the sins" of some few particular men besides, whom you know not, or of some few persons, as well of the Gentiles as of the Jews. For none of the three interpretations amounts to any thing more than this, as is evident. They who interpret, that Christ is the propitiation for the sins of Jews and Gentiles, by Jews and Gentiles do not mean the two great divisions of men in the world commonly distinguished by these names, in all the particulars of either division, (for this is the sense and interpretation which we contend for,) but that small and comparatively inconsiderable remnant of both, who in conclusion come to be actually saved. There is the same consideration of the two other interpretations. Now what weight, or worth of notion, or savour of sense there should be, in informing the Christians here written unto, that Christ was the propitiation for some few men's sins besides theirs, or as well as theirs, I yet understand not.

2. The natural and plain inclination of the context, leads to the interpretation and sense of "the whole world" contended for. For the apostle doth not simply say, that "Christ is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world," but he saith it by way of an emphatical antithesis, or addition to this saying, that he was "the propitiation for their sins." "And he is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." This last clause, "but also for the sins of the whole world," is clearly added by way of augmentation or further strengthening to the ground of their faith and comfort. Now evident it is, that there will be little or nothing found in it tending
to any such end, as the further enlargement of their comfort, or strengthening to their faith, above what the former clause presented, but rather that which will be prejudicial and ensnaring unto both, unless these words, "of the whole world," be taken in their comprehensive signification, I mean for all men in the world without exception. For to say thus unto a believer, or to a professor of the faith of Christ, who is doubtful about the grounds of his faith, and but weak in the comfort of it, (which was apparently the condition of those to whom John writes this epistle, and in consideration whereof that very clause we now speak of was added to the former,) "Christ is the propitiation for the sins" of the elect, or of some few particular men, must needs rather add to their doubtings than their faith, and augment their fears rather than their comforts; yea, and would take from rather than add to that ground of consolation, which he had administered in the former clause, "and he is the propitiation for our sins." For when I am in suspense, and doubtful in my spirit whether Christ died for me, or be a "propitiation for my sins," or no, how should it any ways tend or condue to my establishment, for me to know or consider, that Christ died for his elect, or for some particular men, both of Jews and Gentiles, and for some only? Hath not such a doctrine, or consideration as this, fuel in it to increase the burnings of my fears within me, instead of water to quench or allay them? Or can I be ever a whit the more strengthened to believe that Christ died for me, by believing that he died for some particular men? Or must not my fears in this kind, I mean, whether Christ died for me, or no, needs be the more provoked and enraged within me, by considering, that Christ died for some few particular men only? Or doth such an assertion as this, that Christ died for some particular men, though never so substantially proved, though never so effectually believed, any ways enable, or dispose me to believe, that I am one of those particular men for whom he died? Nay, rather, must not a ruminating or feeding upon such a notion, or conception as that, falling in conjunction with the weakness and doubtfulness of my faith, together with the sense and conscience of many corruptions and infirmities otherwise, of necessity involve and perplex me with so much the more grievous and inextricable fears, that I am none of those particular men, none of those few for whom alone Christ died? Therefore any of those restrained interpretations of "the whole world," which we have opposed, do most manifestly oppose the plain scope and drift of the Ghost, which was, as hath been proved, the strengthening or encouragement of their faith upon rich and excellent terms; whereas the true interpretation of the words, and that which we hath the fairest and fullest consistence with such an intent, which can lightly be imagined. For the consideration, that Christ by his death became a propitiation, or made a full atonement for the sins of all men, without exception, as it tends to magnify "the unsearchable riches" of the grace "of Christ," on the one hand,
and so is proper to strengthen the hand of every man's faith; so, on the other hand, it throws down every mountain, and fills every valley, removes all obstructions, takes away all impediments, clears all scruples, and so prepares a plain and smooth way for every man to come unto Christ by believing, yea, and cuts off all occasions of relapses, or faintings in faith afterwards.

How it comes to pass, and how it may well stand with the justice of God, that, notwithstanding the death of Christ for the sins of all men, yet all men are not saved, shall be taken into consideration in due time and place.

Concerning the distinction mentioned, of Christ's dying sufficiently for all men, but not efficaciously or intentionally, on God's part, as it was first hammered out by workmen of no great credit with us for spiritual building, (the schoolmen, I mean,) so is it built upon a false foundation or supposition, as viz. that intentions are attributable unto God upon the same terms in every respect wherein they are competitive unto men, the contrary whereof hath been undeniably proved, chap. iii.; where likewise it was particularly argued and made good, that God is, and very properly may be, said to intend, whatsoever he vouchsafeth proper and sufficient means to effect, especially with a command to improve or use them accordingly, whether the thing be effected or no. So that to affirm and grant, that Christ died sufficiently for all men, and yet deny that he died intentionally for all men, is to speak contradiction, and to pull down with the left hand what a man hath built up with his right. Certainly he that levyeth and employeth a proportion of means sufficient and proper for the bringing of any thing to pass, must needs, in one sense or other, in one degree or other, be supposed to intend the bringing to pass of such a thing. Nor is it any dishonour at all unto God, nor in the least unworthy of him, that he doth not always attain his ends, or things intended by him, no more than it is that sin should be committed in the world, notwithstanding his opposing it by his authority, law, and threatenings, though in strictness and propriety of speech it is most true, that God never fails of his intentions or ends, if by intentions and ends we mean only such things which are absolutely and positively intended by him. But in this sense the actual salvation of particular men, under any other consideration than as believers, is none of his intentions. "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son," (not simply or absolutely that the world, i.e. every man, no nor yet that any man should be saved, or "have everlasting life,") but that "whosoever believeth" should have it. So that the absolute and positive intentions of God concerning the salvation of men, are not concerning the salvation simply of men, or of any man as such, but of believers; and of such intentions as these he never faileth, or suffers disappointment. But of this we spake liberally in the third chapter.

Besides, If Christ died sufficiently for all men, either God intended this sufficiency of his death for or unto all men or not.
If not, then was the glory or sovereign worth of this death of his, besides the intentions of God. God did not intend any such completeness of merit or satisfaction in his death as were in it. But this, I presume, tempteth no man's thoughts or belief. If, then, God did intend the sufficiency of his death for or unto all men, why may it not be said, that he intended his death itself accordingly? and so, that Christ died intentionally, on God's part, for all men? The word sufficiently is no terminus dimensionis, no term of diminution. Therefore the argument follows roundly: if God intended the sufficiency of Christ's death for all men, then he intended his death itself for all men; and, consequently, Christ died not sufficiently only, but intentionally also for all men. And so the distinction vanisheth.

Thirdly, How can he, who payeth nothing at all for a man, nor intends to pay any thing, be notwithstanding said to pay that which is sufficient for him? Suppose a man be in debt, and in danger of imprisonment for it, can a sufficient payment be said to be made for him, whether any thing at all be paid for him, or in order to the keeping of him from imprisonment or no? When nothing at all is paid for a man that is a great debtor, but that he remains as much a debtor and in as great danger as before, can that which is sufficient or enough for him, or for his discharge, be said to be paid for him, unless, haply, it be in a sense very delusive and deriding, in which sense, doubtless, Christ did not pay any ransom for any man? Suppose a man should pay a great sum of money only for the redeeming of John and Peter, being captives, by which money he might if he had pleased have ransomed me also, and a thousand more, being in the same condition of captivity with them; can this man, by reason of the payment of such a sum as this upon the terms specified, be said to have paid that which is sufficient to ransom me? or is that sufficient to ransom me, which was only paid for the ransom of another?

Fourthly, If there were a sufficiency in the death of Christ for all men, or for the salvation of all men, and God not intend it for all men, but for a few, a number inconsiderable only, then will the death of Christ be found rather matter of dishonour or disparagement unto him, than of honour. Suppose a man were possessed of a very great estate in gold, silver, and other the good things of this life, whereby he is able to relieve the necessities of all his neighbours round about him, who are generally poor, and that to inevitably perish; in case this man should resolve to relieve only three of these indigent persons with this his abundance, and throw the rest of it into the midst of the sea, than minister any more of them, though they be many thousands, and every whit as necessitous and as well deserving as the other; these would be a blot rather, and reproach, than an honour or matter of repute to this man, and declare him to be of a very unnatural, ignoble,
and inhuman spirit? In like manner, if God shall have satisfac-
tion, merit, and atonement before him, abundantly sufficient to
save the whole world from perishing everlastingly, and shall pur-
pose rather to let it be “like water split upon the ground, which
cannot be gathered up,” than dispose of it towards the salvation of
any more than only a small handful of men, comparatively, leaving
innumerable souls to perish irrecoverably, and without mercy;
would not this abundance of merit and satisfaction, upon such an
account as this, be, in the eyes of all considerate men, an ob-
scuring veil over the mercy, love, goodness, and bounty of God,
and occasion the creature to judge of him, as a God rather envying
than desiring the peace and welfare of men? And if God so
deeply abhorred the fact of Onan, “in spilling the seed upon the
ground, lest he should give seed unto his (deceased) brother,” that
he slew him for it, Gen. xxxviii. 9, 10, how dare men present him
so near unto communion in such a fact, as the spilling, inter-
verting, or non-consigning of the far greater part of the merit of
the death of Christ unto men, lest they should be saved, would
render him?

Fifthly, If Christ died sufficiently for all men, and not inten-
tionally, as, viz. not for reprobates, so called, then he died as
much for the devils themselves as he did for the greatest part of
men. Because his death, in respect of the intrinsical value and
worth of it, was sufficient to have redeemed the devils as well as
men. Yea, if the sufficiency of the price paid by Christ, be a
sufficient ground to bear such a saying as this, that he died suffi-
ciently for all men, he may be said to have died, not only for
reprobates as reprobates, and so for unbelievers as unbelievers,
(viz. sufficiently) but for the devils also, quatenus devils: inas-
much as there is no defect imaginable in the price we speak of,
in respect of the absolute and inherent dignity, value, or worth of
it, but that all these, even under the considerations mentioned,
might have been redeemed by it as well as the elect. But that
Christ died for reprobates as reprobates, and for devils as devils, in
one sense or other, were never yet, I conceive, the sayings or
thoughts of any man, nor, I suppose, ever will be; certain I am,
cannot reasonably be.

Sixthly, and lastly, As yet there hath no sufficient ground been
shown, either from the Scriptures, or from principles of reason,
for the distinction under contest, nor, I believe, ever will be, or
can be. Therefore they who distinguish between Christ’s dying
for all men, sufficiently and intentionally, opposing the one to the
other, affirming the former, and denying the latter, do not only go
about to set lambs together by the ears, which will not fight, but
also speak things most unworthy of God, and which render him a
far greater deluder or derider of his poor creature, man, than a
benefactor or well-willer to him, in all his declarations and profes-
sions of love unto him, in the gift of his Son Jesus Christ to make
his atonement, and procure redemption for him.
Upon consultation had with the premises, with other considerations, haply, of like import, some of the greatest and most learned opposers of universal redemption, Piscator and Beza by name, have stigmatized the aforesaid distinction, (at least that member of it wherein Christ is said to have died sufficiently for all men,) as harsh, barbarous, homonymous; yea, the former of the two as absolutely false. "That expression," saith Beza, "Christ died for the sins of all men, sufficiently, but not efficaciously, though in a rectified sense it be true, yet is it extremely harsh, and no less ambiguous than barbarous. For the particle for imports either the counsel of the Father, according to which Christ suffered, else the effect itself of his sufferings, or rather both; whereas neither of them belong to any but the elect."* Piscator to his antagonist, thus: "The proposition laid down is false, viz. that Christ died sufficiently for every particular or single man; this is thy assertion. For Christ died most sufficiently for the elect, paying the price of their redemption, I mean his precious blood, that blood of the Son of God. But for reprobates Christ died neither in one kind nor other, neither sufficiently nor efficaciously."†

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CHAPTER VI.

Wherein several texts of the second sort of Scriptures propounded, Chap. V., as holding forth the Universality of Redemption by Christ, are discussed.

The first of these Scriptures there mentioned was this: "Who gave himself a ransom for all," or for all men, "to be testified in due time," 1 Tim. ii. 6. Let the context adjoining to this Scripture be narrowly sifted, and then, if we shall but grant that the apostle speaks either sap, sense, savour, or any thing congruous to the judgments or understandings of men, we shall not be able to deny but that it carries the doctrine asserted with a high hand of evidence in it. Evident it is, that the apostle in this verse goes on with the confirmation or further proof of that reason of his, laid down verse 4, for the making good what he had said verse 3. That which he had said in this third verse is this: "For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour." This is good, mean-

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* Illud, Christus mortuus est pro omnium hominum pecatis sufficienter, sed non efficaciter, esti recto sensu verum est, dure tamen admodum et ambiguo non minus quam Barbare, dicitur. Illud enim, pro, vel consilium Patris, ex quo passus est Christus, vel ipsius passionis effectum, vel politus utrumque designat, quorum neutrum ad aliquem, quam ad electos spectat.—Beza ad Acta Coloc. Monypol. part ii. p. 217. Vid. eundem in Thesibus cum D. Fayo in Schola Genevensi disputatis de efficacite Sacrifici Jesus Christi.

† Exprimitur enunciacium fideum: nemo Christum pro singulis (pro singulis alia) mortuum sufficienter. Nam Christus pro solis electis mortuus est sufficientissime, pretio redemptionis pereatuto, nemo pretioso sanguine suo, sanguine nimirum illo filii Dei. At pro reprobis nullo modo mortuus est Christus, sive sufficienter dictas, sive efficaciter.—Fisc. contra Scheffmann.
ing the performance of that duty whereunto he had exhorted verses 1 and 2, viz., that "Supplications, prayers, intercessions, giving of thanks, should be made for all men, for kings, and for all that are in authority," &c. Now then, most evident it is, that by all men, in this first verse, for whom prayers, &c. are to be made unto God, is not meant some of all sorts of men, nor yet all the elect or the like, but all of all sorts of men whatsoever, except haply those who have barred up the way of our prayers for them, by that unpardonable sin against the Holy Ghost, as John intimates, 1 John v. 16. For that which followeth verse 2 clearly evinceth it; "For kings, and for all in authority." Certainly if this be good and acceptable in the sight of God, that we should pray for all of one sort or degree of men in the world, especially for all in authority, (in which sort or rank of men there are many as unworthy and incapable of our prayers as in any other,) it is good and acceptable in his sight likewise, that we should pray for all in all other ranks or sorts of men whatsoever. For there is nothing imaginable to cause a difference in this point. So then, to prove that it is "good and acceptable in the sight of God to pray for all men," without exception, the apostle layeth down this ground, verse 4: "That God will have all men to be saved." If now by all men in this reason we shall understand only some of all sorts of men, or all the elect only, we shall shorten the arm of the apostle's argument so far that it will not reach half way towards that conclusion, for the proof whereof it is brought, and so shall make him reason very weakly, and, indeed, ridiculously, as, viz., after this manner: "It is good and acceptable in the sight of God that we should pray universally for all men, without exception of any, because God will have all his elect to be saved, or some out of every sort of men." There is little savour of an argument in this; whereas the rationality and strength of the apostle's arguing, rightly understood, is pregnant and full of conviction. "It is good and acceptable in the sight of God" that we should pray for all men, without exception, because his will is to have all men, without exception, saved. The strength of this argument lieth in this ground, or clear principle in reason, viz., that a conformity unto his own will, in the will and endeavours of men, is, and must needs be, "good and acceptable in the sight of God." Now then to prove that God's will is, that all men without exception, should be saved, the apostle brings this reason, in the words in hand, viz., that "Christ Jesus gave himself a ransom for all men." So that πᾶν ἄνθρωπον, all men here, in this reason, must of necessity be of the same extent, with the same word in the doctrine or conclusion which was to be proved; otherwise we shall make the apostle stumble at that stone in arguing, at which only novices, or lyers-in-wait to deceive, are wont to stumble, as viz., when there is more put into the conclusion than into the premises. That which here lay upon the apostle's hand to prove, was, as hath been undeniably evicted, that God's will is to have all men, without exception, saved. Now, to prove this by such an argument or assertion as
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this, that Christ gave himself a ransom either for all his elect, or for some of all sorts of men, or for some as well Gentiles as Jews, and for no others, is as if I should undertake to prove the bountifulness of a prince towards all his subjects, being many, by such an argument as this, that he sent by a special servant of his very great rewards to two or three of them, but resolved to do nothing at all for any more of them. Therefore, universality of redemption by Christ is the most unquestionable doctrine of the apostle in this Scripture.

The next specified in the said catalogue or inventory, was, "Because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead; and that he died for all, that they who live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him who died for them, and rose again," 2 Cor. v. 14, 15. We see the apostle's judgment here is very clear, that Christ died for all; he once clearly supposeth it; "if one died for all," i. e., since one died for all, the particle if, being ratiocinantis, not dubitantis, as in twenty places besides, meaning Christ; and once plainly asserteth it, "and that he died for all," i. e., we also judge that he died for all. That which is commonly given in by way of answer to this and other Scriptures, both of the former and latter import, by those who look another way in the controversy in hand, is not much considerable. But that which it is, is this: they pretend that both the word "world" and such terms of universality as these, "all," "all men," "every man," &c., in many places of Scripture used, and accordingly are to be taken and understood in a restrained signification; as sometimes for many or greater numbers of men; sometimes for some of all sorts; sometimes for Jews and Gentiles, or the like. From whence they would infer, that therefore such terms and expressions as these are in the Scripture in hand, and in the others formerly cited for our purpose, to be taken in some of these limited significations; and not in the rigour or extent of what they properly signify, as viz., for an absolute and unlimited universality of men. For to this we answer,

1. By way of concession, most true it is, that these notes or terms of universality, "all," "all men," "every man," &c., are in many places of Scripture necessarily to be taken in some such limited and restrained signification as is affirmed. But then,

2. I answer further, by way of exception, four things:

(1.) That neither the terms we speak of, nor any other words or expressions in Scripture, are in any other case, or upon any other pretence whatsoever, to be taken out of their proper and best-known significations, but only when the tenor of the context or some circumstance of the place doth necessitate and enforce such a construction of them. Now, evident it is, by what hath been formerly argued upon the Scriptures alleged, that there is no necessity at all in respect of any the respective contexts, nor of any circumstance in any of them, to understand the said terms of universality any otherwise than in their most proper, i. e., in their most extensive and comprehensive significations.
(2.) That which is more than this, we have evidently proved that the very tenor of the several contexts wherein the aforesaid places are found, doth absolutely enforce and necessitate us unto such a proper and comprehensive signification of the said terms of universality, as hath been contended for: so that there can be no reasonable, regular, or grammatical sense or construction made of those places, unless such a sense of these terms be admitted.

(3.) To reason thus, These, or these words or terms, are to be taken in this or in that sense in such and such places of Scripture; therefore they must or they may be taken in the same sense in such and such other places of Scripture, is to reason ourselves into a thousand errors and absurdities: as for example, evident it is, that in that Scripture, John xviii. 16, where it is said that Peter stood at the door, by the word door is meant a door of wood or some such material; but it would be ridiculously erroneous to infer from hence that therefore it is to be taken, and may be taken, in the same sense in John x. 9, where Christ saith, "I am the door." So again, when Paul saith that Christ sent him "to the gentiles to open their eyes," Acts xxvi. 18, evident it is, that by the word eyes he means their inward eyes, their minds, judgments, and understandings; but from hence to conclude that therefore when David saith that "the idols which men make have eyes," Psal. cxvi. 5, the word eyes is to be understood or may be understood here also in the same sense, is to conclude that which common sense itself abhorreth. So that the weakness of all such arguings or pleadings as this—"All," "all men," "every man," are in these and these places of Scripture to be taken in a limited sense, for some of all sorts of men, for Jews and Gentiles, or the like, therefore they are to be taken in the same sense in all others where they are found—is notorious and most unworthy of considering men. Though, whilst a man is a prisoner, he cannot go whither he desires, but must be content with the narrow bounds of his prison; it doth not follow from hence, that therefore, when he is discharged and set at liberty, he must needs continue in his prison still, especially when his necessary occasions call him to another place, whither also he hath a desire otherwise to go.*

We have, as concerning the former Scripture, evidently proved that the terms "all men" must be of necessity taken in their most proper, free, and unlimited significations; and shall, God assisting, demonstrate the same in those yet remaining. Let us at present, because the place in hand is pregnant and full to our purpose, evince, above all contradiction, that the words "all," or "all men," in it cannot, with the honour of St. Paul's intellectuals, be understood otherwise. "Because we thus judge," saith he, "that if one died for all, then were all dead: and that he died for all, that they who live," &c. Observe that clause of distribution, "that they who live." "We judge that Christ died for all, that they who

* See more upon this account in the preceding Chapter.
live,” i.e. that all they, without exception, who recover, and are, or shall be delivered from this death by Christ for them, “should not live,” &c. So then, if by the word “all” or “all men,” for whom the apostle here judgeth or concludesthat Christ died, we shall understand the universality of the elect only, “for all men,” i.e. for all the elect, and for these only, we shall grievously misfigure the fair face of a worthy sentence, and render it incongruous and inconsistent with all rules and principles of discourse: for then the tenor of it must rise and run thus: We judge that Christ died for all the elect, that all the elect who shall live and be recovered from death by Christ, should not live, &c. Doth not the ears of every man’s reason, yea, of common sense itself, taste an uncouthness and unsavouriness of sound in such a texture of words as this? Yea, doth not such a carriage of the place clearly imply that there are or may be some of the elect themselves who shall not live or be restored from death by Christ, and consequently shall not be bound upon any such engagement to live unto him? Doubtless, if by the word all the apostle had meant all the elect, and these only, he would not have added, “that they who live,” but rather, that they or these might live: for these words, “that they who live,” clearly import a possibility at least, yea, a futurity also, i.e. that it would so come to pass, that some of those all, for whom Christ died, would not live, and consequently would be in no capacity of living from themselves to live unto him. The uncouthness and senselessness of such interpretations as these was somewhat more at large argued in the next preceding chapter; but now let us take the word πάντες, all, in the proper and due signification of it, viz. for the generality or universality of men, the sense will run clear, and have a savoury and sweet relish with it: “Because we thus judge,” i.e. upon clear grounds and principles of reason, argue and conclude, “that if one died for all men, then were all men dead;” i.e. obnoxious unto death, dead in law, as good as dead, otherwise they should not have had any need that another should die for their preservation; “and that he died for all men,” i.e. we further also judge and conclude that he died for all men, with this intent or for this end amongst others, “that they who live,” i.e. that whosoever of those, for whom he thus died, shall be saved by this death of his for them, “should,” in consideraion of, and by way of signal thankfulness for such a salvation, “not live unto themselves,” i.e. only or chiefily mind themselves whilst they live in the world, in their carnal and worldly interests, “but unto him who died for them and rose again,” i.e. promote his interest and affairs in the world, who so notably engaged them hereunto by dying for them, and, by resuming his life and being after his death, is become capable of their love and service to him in this kind. In such a carriage of the place as this, there is spirit and life, evidence of reason, commodiousness of sense, regularity of construction, no forcing or straining of words or phrases, or the like; whereas, in any such expostions which contract the signification of the word πάντες, all men,
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either to the elect, or to any lesser number of men than all, there will be found an universal disturbance in the sentence, nothing orderly, smooth, or clear.

By the way, the apostle in saying that Christ died for all men, that they who live should not live unto themselves, &c., doth not intend to confine the duty of thankfulness for Christ's death only unto the saints, or those that are put into an estate of salvation by it, as if wicked men and unbelievers owed him no service at all upon that account; but only shows, that Christ expects or looks for no such denial of themselves for his sake at the hands of any, but of theirs only who come actually to taste and partake of the great benefit and blessing of his death. Thus then we see, that the word "all," or "all men," though in some place or places it may, yea, of necessity must signify only some men, or some parts of all men, yet in others, and particularly in those two lately insisted upon, it must with the like necessity signify all men without exception.

4. And lastly, for the word "world," which was the term of contention in the former head of Scriptures, though I deny not, but that in some places it signifies only some part of men in the world, and not the entire universality of men, as Luke ii. 1; Acts xix. 27, and frequently elsewhere; yet that it any where signifies precisely that part of the world which the Scripture calls the elect, I absolutely deny, neither hath it yet been, nor, I believe, ever will be proved; and the rather, because the Holy Ghost delights still, as some instances have been given in Chap. V., and more might be added without number, to express that part or party of men in the world, which is contrary unto the saints, and which are strangers and enemies unto God, by "the world." This by way of answer to that exception or pretence against the exposition given of the Scriptures alleged, viz. that the word "world," and those general terms all and every man, are sometimes used in a restrained signification.

Concerning the exposition given of the Scripture last argued, were it not clear and pregnant enough by the light wherein it hath been presented, further countenance might be given unto it, by showing what friends it hath amongst our best and most approved authors. Among the ancients, Chrysostom is generally esteemed, and that worthily, the best interpreter of the Scriptures. His sense of the place under debate is plainly enough the same with ours. "For," saith he, writing upon the place, "He (meaning Christ) had not died, or would not have died, for all, had not all died or been dead." In which words he clearly supposeth, that Christ died for as many as were dead, and consequently for all, without exception, inasmuch as all, without exception or difference, were dead. A little after, thus: "for it argueth an excess of much love, both to die for so great a world, and to die for it being so affected or disposed as it was."*

* Οὐ γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ πάντες ἀπίθανον, ὑπὲρ τῶν τῶν ἀπίθανων. Καὶ γὰρ πολλής τῆς ἀγάπης ἡ υπερβολή, καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ τοσαύτης οἰκομένης, καὶ οὕτω διακειμένης ἀποθανεῖν.
the least, if not equal to the greatest. Yet he also gives the right-
hand of fellowship to the interpretation given upon the place. "But
Christ," saith he, "died not only for his friends, but for his
enemies also; not for some men only, but for all, without exception.
This is the unmeasurable or vast extent of the love of God." But
the cause we plead needs no such advocates as these, being potent
enough with its own evidence and equity, and therefore we shall
retain no more of them.

A third text of Scripture presented upon the same account with
the former, was, "— that he by the grace of God should taste
death, νηπὶ παντὸς, for every man," Heb. ii. 9. This clause importeth
that universality of atonement made by the death of Christ, which
we maintain more significantly, if more may be, and with less
liableness to any evasion or shift, than any of the former, places
engaged in the warfare. To show that the Lord Christ, though
clothed with a body of flesh, wherein he was capable of dying as
well as other men, yet did not suffer death simply through the
malice or power of his enemies, but upon an account far superior
to these. The apostle attributes his death to the grace of God,
i. e. the love and gracious affections of God, not towards some,
or a few, no, nor yet towards all men collectively taken or in the lump,
but towards all men distributively taken, i. e. towards every parti-
cular and individual man. "Τοῦτον παινῶν," saith the Holy Ghost,
forg every man;" i. e. to procure eternal redemption and salvation
for every man, without the exclusion of any. I cannot apprehend
what can reasonably be said to alienate the mind or import of this
Scripture from our present cause. Evident it is, and you shall find
our best interpreters of the place affirming the same, that the apos-
tle in these words, "that through the grace of God he might taste
death," &c., assigns a reason, or two rather, of what he had
little before concerning the incarnation and humiliation of Christ, whom he had in the former chapter asserted to be the Son
of God, to prevent or heal any scandal or offence that either had
already, or might afterwards arise in the minds of these Hebrews,
through the unlikelihood, strangeness, or incredibleness of such a
thing. It is a saying among philosophers, and all men have experi-
ence, in part, of truth in it, that a knowledge of the reasons or
causes of things causeth admiration, and so all troublesomeness of
thoughts about them to cease. So then, the apostle's drift and
intent in these words mentioned, being to satisfy the Hebrews con-
cerning such a strange, wonderful, and unheard of thing, as, 1.
That the Son of God should be made man; and, 2. That being made
man, he should suffer death; it is no ways credible but he
should, 1. Assign such a cause as would carry the greatest
of satisfaction in it; and 2. Express himself in such perspicuity and
plainness of words, that they might not lightly mistake his meaning,
lest by occasion of his words they should first apprehend the

* Christus verò non pro amicis tantum, sed et inimicis; non pro quibusdam tantùm, sed pro
omnibus mortuus est. Hæc est immensa Divina dilectionis amplitudo.
reason or cause assigned by him, to be more weighty or considerable than he intended it, and afterwards should come to understand that it was far lighter and less considerable; their scandal and offence, instead of being healed or prevented, would be more strengthened and increased, as usually it comes to pass in such cases. Now, evident it is, 1. That the apostle's words in this place, "That He, through the grace of God, should taste death for every man," in the plainest, the most obvious and direct sense and signification of them, hold forth the doctrine which we maintain for truth, here being no restraint at all, nor the least whispering of any limitation to be put upon that term of universality, παντὸς, every man; and 2. As evident it is, that the death of Christ for all men, without the exception of any, which is the doctrine we assert, and the grace of God so intending it, amount to a far more weighty consideration and satisfaction, touching those great dispensations spoken of, (the incarnation and humiliation of the Son of God,) than his dying only for a few, or for a select number of men, and the grace of God commensurable hereunto. Therefore there is not the least question to be made, but that the large, and not the limited sense, was the apostle's sense in the words now under debate. And when the Holy Ghost expresseth himself, as we have heard, "That he, through the grace of God, should taste death for every man," for any man to come and interpret thus, for every man, i.e. for some men, or for a few men, which, if not for form, yet for matter and substance must be their interpretation who oppose the exposition given, is not to interpret, but to correct, and to exercise a magisterial authority over the Scriptures.

Nor had Pareus himself the heart to decline the interpretation asserted, though he seems somewhat desirous by some expressions, to hide this his ingenuity from his fellows, to avoid their offence, "Whereas," saith he, "the apostle saith, for every man, it respects the amplification, or extent, of the death of Christ. He died not for some few; the efficacy, or virtue, of it appertains unto all. Therefore there is life prepared," (or made ready,) "in the death of Christ, for all afflicted consciences," &c.* The truth is, that there can be no solid ground of peace or comfort to any afflicted conscience whatsoever, without the supposal of Christ's death for every man, without exception, as hath been argued in part, page 153, &c. of the former chapter; and might be further evicted above all contradiction. Amongst the orthodox fathers, Chrysostom, who, as we heard, avouched the exposition given of the former Scripture, stands by his own judgment and mine, in his explication of this. "That he, through the grace of God, should taste death for every man; not only," saith he, "for the faithful, or those that believe, but for all the world." He indeed died for all men. For what if all men

* Quod dicit, ἑνὶ παντὸς, ad fructum mortis Christi amplificandum pertinet. Non pro paucis aliquibus mortuus est: sed ad omnes efficacia ejus pertinet. Omnibus igitur afflictis conscientiis in morte Christi vita parata est, &c.
do not believe? yet he hath done his part," * or fully performed
that which was proper for him to do.

The Scripture next advancing in the fore-mentioned troop was,
"Who will have all men to be saved," (speaking of God,) "and to
come unto the knowledge of the truth," 1 Tim. ii. 4. Whereunto
(for conformity in import) we shall join the last there specified,
which is this: "The Lord is not slack concerning his promise,"
(as some men count slackness,) "but is long suffering to us-ward, not
willing that any should perish, but that all should come to re-
pentance," 2 Pet. iii. 9. Concerning the former of these places,
we clearly evinced, in page 158 of this chapter, from the unques-
tionable tenor and carriage of the whole context, that by "all men,"
cannot possibly be understood, either some of all sorts of men, or
Jews and Gentiles, or all the elect, or the like; but of necessity, all
of all sorts of men, simply and universally, without the exception
of any, whether Jews or Gentiles. Any other interpretation or
sense of the words, πάντας ἀνθρώπους, all men, but this, renders the
apostle palpably impertinent and weak (that I say not ridiculous) in
his arguing in this place. This I plainly demonstrate in the place
above cited: I now add, that if it be said that God will have all men
to be saved, because he will have some of all sorts of men to be
saved; it may more properly and truly be said of him, that he will
have all men to be destroyed, at least in their sense, who hold an
irreversible reprobation of persons personally considered, from
eternity, because not simply some, but a very great part of all sorts
of men, now extant in the world, will in time perish, and that ac-
cording to the decree or will of God; the tenor whereof is, that all
persons dying in impenitency and unbelief shall perish. Yet the
Scriptures do no where say upon any such account as this, either in
terminis, or in substance, that God will have all men to perish, and
not to come to the knowledge of the truth. Which is somewhat
more than a topic argument, that God is not therefore said to will
that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth,
only because he will have some, some few of all sorts of men to be
saved, and come to this knowledge: but simply because his will is
to have all men, without exception, (viz., as they are men, and
whilst they are yet capable of repentance,) to be saved, and in order
thereunto to come to the knowledge of the saving truth, i.e. the
gospel. Nor doth it follow, that the will of God is changeable, in
case he should will the same man as this day to be saved, and so on
the morrow to perish, but only that such a man is changeable, as
we shall further show, God willing, in due time. Now then, if it
be the will of God to have all men, without exception, saved, &c.,
most certain it is that Christ died, and intentionally on God's part,
for all men, without exception; because it is not imaginable

* "Οὗτες χάριτι θεοῦ ὑπὲρ πάντος γεύσηται θανάτου, οὐκὶ τῶν πιστῶν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς οἰκείας ἀπάσης. Ἀντὶς μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανε, τί γὰρ, εἰ μὴ πάντες ἐπίστευσαν; αὐτὸς τὸ ἦλθων πεπλήρωκε.
God should be willing to have those saved for whom he was unwilling that salvation should be procured.

The latter of the two Scriptures lately brought upon the theatre of our present discourse, acts the same part with the former. There it is said of the Lord (Christ) that he is not "willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance." If so, then certainly there neither was, nor is, nor ever shall be any, for whom Christ was not willing, did not intend, to die, and to purchase repentance. So that his death was intentionally for all men, as well in respect of himself, as of God the Father. Besides those slimy evasions and shifts of making bondmen of Christ's freemen, I mean of an arbitrary and importune confining the expressions importing a simple and absolute universality, in such Scriptures as these, to petty universalities, as of the elect, of species, sorts, or kinds of men, &c., (the nakedness whereof hath been detected over and over), our adversaries in the cause in hand are wont to take sanctuary from such Scriptures as the two now in debate, under the wing of this distinction. "It is true," say they, "God wills that all men should be saved, and so that all should come to repentance, voluntate signi, with his signified or revealed will; but this doth not prove but that voluntate beneplaciti, with the will of his pleasure, or purpose, he may be willing that many, even far the greatest part of men, should perish." But to show the vanity, or at least the impertinency of this distinction to the business in hand:

1. I would demand of those who lean upon the broken reed of this distinction, in opposition to the clear and distinct sense given of the two Scriptures last mentioned, what they mean by their voluntas signi, the signified or revealed will of God; and wherein the opposition or difference lieth between this and that other will of God, which they term the will of his good pleasure or purpose? If by his signified or revealed will, they mean only the precepts or commandments of God concerning such and such duties, which God would have practised and done by men, (which is all the account that some of the greatest opposers in the point in hand give of it,) I do not understand how, or in what respect, God can be said to will the salvation of all men, or that none should perish. For, 1. Salvation actively taken, is an act of God himself, not of men; and consequently cannot be said to be a duty enjoined by him unto men, and therefore not to be willed neither by him, by way of precept or command. 2. Salvation, passively taken, is not an act, but a state or condition; and consequently is no matter of duty; and so cannot be said to be willed by God in such a sense.

If by the signified or revealed will of God, in the distinction now under canvass, be meant the declaration which he hath made in his word concerning the final or eventual salvation or condemnation of men, evident it is, that neither in this sense can he be said
to will the salvation of all men; because he hath declared and signified unto the world that few comparatively will or shall in fine be saved.

If it be pleaded, that in this sense God may be said to will the salvation of all men with his signified or revealed will, because he enjoins faith and repentance unto all men, which are the means of salvation; and he that enjoins the means, may, in a consequential way, be said to enjoin the end in the same injunction, I answer,

1. If God enjoins faith and repentance unto all men, it argues that he preacheth the gospel unto all men; and consequently, that they who have not the letter of the gospel preached unto them by books or men, as many heathen nations have not at this day, yet have the spirit, substance, and effect of the gospel preached to them otherwise, as, viz. by the creation and gracious government of the world, which is, as I have shown elsewhere,* purely evangelical and corresponding with the Scriptures. But how this will stand with our adversaries' judgment in the case depending, I understand not.

2. It is the sense of one of the greatest patrons of the adverse cause, that “the precept or injunction of God is not properly the will of God;† because,” saith he, “he doth not hereby so much signify what himself willeth to be done, as what is our duty to do.” I confess that no signification whatsoever, whether of what a man willeth or decreeth to be done, or of what is the duty of another to do, can properly be said to be the will of the signifier; but yet that will, wherewith or out of which God willeth or commandeth us to do that which is our duty to do, is as properly his will as that whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done. My will or desire that my child should obey me, or that he should prosper in the world, is as properly my will as that whereby I will or purpose to show the respects of a father unto him in providing for him; being as proper, natural, and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within me whereby I will the former, as that act itself of this faculty wherein I will the latter is: for the principle or faculty within me of willing, how numerous or different soever the acts of willing which I exert by virtue of this faculty may be, is but one and the same; and this faculty being natural, there can be no such difference between the acts proceeding from it which should make some to be more proper and others less, though some may be better and others worse. But this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God; therefore, if the precept or preceptive will of God be not properly his will, neither can any other will of his, or any other act of his will, be properly such. If so, then that will of God, or act of will in God, whereby

† Mandatum Dei non est voluntas Dei proprie dicta; quia illo non tam significet quid ipse vult fieri, quam quid nostri officii sit facere.—Dr. Turesse. Vindicata Gratiae, &c. p. 171.
he willeth or enjoineth faith and repentance, and consequently salvation, unto all men, is as properly his will as that whereby he willeth the salvation of any man. Therefore, if there be any secret or unrevealed will in God, whereby he willeth the destruction of any man at the same time when he willeth the salvation of all men, (be it with what kind of will soever,) these two wills must needs interfere and contradict the one the other. Nor will that distinction of the late-mentioned author salve a consistency between them, wherein he distinguisheth between the decree of God and the thing decreed by him, affirming that “the thing which God decreeth may be repugnant to or inconsistent with the thing which he commandeth, though the decree itself cannot be repugnant to the command.”* The vanity of this distinction clearly appeareth upon this common ground, viz. that acts are differentiated and distinguished by their objects: therefore, if the object of God’s decreeing will, or the thing decreed by him, be contrary to the thing preceptively willed or commanded by him, impossible it is but that the two acts of his will, by the one of which he is supposed to will the one, and by the other the other, should digladiate and one fight against the other: therefore, certainly, there is no such pair or combination of wills in God as the distinction of voluntas signi and beneplaciti (as applied in the question in hand) doth suppose. It is impossible that I should inwardly and seriously will or desire the death of my child, and yet at the same time seriously also will and enjoin the physician to do his best to recover him.

Again, if God enjoin faith and repentance unto all men, with a declaration that he enjoineth them in order to their salvation, or with a promise that, upon their obedience to this injunction of his, they shall be actually saved, then can he not at the same time will with a secret will the condemnation of any. But most evident it is, that unto whomsoever he enjoineth faith or repentance, he enjoineth them in order to their salvation, and with promise of actual salvation upon their obedience to this injunction, Matt. xvi. 16; Acts iii. 19; John xx. 31, &c. Therefore, impossible it is, that he should secretly intend, will, or purpose the destruction of any to whom he enjoins faith and repentance. The consequence in this argument is so rich in evidence, that it needs no proof. If a prince should inwardly and resolvedly determine to put such or such a malefactor to death, and yet by proclamation or otherwise promise him his life or a pardon upon condition he would reform his course, would this be a strain of divine perfection, or like unto one of the ways of God?

There is a sense, I confess, wherein the distinction now in consideration may be admitted. If by the signified or revealed will of God he meant nothing else but such declarations or manifestations made by God, which, when made by men, are signs of a will, pur-

* Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata pugnare posse dicimus; decretum vero Dei cum mandato pugnare posse non dicimus.—Tissius, ubi supra.
pose, or desire in them, suitable to their respective tenors and imports, (which is clearly their sense of this member of the distinction who were the first coiners of it, I mean the schoolmen,)* there is no inconvenience in granting a revealed will in God distinguished from or opposed unto a will of good pleasure or of purpose in him. This sense makes no opposition of wills in God, nor yet between things willed or purposed by him; but only showeth or supposeth that the will and good pleasure in God extendeth not to the actual procurement of obedience from men unto all those laws or commands which he judgeth meet to impose upon them; or, which is the same, that God hath not positively decreed that all men or shall be necessitated by him to live in subjection to all those laws which he hath appointed unto them. This sense is orthodox, and blameable, but holds no intelligence with that opinion which supposeth one will in God, according unto which he willeth all men to be saved; and another, according unto which he willeth the far greatest part of men to be damned, and both antecedent. For otherwise, two such wills as these are fairly and clearly enough consistent in him. God, according to the distinction of the will of God into antecedent and consequent, first set on foot by some of the fathers, Chrysostom, and Damasen by name, and since made use of by the schoolmen, may, with the former, be said to will the salvation of all men; and yet with the latter be said also, in a sense, to will the condemnation of the greatest part of men. His antecedent will, the distinction being admitted as it ought to be, having so clear a foundation in Scripture, respecteth men simply as men; his consequent will relateth to them as considerable under the two opposite qualifications, or immediate capacities of life and death, or of salvation and condemnation; the one of these faith persevered in unto death, the other, final impenitency or unbelief. According to the former of these wills, God is said to will the salvation of all men, partly because he vouchsaeth a sufficiency of means unto all men whereby to be saved; partly also, because he hath passed no decree against any man which either formally, or consequentially, or in any consideration whatsoever excludeth any man, personally considered, from salvation before he voluntarily excluseth himself by such sinful miscarriages and deportments, which, according to the revealed will of God, render him incapable thereof. According to the latter of these wills, as he peremptorily willeth the salvation of all those who are faithful unto death; so doth he as peremptorily will the condemnation of all those who shall not be found in the faith of Jesus Christ at their end. The latter, through their own deplorable and voluntary carelessness and negligence, proving to be in number far the greater part of men, God, upon this supposition, and in a consequent way, may be said to will the condemnation of the greatest part of men, and the salvation only of a few, comparatively. But of these things more hereafter.

* Aqu. Sum. part i. qu. 19. art. 12. in Cor.
In the meantime, evident it is from the Scriptures argued, that Christ died intentionally for all men, without exception, considered as men; and that there was nothing more procured, nor intended to be procured, thereby for one man than another, personally considered, or simply as men. Only this was intended in this death of Christ, in the general, that whosoever, whether few or whether many, should with a true and persevering faith believe in him, should actually partake of the benefit and blessing of this his death in the great reward of salvation; and on the other hand, that whosoever, whether few or whether many, should not believe in him with such a faith, should, upon this account, be excluded from all participation in the great blessing of salvation purchased by his death, notwithstanding the purchase was as much made, and intended to be made for them as for those who come actually to inherit; even as the marriage feast in the parable was as much provided, prepared, and intended for those, who upon their invitation came not, as it was for those who came and actually partook of it; unless we shall say that the king who made this feast intended it not for those whom, notwithstanding, he solemnly invited to it, and with whom he was highly displeased for their refusal to come, being invited, Matt. xxii. 3, 4, &c. And that the death of Christ, and the gracious intentions of God therein, did, and do equally and uniformly respect all men, is abundantly manifest from that declaration made by the Lord Christ himself on this behalf, formerly opened; "So God loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life," John iii. 16. Those words, "that whosoever believeth on him should not perish," &c., evidently import indifferenced and impartial intentions on God’s part towards men in the gift of his Son.

The last Scripture of the division yet in hand was this, "Therefore as by the offence of one, the judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto the justification of life," Rom. v. 18. Evident it is, that the apostle in this passage compareth the extent of the condemnation which came by the sin of Adam, with the extent of the grace of justification which came by Christ, in respect of the numbers of persons unto whom they extended respectively, and finds them in this point commensurable the one unto the other. The persons upon whom the gift of justification cometh by Christ, are made equal in number unto those upon whom the judgment of condemnation came by Adam. For as the offence of Adam is here said to have come upon all men unto condemnation, so also is the gift of justification of life, i. e. of such a justification upon which, and by means whereof, men are saved, which comes by Jesus Christ, said to come upon all men likewise. Now to say, that all men in the former clause is to be taken properly and signifies all men, indeed, without exception of any, which all expositors grant without exception of any, but in the latter improperly and with limitation,
yea, with such a limitation, which comparatively, and a few only excepted, excludes all men, there being not the least ground or reason in the context to vary the signification of the words, or to make them to signify more in the one clause and fewer in the other, is to exercise an arbitrary dominion over the expressions of the Holy Ghost, and to invent and set up significations and senses of words at pleasure.

Nor doth it at all ease the matter, to say or prove, that in other places of Scripture this word πᾶντες, all men, signifies not all without exception, but only a great number, or all of one particular sort or kind of persons; because,

1. If it can be proved that in other places of Scripture it so signifies, I mean not all without exception, but only some greater number or numbers of men, it seems then there is a reason why it should or must so signify in these places; otherwise, it could not be proved that there it so signifies. But here is no reason at all to be given why it should be taken out of the proper and native signification, or signify any lesser number than all men simply. Now to refuse the proper signification of a word, where there is no other reason why it should be refused, but only because it is to be refused where there is a reason, and so a necessity, to refuse it, is as if one should persuade a man that is hungry to forbear meat whilst he may have it, because he must forbear it when he cannot get it. When the context or subject matter doth require a by, less proper or limited signification of a word or phrase, this signification is put upon them by God. But when there is no occasion or necessity, either in respect of the one or of the other, why such a signification should be put upon them, now if it be done, the doing of it is arbitrary, and from the lawless presumption of men. How much more when men shall do it, not only without any sufficient ground or reason, but against reason? which is the case of those, viz., all men in the latter clause of the verse in hand, will needs stand only some men, and these but few comparatively. For,

2. Though one and the same word or phrase, is sometimes to be taken in a different signification in one and the same period or sentence, as elsewhere is observed, yet this is no where to be done, but where there is manifest and pregnant reason for the doing of it, as in these and the like cases. “Let the dead bury their dead,” Mat. viii. 22. So again, “Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again; but whosoever shall drink of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst more,” John iv. 13, 14. There is a plain reason why by the “dead,” in the end of the former of these places, should be meant such as were naturally or corporally dead, viz. because such only are to be buried with that kind of burial, whereof our Saviour had occasion to speak, as appears from the former verse. Again, why by “the dead” in the beginning of the said passage, should be meant those that are spiritually dead, and not those that are corporally dead, there is this reason, every whit as plain as the former, viz. because those that are naturally or corporally dead, are not
capable of burying those that are dead, either with one kind of burial or other. So why the word "water," in the latter of the passages mentioned, should in the first place signify material or elementary water; in the latter, spiritual water or the Holy Ghost, reasons are obvious and near at hand; we shall not need to name them. But why the words, πάντες άνθρώπους, all men, in the place of the apostle under debate, being twice used, should be conceived so far to vary in their significations as in the former clause, to signify all men without exception; in the latter, very few men, no like reason, nor indeed any competent, can be given.

3. Though "all men" doth in some places signify only a greater number of men, not all men simply or universally, yet it never signifieth a small number of men, either in opposition to or in comparison with a greater, least of all with the greatest number that is, as they must make it signify in the Scripture in hand, who will have no more signified by it, in the latter of the two clauses where it is used, than only those who come in time to be actually saved by Christ. For these are a very small number, "Few there be," saith Christ, "that find it," speaking of the strait gate which leadeth unto life, in comparison of those upon whom condemnation came by Adam.

4. If condemnation should come upon all men simply by the offence of Adam, and righteousness only upon some men, and these but a few neither, comparatively, by the obedience and gift of Christ, then where sin abounded, grace should not superabound, as the apostle saith it did; nay, sin should superabound, and grace be confined to a narrow compass, comparatively. To say that the superabounding of grace above sin here spoken of, is to be considered in the intensiveness of it, i.e., in its prevalency over sin where it is vouchsafed, not in the extensiveness of it, as if it extended to more persons, is thus far acknowledged for a saying of truth. Grace doth not extend to more persons than sin, at least not to more persons of men, because sin extendeth unto all, and grace cannot extend to more than all. But if we shall straiten and limit grace in respect of the extent of it, to a small number of persons, as viz. unto those only who are or shall be actually saved, the glory of the superabounding of grace above sin in respect of the prevalency of it, where it is in such a sense given, will be fully matched or rather overcome and swallowed up by the prevailing extensiveness of sin above grace.

5. The apostle, both before and after, as viz. verses 15 and 19, computeth the condemned ones of Adam and the justified ones of Christ, by one and the same numerical expression. He tells us in both places of many dead by Adam, and of no fewer than many justified and redeemed by Christ. Now what the Holy Ghost makes equal for men to disequalize, especially to such a proportion or degree that the one number shall be inconsiderable, and as nothing in comparison of the other, is to lift up themselves above their line, and so take hold of vanity instead of truth. The apostle's