Foreknowledge
Does God repent? - Bible Answer Man clarifies
Submitted by drwayman on Wed, 02/01/2012 - 9:38amThe classic King James Version of the Bible says, “It repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart” (Genesis 6:6). Elsewhere, God says, “It repenteth me that I have set up Saul to be king for he is turned back from following me, and hath not performed my commandments” (1 Samuel 15:11). If God is perfect, how could he repent?
First, the Bible unequivocally teaches that God is perfectly good and thus incapable of doing evil (Psalm 5:4–5; James 1:13; 3 John 1:11). As such, God’s repentance must not be understood as entailing moral guilt. Indeed, the moral perfection of the Creator sets him apart from his sin–tainted creation (Leviticus 11:44–45; 19:2; 20:7; 1 Peter 1:15–16).
Jack Cottrell - Understanding God: God and Time
An article by Arminian Theologian Jack Cottrell.
Cottrell speculates about God’s relation to time, and the nature and extent of God's foreknowledge. Is God timeless (outside of time)? Or does God experience time in some sense (everlasting)? Cottrell argues that God does experience time, but that he is metatemporal – God experiences his own time, and also created our time.
The Fallacies of Calvinist Apologetics – Fallacies #12 & #13: The Arminian View of Divine Foreknowledge Attacks God’s Simplicity and Immutability
Submitted by JC_Thibodaux on Fri, 07/22/2011 - 2:12pmRelated Fallacies:
Conflation
Hasty Generalization
Oversimplification
Tim Prussic attempts to salvage his hopeless case after I pointed out his fallacious reasoning concerning God's aseity. Tim makes a tenuous appeal to divine simplicity; in his words,
The Fallacies of Calvinist Apologetics – Fallacy #11: The Arminian View of Divine Foreknowledge Attacks God's Aseity
Submitted by JC_Thibodaux on Wed, 07/20/2011 - 1:28pmRelated fallacies:
Non Sequitur
Equivocation
Special Pleading
One apparent ramification of holding to both libertarian free will and God's omniscience is that God (apparently) derives His knowledge of our choices from us, since our choices ultimately come from us. A while back I had a run-in with a Mr. Tim Prussic, who employed an argument I've seen before: Calvinists who hold to exhaustive determinism will often argue that God having knowledge that is in some way based upon human will undermines His aseity.
Defining "Aseity"
Nelson’s Dictionary of Christianity Gets it Wrong: Examining the So Called "15 Major Tenets of Arminianism"
Submitted by Ben Henshaw on Wed, 06/08/2011 - 12:46pmAbout a year ago I engaged in a conversation with someone who kept misrepresenting Arminian and Wesleyan teaching while insisting that his claims were “historical facts”. This person kept making reference to the “15 Major Tenets of Arminianism” to back up his claims. I had no idea what this could be a reference to since I was not familiar with any document written by Arminius or the Remonstrants that went by such a name. As it turns out, the so called “15 Major Tenets of Arminianism” is a sub-title given under the heading “Arminianism” in Nelson’s Dictionary of Christianity. Below is a critique proving that these 15 tenets are far from representative of Arminian theology.
The 15 Major Tenets of Arminianism are:
1. Human beings are free agents and human events are mediated by the foreknowledge of God.
Arminianism, Calvinism, Open Theism & Universalism
Submitted by neborg on Fri, 05/27/2011 - 10:00amHere are some thoughts of SEA members on the relationship between
Arminianism, Calvinism, Open Theism, and Universalism. Sometimes
Calvinists accuse Arminianism of being the stepping stone to Open
Theism or Universalism, but is this accusation really founded?
It is true that there is a relationship between the different groups,
but in some ways, it is actually Calvinism that is closer to Open
Theism and Universalism.
Book Review: Whedon's Freedom of the Will
Submitted by Godismyjudge on Thu, 04/28/2011 - 10:57amJohn Wagner recently edited and republished Daniel Whedon’s Freedom of the Will: A Wesleyan response to Jonathan Edwards. The book is an outstanding refutation of Edward’s Inquiry into the Will. Whedon seeks and engages top authors and arguments like Hobbs’ argument (later adopted by Locke and Edwards) that free will is incoherent, because it either amounts to a causeless cause or infinite regression of causes. Whedon responds by pointing out 1) the will is the cause of choice (74); 2) defining indeterministic causes (38-39); and 3) explaining that indeterministic causes account for either choice (71-72). In other words, indeterministic causes explain the goal of our choices (or reason for our choices), but the will is the cause we choose this goal, not that goal. This is essentially agent causation.
Josh Thibodaux, "More on the Authorship of Sin (Part 3)"
Submitted by SEA on Tue, 04/12/2011 - 1:41pmMore On the Authorship of Sin (Part 2)
Submitted by JC_Thibodaux on Mon, 04/11/2011 - 9:27amThis is the second of a series on the authorship of sin that came about as a result of discussions and observations on this post. Part 1 and the first section of this post address Calvinist claims that Arminians “also make God the author of sin.”
Conflating Origins
When discussing authorship implying the origination of sin, the argument inevitably arises, “but if sin originates in people, people still originate from God, therefore sin originates from God as well!” Not quite. Beings capable of sin originated from within God, it doesn’t follow that their rebellion itself came from within Him.
The Theological Fatalist's Modal Fallacy
Submitted by bossmanham on Wed, 03/09/2011 - 2:49pmTheological fatalists posit that God's foreknowledge of future events mean that it is not possible for anything other than what happens to happen. Since God knows every event that will happen, then aren't those events necessary?
This mode of thinking works out like this:
1) Necessarily, if God foreknows x will happen, then x will happen
2) God foreknows x will happen
3) Therefore, necessarily x will happen
which would take the form:
□ P -> Q
P
___
□ Q
But this is a non sequitur. All that would actually follow from the premises displayed is Q. In terms of God's foreknowledge, all that would follow is that x will happen, not that necessarily x will happen.
Theological fatalists have tried to remedy this by positing that the second premise is also necessary. So the argument would go:
1) Necessarily, if God foreknows x will happen, then x will happen
2') Necessarily, God foreknows x will happen
3) Therefore, necessarily x will happen